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I. Introduction
In recent cases involving substantive challenges' to the death
penalty, several members of the United States Supreme Court have
favored jettisoning all benchmarks but the "evolving standards of de-
cency" test for determining whether a death penalty is cruel and unu-
sual in violation of the Eighth Amendment. Because of this trend,
and because of the uncertainty of how newer members of the Court
will view the doctrinal construct for determining constitutionality, it is
necessary to assess the validity of the evolving standards test and to
determine whether it should be employed as the sole determinant of
what constitutes cruel and unusual punishment in the death penalty
context. This Article therefore critiques the construction of the
"evolving standards of decency" test for cruel and unusual punish-
ments under the Eighth Amendment, specifically in the death penalty
context.
This Article demonstrates that the consequence of the Supreme
Court's current death penalty jurisprudence on the evolving standard
1. The phrase "substantive challenges" is used here to denote those challenges to
death sentences for certain classes of offenders, while the phrase "procedural challenges"
refers to those that protest the manner in which the penalty was imposed. A death sen-
tence may be cruel and unusual either for the offender on whom it is imposed or for the
offense for which it is imposed, see generally infra notes 64-208 and accompanying text, or
because the procedures employed by the state to determine the appropriateness of death
result in the intolerable arbitrary infliction of death. See generally infra notes 220-302 and
accompanying text.
EVOLVING STANDARD OF DECENCY
of decency is a pro-death,2 self-fulfilling constitutional construct, and
that the evidence gleaned from the "objective indicia" of jury sentenc-
ing behavior and legislative enactments can be and has been rigged to
favor death. This rigging is accomplished through the creation of pro-
cedural rules that slant juror decisionmaking toward death sentences
and the selective evaluation of legislative enactments. This Article
concludes that because of the manipulability of the prongs of the test,
there must be other checks on the death penalty.
Toward those ends, Part II of this Article sets forth the doctrinal
underpinnings of the Supreme Court's death penalty jurisprudence.
Part III then traces the application of that doctrine by examining the
Court's assessment of both substantive and procedural challenges to
death sentences since 1976. Examination of the substantive chal-
lenges will reveal the Court's basic Eighth Amendment analytical con-
struct and the schism in the Court over the propriety of sole use of the
evolving standards test, which looks to jury sentencing behavior and
legislative enactments as objective gauges of contemporary commu-
nity values. This section also discusses the doctrine governing death
penalty procedure in order to place the more recent procedural deci-
sions in context.
Part IV then sets forth the rigging of the evolving standards test
by looking first at what jury sentencing behavior is likely to show
about the evolving standard as a consequence of the Court's more
recent rulings. Specifically, this Article surveys the various procedural
rules that impact both the constitution of the jury and jury decision-
making, thus affecting jury sentencing behavior. This Article exam-
ines the Court's jurisprudence concerning antisympathy instructions,
victim impact evidence, mitigating circumstances evidence, vague ag-
gravators, and death qualification of juries. Even if valid justifications
exist for each of these lines of doctrine, this Article argues that the net
effect of the decisions is to stack the sentencing deck in favor of death,
which then results in a greater likelihood of jury decisions imposing
death. When the Supreme Court takes up the question of the consti-
tutionality of a death sentence and uses evidence of jury sentencing
behavior to determine the "evolving standards of decency," the results
are, to a great extent, predetermined: juries will have imposed death
more often because of the effects of the procedural rules, the "objec-
2. Another commentator has scrutinized the pro-death nature of the Court's death
penalty jurisprudence through an examination of the Court's habeas corpus decisions.
Anthony G. Amsterdam, In Favorem Mortis: The Supreme Court and Capital Punishment,
14 HUM. RTs. A.B.A. SEC INDWJDUAL Rrs. & RESP. J. 14 (Winter 1987).
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tive index" of societal standards of decency will show a favoring of
death sentences, and the analysis will be steered toward the inevitable
conclusion of constitutionality. The validity of using jury sentencing
behavior as an "objective" gauge of the evolving standards of decency
is thus put into question.
The rigging of the evolving standards test is further demonstrated
through an examination of the Court's selective evaluation of legisla-
tive enactments to ascertain the evolving standards of decency. In
cases challenging the imposition of death on a certain class of offend-
ers, a majority of the Court has looked only to enactments in those
states that authorize capital punishment and has not factored the leg-
islative decisions of abolitionist states into the calculus. This selective
examination itself skews the analysis of the evolving standards by ex-
cluding evidence of general, and thus necessarily specific, opposition
to the death penalty. The resulting "standard" is therefore more
death-inclined. The remainder of Part IV evaluates the propriety and
effect of that selective sampling in relation to the rigging of the evolv-
ing standards test.
Finally, Part V proposes that to counteract the self-fulfilling na-
ture of the constitutional construct as it has evolved over the last sev-
eral terms, the Court must remain faithful to its original methods of
assessing the constitutionality of the death penalty for classes of of-
fenders or for certain crimes. The Article concludes that the Court
should consider the international response to the death penalty and all
legislative action regarding capital punishment, even in abolitionist
states. The Court should also continue to conduct its own assessments
of proportionality and penological justification as additional constitu-
tional benchmarks to prevent the self-fulfilling nature of the constitu-
tional construct from eliminating any real constraint on the penalty.
H. Doctrinal Underpinnings of Current Death Penalty
Jurisprudence
Since the 1972 decision of Furman v. Georgia,3 the United States
Supreme Court has refined its Eighth Amendment death penalty ju-
risprudence in evaluating both substantive and procedural aspects of
state death penalty statutes. Today, the Court examines statutes to
determine not only whether the punishment itself is one that comports
with the requirements of the Eighth Amendment, but also whether
the manner of the sentencer's arrival at that punishment comports
. 3. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
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with the Amendment's requisites. Thus, under the current formula, a
state death penalty statute must leap various substantive and proce-
dural constitutional hurdles if it is to be upheld under an attack chal-
lenging it as cruel and unusual under the Eighth Amendment.
A. Substantive Limits on Capital Punishment
In Gregg v. Georgia,4 the Court delineated the general contours
of Eighth Amendment analysis, stating that the determination of
whether a punishment is "cruel and unusual" under the Amendment
requires an evaluation of the punishment under society's "evolving
standards of decency."' The Court ascertains those evolving stan-
dards by looking to certain objective indicia.6 Additionally, the Court
has measured a punishment for excessiveness according to its further-
ance of penological goals and its proportionality to the blameworthi-
ness of the offender.7 Hence, if a sentence of death in a particular
case or for a particular class of offenders does not further any of the
recognized penological goals, or is too extreme in relation to the of-
fender's blameworthiness, then the sentence may be considered exces-
sive or "cruel and unusual" punishment in that case or for that class.
These tests will be examined in turn.
1. "Evolving Standards of Decency"
In the first decision since Furman to uphold a state death penalty
statute against an Eighth Amendment challenge, the three-member
4. 428 U.S. 153 (1976) (plurality opinion). The judgment of the Court was set out in
the plurality opinion of Justices Stewart, Powell, and Stevens. Id. at 158. Those three Jus-
tices also authored the opinions and announced the judgment of the Court in four other
cases decided the same day as was Gregg- Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976) (uphold-
ing a death penalty statute, similar to Georgia's scheme in Gregg, except that judge rather
than jury imposed sentence); Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976) (upholding the constitu-
tionality of Texas's death penalty scheme, which permitted the imposition of death when
the jury answered in the affirmative to three statutorily-enumerated questions); Woodson
v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976) (holding North Carolina's mandatory death penalty
scheme unconstitutional); Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 (1976) (holding unconstitu-
tional Louisiana's mandatory scheme). Justices Brennan and Marshall dissented in sepa-
rate opinions to Gregg, Jurek, and Proffitt. See Gregg, 428 U.S. at 227 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting), 231 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
5. 428 U.S. at 169-77. See infra notes 14-19 and accompanying text. The death pen-
alty as a general proposition has historically been considered "decent" under societal stan-
dards. See infra notes 10-13 and accompanying text.
6. See infra notes 17-23 and accompanying text.
7. See infra notes 25-37 and accompanying text. But cf. Herbert L. Packer, Making
the Punishment Fit the Crime, 77 HARV. L. REV. 1071, 1074 (1964) (arguing that these
questions are more appropriately considered as governed by substantive due process con-
siderations, rather than by Eighth Amendment commands).
Winter 19961
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plurality in Gregg v. Georgia8 established the general principles
against which an Eighth Amendment "cruel and unusual punishment"
claim is measured.9 The opinion first noted that in the earliest Eighth
Amendment cases, courts only examined the method or mode of exe-
cution and that "[t]he constitutionality of the sentence of death itself
was not at issue."'1 The Justices pointed to the "long history of ac-
ceptance" of capital punishment in this country, illustrated by its im-
position by many states under the common law, its existence at the
time the Bill of Rights was ratified, and its continued use into the
twentieth century. 1 The Gregg plurality found that acceptance of the
death penalty as a punishment was also indicated by various provi-
8. 428 U.S. 153 (1976) (plurality opinion). The plurality opinion first addressed the
more general question of whether the death penalty is always cruel and unusual punish-
ment and held that it was not. Id. at 187. The opinion then examined the particular statute
at issue and determined whether it violated the Eighth Amendment on procedural
grounds. Id at 196-207 and see infra notes 41-49.
9. For discussions of the history and meaning of the cruel and unusual punishments
clause, see Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 314-28 (1972) (Marshall, J., concurring);
RAOUL BERGER, DEATH PENALTIES: THE SUPREME COURT'S OBSTACLE COURSE 29-58
(1982); Hugo A. Bedau, Thinking of the Death Penalty as a Cruel and Unusual Punishment,
18 U.C. DAViS L. REv. 873, 892-97 (1985); Anthony F. Granucci, "Nor Cruel and Unusual
Punishments Inflicted": The Original Meaning, 57 CAL. L. REV. 839 (1969).
10. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 170. A method of punishing by death was struck down, how-
ever, if it was "barbarous" or more akin to "torture." Id. These early cases thus seemed to
focus more on the "cruel" portion of the clause. See generally id. & n.17; Furman, 408 U.S.
at 376-79 (Burger, C.J., dissenting); kd at 378 (stating, as of 1972, that the cases decided
under the Eighth Amendment "reveal[ ] an exclusive concern with extreme cruelty"). In
Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958), a case not involving the death penalty, the Court none-
theless opined that:
[wlhatever the arguments may be against capital punishment, both on moral
grounds and in terms of accomplishing the purposes of punishment-and they are
forceful-the death penalty has been employed throughout our history, and, in a
day when it is still widely accepted, it cannot be said to violate the constitutional
concept of cruelty.
Id. at 99. In attempting to demarcate some boundaries of the "cruel and unusual punish-
ments" clause short of death, but recognizing that the precise contours had not been de-
fined, the Court cautioned that "the existence of the death penalty is not a license to the
Government to devise any punishment short of death within the limit of its imagination."
Id.
11. 428 U.S at 176-77. The Justices stressed that, indeed, "[a]t the time the Eighth
Amendment was ratified, capital punishment was a common sanction in every State." Id.
at 177.
sions of the Constitution itself. 2 Thus, "history and traditional us-
age"'13 evinced societal acceptance of the punishment.
The Court has not limited itself, however, to comparing today's
punishments against those punishments available at the adoption of
the Bill of Rights or under the common law.'4 Over time, the Court
has interpreted the Eighth Amendment "'in a flexible and dynamic
manner,'" endowing it with fuller, more contemporary "'meaning as
public opinion becomes enlightened by a humane justice.""' This ad-
ditional mode of interpretation, beyond the "static" interpretation of
original meaning, recognizes that "[tihe Amendment must draw its
meaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark the pro-
gress of a maturing society."'1 6 In ascertaining these "evolving stan-
12. Id. at 177 (finding that because the Fifth Amendment provided that "'[n]o person
shall be held to answer for a capital... crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a
Grand Jury ... nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law...
,"' (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. V), and was adopted along with the Eighth Amendment,
the framers had contemplated that the penalty would remain in use); see also id. (reaching
the same conclusion from similar due process language in the text of the Fourteenth
Amendment). But see William J. Brennan, Jr., Foreward. Neither Victims Nor Execution-
ers, 8 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHics & PUB. POL'Y 1, 5-6 (1994) (arguing that even if some
parts of the Constitution, such as the Fifth Amendment, contemplate the use of the death
penalty, "the language of [that Amendment] does not declare that the right of the state to
punish by death shall be inviolable; it merely requires that when and if death is a possible
punishment, the defendant shall enjoy certain procedural safeguards.").
13. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S 280, 288 (1976).
14. The Court has expressly recognized that the Amendment reaches beyond those
indicators:
There is now little room for doubt that the Eighth Amendment's ban on cruel and
unusual punishment embraces, at a minimum, those modes or acts of punishment
that had been considered cruel and unusual at the time that the Bill of Rights was
adopted....
Moreover, the Eighth Amendment's proscriptions are not limited to those
practices condemned by the common law in 1789.
Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 405-06 (1986) (holding that execution of insane defend-
ants violates the Eighth Amendment) (emphasis added).
15. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 171 (quoting Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349,378 (1910)).
16. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) (plurality opinion), quoted in Gregg, 428
U.S. at 173. Trop was one of the cases in which the Court went beyond the traditional
examination of a punishment for its torturous or barbarous nature. A court-martial had
convicted the defendant in Trop for wartime desertion and, along with other punishment,
dishonorably discharged him. He was additionally stripped of his citizenship under a stat-
ute that provided that a dishonorably discharged wartime deserter would be stripped of
United States citizenship. Trop, 356 U.S. at 87-90. The defendant then challenged the
operation of the statute. After noting that the Amendment's commands are not static or
precise, id. at 100-01, the Court held that "the Eighth Amendment forbids Congress to
punish by taking away citizenship . P..." Id  at 103. The Court quoted the dissent in the
court of appeals for the reasoning that "'the American concept of man's dignity does not
comport with making even those we would punish completely "stateless" .... "' Id. at 101
Winter 19961 EVOLVING STANDARD OF DECENCY
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dards of decency," the Court looks to two primary indicia17 of what
contemporary American society regards as acceptable punishments:
legislative enactments' 8 and jury sentencing behavior.19
In Gregg, for example, the Court cited the death penalty laws of
thirty-five states that were enacted in response to the Furman decision
as illustrative of the desire for capital punishment among the people's
elected representatives and, hence, among the people:20 "The most
marked indication of society's endorsement of the death penalty for
murder is the legislative response to Furman."'" The Justices further
opined that "[t]he jury also is a significant and reliable objective index
n.33 (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 239 F.2d 527, 530 (2d Cir. 1956) -(Clark, C.J., dissenting)). It
further reasoned that with denationalization:
[tihere may be involved no physical mistreatment, no primitive torture. There is
instead the total destruction of the individual's status in organized society. It is a
form of punishment more primitive than torture, for it destroys for the individual
the political existence that was centuries in the development....
The civilized nations of the world are in virtual unanimity that statelessness is
not to be imposed as punishment for crime.
Id. at 101-02. In part because the punishment here was "deplored in the international
community of democracies," id. at 102 (footnote omitted), it was indecent by contempo-
rary standards and so was cruel and unusual under the Eighth Amendment.
17. In Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976), decided the same day as
Gregg, the Court described these indicia as "two crucial indicators of evolving standards of
decency." Id. at 293 (emphasis added). The Court also considers these to be "objective
indicia that reflect the public attitude toward a given sanction," Gregg, 428 U.S. at 173
(emphasis added), thus allowing courts to avoid imposing their own subjective judgments
about the content of contemporary values. As this Article will argue, however, the Court's
recent jurisprudence has eliminated any "objective" characteristics of these indicia and so
rendered highly suspect their use in the analysis.
18. Gregg, 428 U.S at 174 n.19.
19. Id. at 181.
20. In general, "legislative measures adopted by the people's chosen representatives
weigh heavily in ascertaining contemporary standards of decency." Woodson, 428 U.S. at
294-95.
21. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 179. "[A]I1 of the post-Furman statutes make clear that capital
punishment itself has not been rejected by the elected representatives of the people." Id.
at 180-81. The Justices had earlier cautioned, however, that "legislative judgments alone
cannot be determinative of Eighth Amendment standards since that Amendment was in-
tended to safeguard individuals from the abuse of legislative power." Id. at 174 n.19; see
also Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 1016-17 (1991) (White, J., dissenting) (noting "the
fact that a punishment has been legislatively mandated does not automatically render it
'legal' or 'usual' in the constitutional sense. Indeed .... if this were the case, then the
prohibition against cruel and unusual punishments would be devoid of any meaning."). To
illustrate the point, the Justices in Gregg cited Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962),
in which the Court found unconstitutional one of nine state statutes that criminalized the
status of addiction: "[P]enal laws enacted by state legislatures may violate the Eighth
Amendment because 'in the light of contemporary human knowledge' they 'would doubt-
less be universally thought to be an infliction of cruel and unusual punishment."' 428 U.S.
at 174 n.19 (quoting Robinson, 370 U.S. at 666).
EVOLVING STANDARD OF DECENCY
of contemporary values because it is so directly involved."22 In that
regard, the Gregg court also emphasized that "'one of the most impor-
tant functions any jury can perform in making.., a selection [between
life imprisonment and death for a defendant convicted in a capital
case] is to maintain a link between contemporary community values
and the penal system." '23 When legislatures enact laws providing for
certain punishments and juries impose sentences according to those
guidelines, the Court will consider these acts as reliable benchmarks
of contemporary standards of decency and thus as touchstones of what
constitutes "cruel and unusual" punishment. These benchmarks, how-
ever, are not conclusive as to the constitutionality of a particular sanc-
tion because the Court is the final arbiter of constitutionality and uses
other aids in that determination. 24
2. The Court's Excessiveness Inquiry
a. Furtherance of Penological Goals
The Gregg decision noted that the Eighth Amendment requires
not only adherence to society's standards of decency in inflicting pun-
ishment, as evidenced by "objective indicia," but also fidelity to "the
basic concept of human dignity."' 2 This amorphous concept precludes
Thus, contemporary societal standards of decency may be violated by enactments of
those very legislatures whose decisions are thought to reflect the relevant contemporary
values employed as one of the touchstones of Eighth Amendment analysis. The difficulty
with this reasoning is one of the components of the criticism this Article will explore in
assessing the workability of the evolving standards test as it is currently formulated.
22. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 181.
23. 1L (quoting Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 519 n.15 (1968)). Even though
statistics presented to the Court in Gregg revealed an apparent reluctance on the part of
juries to sentence defendants to death, id. at 181-82, and arguably a possible rejection of
the death penalty, the Justices instead interpreted the figures as demonstrating "the hu-
mane feeling that this most irrevocable of sanctions should be reserved for a small number
of extreme cases." Id. at 182; see also infra note 160 and accompanying text. Based on the
evidence that more than 460 persons were sentenced to death between the Furman deci-
sion and the time of argument in this case, the Justices found the actions of juries "fully
compatible with the legislative judgments ... as to the continued utility and necessity of
capital punishment in appropriate cases." Gregg, 428 U.S. at 182.
24. IL at 173. Significantly, the Court has subsequently stressed that "[a]lthough the
judgments of legislatures, juries, and prosecutors weigh heavily in the balance, it is for us
ultimately to judge whether the Eighth Amendment permits imposition of the death pen-
alty" in a particular case. Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 797 (1982) (emphasis added);
see also Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 833 n.40 (1988) (plurality opinion) ("That
the task of interpreting the great, sweeping clauses of the Constitution ultimately falls to us
has been for some time an accepted principle of American jurisprudence." (citing Marbury
v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803))).
25. 428 U.S. at 182. "The basic concept underlying the Eighth Amendment is nothing
less than the dignity of man. While the State has the power to punish, the Amendment
Winter 19961
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a state from inflicting suffering gratuitously, or without the appropri-
ate penological justification.2 6 If there exists no penological justifica-
tion, or if the penalty "serves no penal purpose more effectively than a
less severe punishment, '27 then it is excessive, contrary to human dig-
nity, and therefore cruel and unusual.28 In the death penalty context,
the plurality recognized the two justifications of retribution and
deterrence.29
Retribution, accomplished through the legal system, is necessary
to prevent citizens from engaging in self-help to vindicate their out-
rage at the wrongs committed against them.30 A death penalty in-
flicted for the purpose of retribution has been said to be consistent
with the underlying concept of human dignity since the "grievous ...
affront to humanity" resulting from certain extreme crimes warrants
the "expression of . . . moral outrage" reflected by the penalty of
death.3 '
stands to assure that this power be exercised within the limits of civilized standards." Trop
v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100 (1958).
26. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 183. "[T]he punishment must not involve the unnecessary and
wanton infliction of pain." Id. at 173 (emphasis added). Thus, with the appropriate peno-
logical justification, the punishment and concomitant possible infliction of pain is viewed as
being "necessary" or at least not "wanton." For discussions of these jurisprudential justifi-
cations for the death penalty, see id. at 236-41 (Marshall, J., dissenting); ALBERT CAMUS,
Reflections on the Guillotine, in RESISTANCE, REBELLION, AND DEATH 175-234 (Justin
O'Brien trans., 1st Am. ed. 1961); Bedau, supra note 9, at 910-16; Hugo Adam Bedau,
Bentham's Utilitarian Critique of the Death Penalty, 74 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1033
(1983); Samuel J.M. Donnelly, Capital Punishment. A Critique of the Political and Philo-
sophical Thought Supporting the Justices' Positions, 24 ST. MARY'S L.J. 1 (1992); Mary E.
Gale, Retribution, Punishment, and Death, 18 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 973 (1985); Stephen G.
Gey, Justice Scalia's Death Penalty, 20 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 67, 102-20 (1992); Arthur J.
Goldberg & Alan M. Dershowitz, Declaring the Death Penalty Unconstitutional, 83 HARV.
L. REv. 1773, 1796-97 (1970); David J. Gottlieb, The Death Penalty in the Legislature: Some
Thoughts About Money, Myth, and Morality, 37 KAN. L. REV. 443 (1989); Richard 0.
Lempert, Desert and Deterrence: An Assessment of the Moral Bases of the Case for Capital
Punishment, 79 MICH. L. REv. 1177 (1981); Margaret J. Radin, Cruel Punishment and
Respect for Persons: Super Due Process for Death, 53 S. CAL. L. Rv. 1143 (1980) [herein-
after Radin, Super Due Process]; Margaret J. Radin, The Jurisprudence of Death: Evolving
Standards for the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause, 126 U. PA. L. RPv. 989 (1978)
[hereinafter Radin, Jurisprudence of Death]; Ernest van den Haag, The Death Penalty Once
More, 18 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 957, 964-71 (1985).
27. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 280 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring).
28. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 173, 183.
29. Id. at 183.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 183-84. Apparently, but seemingly contradictorily, the "affront to humanity"
occasioned by a certain class of killing of a human being justifies society's retributive kill-
ing of a human being; in other words, the very act that we find such an affront, as it clearly
is, warrants the commission of the same act in return against the perpetrator. It seems
counterintuitive to find one act such an "affront to humanity" but find the same act per-
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Deterrence of capital crimes is the second goal of the death pen-
alty that the Court has recognized as legitimate. But, as noted in
Gregg, use of the death penalty for that purpose has not been rooted
in a firm foundation: the results of "[s]tatistical attempts to evaluate
the worth of the death penalty as a deterrent to crimes by potential
offenders ... simply have been inconclusive."32 For that reason, the
Gregg Court left the ultimate calculation of the deterrent effect, and
thus the value of capital punishment in those jurisdictions, to individ-
ual state legislatures.33 Ultimately, the Gregg plurality found the
death penalty sufficiently justified under these recognized penological
goals.34
formed by the state consistent with "the basic concept of human dignity." This dichotomy
may explain an inherent flaw in the "evolving standards of decency" standard itself; the
standard employs legislators' and juries' views, necessarily implicating their desires for ret-
ribution, to ascertain what is "cruel and unusual." Legislators and jurors are likely only
concerned with the "affront to humanity" occasioned by the murder of the victim and
express the desire for retribution through sentencing statutes and sentences. If the Court
looks only to the evolving standards test, which incorporates these retributive impulses,
then it ignores the "dignity of man" protected by the Eighth Amendment. That Amend-
ment protects the dignity of the defendant, not the victim, and so resort only to the objec-
tive indicators and what they say about retribution essentially excludes the core concept of
the Amendment. The only institution that can enforce or safeguard the principles of dig-
nity embodied in the Eighth Amendment is the Court, and to accomplish that task it must
conduct its own inquiry. It must itself inquire, for example, whether the punishment serves
retributive purposes that comport with the dignity of the defendant. Otherwise, resort to
the evolving standards test alone will fail to save us from ourselves, as the Amendment
seemingly was meant to do. See infra note 461 and accompanying text. This Article will
therefore discuss the consequent need for other checks on the punishment. That need also
arises because of the Court's ability to rig part of the evolving standards test by its subse-
quent, seemingly unrelated, decisions. The Article will therefore spend considerable time
establishing that rigging.
32. 428 U.S. at 184-85.
33. Id. Without corroborative statistics, the Justices felt they could "nevertheless as-
sume safely" that there were classes of murderers for whom the death penalty would be a
significant deterrent, such as murderers for hire and others who coldly calculate their deci-
sions to kill. Id. at 185-86, 186 n.33. Again without reference to supporting authority, the
Justices stated that many of the recent statutes had attempted to define the classes of
crimes and criminals "for which capital punishment is most probably an effective deter-
rent." Id. at 186 (emphasis added). On these bases, the Justices found the death penalty
justified, or at least not "clearly wrong," on deterrence grounds. Id at 186-87. A commen-
tator has observed that "the Justices incorrectly rely on the common-sense conclusion that
the death penalty will have some deterrent effect in some circumstances." Donnelly, supra
note 26, at 29. Moreover, the plurality's reasoning on this point is circular in that the
Justices purported to conduct their own inquiry and yet, in this case challenging the death
penalty in general, ultimately relied on legislators' determinations regarding deterrent ef-
fect. By this approach to constitutional determination, the Court would fail to act as a final
check on states' use of the death penalty. Justice O'Connor is a more current adherent to
this approach. See infra notes 211-216 and accompanying text.
34. 428 U.S. at 187.
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b. Proportionality Analysis
In addition to evolving standards of decency and the excessive-
ness inquiry into the penological justifications for the death penalty,
the Gregg plurality articulated another factor in the assessment of the
penalty's constitutionality or "cruel and unusual" or excessive nature:
"whether the punishment of death is disproportionate in relation to
the crime for which it is imposed.135 A sentence that is not propor-
tional to the crime is excessive and is therefore cruel and unusual.36
Because the crime for which Georgia sought to impose the death pen-
alty in Gregg was murder, Justices Stewart, Powell, and Stevens elabo-
rated no further than to declare that they could not "say that the
punishment [of death] is invariably disproportionate to th[at]
crime." 37 The punishment therefore survived proportionality review
and was not found unconstitutional on that ground.
35. Id. at 187. The Court determines whether the punishment is "grossly out of pro-
portion to the severity of the crime." Id. at 173. According to Justice O'Connor, this
concept of proportionality was first detailed in Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 371
(1910). Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 812 (1982) (O'Connor, J., dissenting). But the
Weems Court had quoted Justice Field in dissent in O'Neil v. Vermont, 144 U.S. 323,339-40
(1892), in which he wrote,
The inhibition [of cruel and unusual punishments in the Eighth Amendment] is
directed, not only against punishments of the character mentioned, but against all
punishments which by their excessive length or severity are greatly dispropor-
tioned to the offences charged. The whole inhibition is against that which is ex-
cessive either in the bail required, or fine imposed, or punishment inflicted.
One commentator has noted some debate concerning the role of proportionality review in
Eighth Amendment cases. See Scott W. Howe, Resolving the Conflict in the Capital Sen-
tencing Cases: A Desert-Oriented Theory of Regulation, 26 GA. L. REv. 323, 338 n.65
(1992).
36. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 173.
37. Id. at 187. Later decisions have refined disproportionality analysis and, in death
penalty cases, have mostly applied that type of "disproportionality" analysis that compares
the punishment at issue with the culpability of the particular offender. See, e.g., infra notes
100-102, 113-115, 127-130 and accompanying text. Disproportionality may also arise, as
indicated in Gregg, if the death penalty is too severe a sanction for the particular crime.
See, eg., Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977) (holding disproportionate and unconstitu-
tional the death penalty for rape of an adult woman); see also infra notes 67-68, 76-77 and
accompanying text. The Court has held, however, that the Eighth Amendment does not
require the kind of proportionality review that compares death penalties imposed on those
similarly situated. Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37, 43-44, 50-51 (1984). For a critique of that
opinion, see William S. Geimer, Death at Any Cost: A Critique of the Supreme Court's
Recent Retreat from its Death Penalty Standards, 12 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 737, 776-78 (1985)
(arguing that "[r]eal proportionality review threatens the existence of the death penalty,"
id. at 778, ostensibly because such a review would indicate the existence of arbitrariness).
For a discussion of the differences between the two types of proportionality analysis, that
which is done in capital cases and that which is not, see David C. Baldus et al., Compara-
tive Review of Death Sentences: An Empirical Study of the Georgia Experience, 74 J. CRIM.
L. & CRIMINOLOGY 661, 665-68 (1983). Outside of the death penalty context, the Court
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The Gregg plurality thus outlined the substantive restrictions that
the Eighth Amendment places on a state's ability to execute. Even
for punishments such as the death penalty that existed at common law
or at the adoption of the Bill of Rights, the "evolving standards of
decency that mark the progress of a maturing society"3 8 must evince
current societal acceptance of the death sentence at issue. The pen-
alty must also further the penological goals of retribution and deter-
rence and be proportional either to the offender's blameworthiness or
to the crime committed.
B. Procedural Requirements
Having upheld the death penalty as consistent with the evolving
standards of decency, and finding that it served appropriate penologi-
cal goals and was proportionate to the crime of murder, the Gregg
plurality proceeded to evaluate the manner in which Georgia courts
and juries arrived at the death sentence and imposed it in particular
cases.39 In so doing, it announced various standards for measuring
death penalty procedures. 40 Generally, "[b]ecause of the uniqueness
of the death penalty, Furman held that [the death penalty] could not
be imposed under sentencing procedures that created a substantial
risk that it would be inflicted in an arbitrary and capricious manner."'"
The Gregg plurality also found that the Furman concurrences had rec-
ognized that if "'there [were] no meaningful basis for distinguishing
the few cases in which [the death penalty was] imposed from the many
cases in which it [was] not,' '4 2 then the penalty was imposed in an
arbitrary, capricious, and therefore unconstitutional manner. Follow-
has found that the Eighth Amendment "does not require strict proportionality between
crime and sentence." Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 1001 (1991) (Kennedy, J., con-
curring in part and concurring in the judgment). For analysis of Harmelin, see John C.
Rooker, Note, Crime and Punishment: The Eighth Amendment's Proportionality Guarantee
After Harmelin v. Michigan, 7 B.Y.U. J. PUB. L. 149 (1992), and Olivia Outlaw Singletary,
Comment, Harmelin v. Michigan: The Most Recent Casualty in the Supreme Court's Strug-
gle to Develop a Standard for Eighth Amendment Proportionality Review, 54 OHIo. ST. LJ.
1205 (1993).
38. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) (plurality opinion).
39. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 204-06.
40. Id. at 204.
41. Id. at 188.
42. Id. (quoting Furman, 408 U.S. at 313 (White, J., concurring)). The Gregg judg-
ment here also quoted Justice Stewart's concurring opinion in Furman (stating that the
Furman death sentences were "'cruel and unusual in the same way that being struck by
lightning [was] cruel and unusual.... [T]he Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments cannot
tolerate the infliction of a sentence of death under legal systems that permit this unique
penalty to be so wantonly and so freakishly imposed."'). Id. (quoting Furman, 408 U.S. at
309-10 (Stewart, J., concurring) (second alteration in original); Id. at 188 n.36 (noting that
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ing Gregg, the Court has required that the sentencer's discretion to
impose the death penalty "be suitably directed and limited"4 3 so as to
avoid this arbitrariness. The Gregg plurality also concluded that the
jury's decision must be informed generally by considerations of the
"'circumstances of the offense together with the character and
propensities of the offender."'44 In this way, the sentence is individu-
alized to the offender.
This guidance of the jury and individualization in sentencing can
be accomplished, as it was under the Georgia scheme in Gregg, by
having the sentencer consider a statutory enumeration of aggravating
factors, along with any mitigating circumstances that the defendant
may present.45 Typically the sentencer must find the existence of at
"[t]his view was expressed by other Members of the Court who concurred in the
judgments").
43. Id. at 189.
44. Id (quoting Pennsylvania ex. reL Sullivan v. Ashe, 302 U.S. 51, 55 (1937)).
45. Many jurisdictions enumerate both aggravating and mitigating circumstances that
the sentencer must consider. See e.g., ALA. CODE §§ 13A-5-49, -51 (1994); ARIZ. REV.
STAT. ANN. §§ 13-703(F), (G) (Supp. 1995); ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 5-4-603 to 605 (Michie
1993); CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 190.2, 190.3 (West 1988 & Supp. 1995); COLO. REv. STAT.
§§ 16-11-103(4), (5) (Supp. 1995); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 53a-46a(g), (h) (West 1994 &
Supp. 1995); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 921.141(5), (6) (West 1985 & Supp. 1995); ILL. ANN.
STAT. ch. 720, para. 5/9-1(b), (c) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1995); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 35-50-2-
9(b), (c) (West Supp. 1994); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 532.025(2)(a), (b) (Michie/Bobbs-Mer-
rill 1990); LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 905.4-905.5 (West Supp. 1994 & West 1984);
MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, §§ 413(d), (g) (Supp. 1994); MASS. GEN. L. ch. 279, § 69 (Supp.
1995); Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 99-19-101(5), (6) (1994); Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 565.032(2), (3)
(Vernon Supp. 1995); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 46-18-303, -304 (1994); NEB. REv. STAT.
§§ 29-2523(1), (2) (1989); NEV. Rnv. STAT. ANN. §§ 200.033 (Michie Supp. 1993), 200.035
(Michie 1992); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 630:5(VI), (VII) (Supp. 1994); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 2C:11-3(c)(4), (5) (West 1995); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 31-20A-5, -6 (Michie Supp. 1995 &
Michie 1994); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW §§ 400.27(3), (6)-(7), (9) (McKinney Supp. 1996);
N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.27(1)(a) (McKinney Supp. 1996); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 15A-2000(e),
(f) (Supp. 1994); OR. REv. STAT. §§ 163.150(1)(b), (c) (Supp. 1994); 42 PA. CONS. STAT.
ANN. §§ 9711(d), (e) (Supp. 1995 & 1982); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-20(C)(a), (b) (Law. Co-
op. Supp. 1994); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-204(i), (j) (Supp. 1995); UTAH CODE ANN.
§§ 76-5-202, 76-3-207(3) (1995); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 19.2-264.2, 19.2-264.4 (Michie 1990);
Wyo. STAT. § 6-2-102(h), (j) (Supp. 1995). The sentencer's consideration of mitigating
factors, however, cannot be limited to those provided in the statute. See infra notes 244-
263 and accompanying text.
Under the Georgia statute under consideration in Gregg, for example, the sentencer
would determine the penalty in the second half of a bifurcated proceeding. (See Gregg,
428 U.S. at 162-69 for an explication of the statutory scheme that the Court examined and
found constitutional.) The statute provided a list of ten statutory aggravating factors and
directed that, after considering the ten aggravators enumerated in the statute and any non-
statutory aggravating and mitigating factors, the sentencer could impose the death penalty
as long as it found the existence of one statutory aggravating factor beyond a reasonable
doubt. Id. at 164-66 (citing GA. CODE ANN. §§ 27-2534.1, 26-3102 (Supp. 1975)). The deci-
sion noted that through this procedure, the Georgia legislature limited the class of murder-
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least one aggravating factor before it may impose the death penalty.46
Because the sentencer could also look to any circumstance that the
defendant presented in mitigation, however, it could tailor the punish-
ment to the particular individual.47 Such a scheme "provide[s] gui-
ers subject to the death penalty and thereby better assured that the decision to impose the
penalty was not based on caprice; the sentencer was required to consider evidence about
the crime and character of the defendant when it considered factors both in aggravation
and in mitigation. Id. at 196-97. The Georgia scheme is essentially the same now, except
one unconstitutionally vague aggravator has been removed. See GA. CODE ANN. § 17-10-
30 (1990).
The Georgia legislature further reduced the risk of arbitrariness, in the judgment of
the Court, by providing for a special expedited review process by which the Supreme Court
of Georgia independently reviewed the sentence for arbitrariness, disproportionality, and
sufficiency of support for the statutory aggravating factors found by the sentencer. Id. at
198 (citing GA. CODE ANN. 27-2537(c) (Supp. 1975)).
46. In some states, the sentencer can impose death after finding at least one aggravat-
ing circumstance. See, eg., ALA. CODE § 13A-5-45(f) (1994); GA. CODE ANN. § 17-10-
31.1(a) (Supp. 1995); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 532.025(3) (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1990); LA.
CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 905.3 (West Supp. 1995); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-20(C) (Law.
Co-op. Supp. 1994); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 23A-27A-4 (1988); VA. CODE ANN.
§ 19.2-264.4(c) (Michie 1990). Most states, however, require the jury to weigh any ag-
gravators it finds against any mitigating circumstances. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-4-
603 (Michie 1993); CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.3 (West 1988); COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-11-
103(2) (Supp. 1995); DEL CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4209 (c), (d) (Supp. 1994); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 921.141(2), (3) (West 1985); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-50-2-9(i) (West Supp. 1995); MD. ANN.
CODE art. 27, § 413(h) (Supp. 1994); MASS. GEN. L. ch. 279, § 68 (Supp. 1995); Miss. CODE
ANN. § 99-19-101(2) (1994); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 565.030(4) (Vernon Supp. 1995); MONT.
CODE ANN. § 46-18-305 (1995); NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-2522 (1989); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 175.554(3) (Michie Supp. 1993); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 630:5(IV) (Supp. 1994); N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 2C:11-3(c)(3) (West Supp. 1995); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-20A-2(B) (Michie
Supp. 1995); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 400.27(11)(a) (McKinney Supp. 1996); N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 15A-2000(b) (Supp. 1994); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 701.11 (West Supp. 1996);
42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 9711(c) (1982); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-204(f)(2), (g) (Supp.
1995). Other states do not expressly require weighing. See, eg., ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN.
§ 13-703(E) (Supp. 1995); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-46a(f), (g), (h) (West 1994 &
Supp. 1995)); IDAHO CODE § 19-2515(c) (Supp. 1995); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 720, para. 5/9-
1(g) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1995); MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-18-305 (1993); OR. REV. STAT.
§ 163.150 (Supp. 1994); TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 37.071 (West Supp. 1995);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-3-207(2) (1995); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 10.95.060(4) (West
1990); Wvo. STAT. § 6-2-102(d) (Supp. 1995).
47. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 197 (citing GA. CODE ANN. § 27-2534.1(b) (Supp. 1975)). Even
if the Georgia jury found the existence of an aggravating circumstance beyond a reason-
able doubt, for example, it could still grant mercy to the defendant depending on the miti-
gating evidence she presented to explain why she should not receive the ultimate penalty;
in fact, the jury could recommend mercy even without a finding of a mitigating circum-
stance. Id. (citing GA. CODE ANN. § 27-2302 (Supp. 1975)). In essence, the sentencer was
guided in its imposition of the death penalty but had virtually unbridled discretion not to
impose the penalty. In response to defendant Gregg's argument that portions of the stat-
ute still allowed for the impermissible exercise of discretion, specifically the section that
permitted a grant of executive clemency, the Justices pointedly noted that "the decision to
impose [the death penalty] had to be guided by standards so that the sentencing authority
would focus on the particularized circumstances of the crime and the defendant"; however,
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dance to the sentencing authority and thereby reduce[s] the likelihood
that it will impose a sentence that fairly can be called capricious or
arbitrary.548 Although cautioning that they were not prescribing a
constitutional blueprint to which state statutes were required precisely
to conform, the Justices nonetheless indicated that a bifurcated
scheme involving the consideration of prescribed aggravating factors
and any mitigating factors, such as that employed in Georgia, would
be a good candidate for passing constitutional scrutiny.49
"[n]othing in any of our cases suggests that the decision to afford an individual defendant
mercy violates the Constitution." Id. at 199 (emphasis added). This reality has become a
source of conflict within the present Court and, as this Article posits, unbridled discretion
to be merciful has been scaled back by recent decisions. See infra notes 339-374 and accom-
panying text.
48. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 194-95.
49. Id. at 195. In the context of capital crimes, when jury sentencing is particularly
desirable in order that the punishment reflect the "evolving standards of decency" in the
society, the plurality stated that bifurcated proceedings would best achieve the desired end
of fairness in sentencing. Id. at 190-92, 195. A bifurcated proceeding is one in which the
jury first determines guilt or innocence, relying on evidence relevant and admissible only
on the issue of guilt or innocence, and later determines the appropriate sentence, relying
on evidence relevant to sentencing, some of which is only introduced at that stage. See
Sumner v. Shuman, 483 U.S. 66, 85 n.13 (1987) ("Bifurcating the trial into a guilt-determi-
nation phase and a penalty phase tends to prevent the concerns relevant at one phase from
infecting jury deliberations during the other."). See generally Gregg, 428 U.S. at 191 (quot-
ing MODEL PENAL CODE § 201.6, cmt. 5, pp. 74-75 (Tentative Draft No. 9, 1959)). Addi-
tionally, "[a]s a general proposition the[] concerns [expressed in Furman regarding
arbitrariness] are best met by a system that provides for a bifurcated proceeding at which
the sentencing authority is apprised of the information relevant to the imposition of sen-
tence and provided with standards to guide its use of the information." Gregg, 428 U.S at
195. Most states expressly provide for such a separate sentencing proceeding. See, eg.,
ALA. CODE § 13A-5-45 (1994); ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-703(B) (Supp. 1994); ARK.
CODE ANN. § 5-4-602(3) (Michie 1993); CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.1 (West 1988); COLO.
REv. STAT. § 16-11-103(1) (Supp. 1994); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-46a(b) (West
1994); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4209(b) (1987); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.141(1) (West
1985); IDAHO CODE § 19-2515 (Supp. 1995); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 720, para. 5/9-1(d)
(Smith-Hurd Supp. 1995); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-50-2-9(d) (West Supp. 1994); Ky. REv.
STAT. ANN. § 532.025(1)(a) (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1990); LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN.
art. 905 (West Supp. 1994); MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 413(a) (Supp. 1994); MASS. GEN. L.
ch. 279, § 68 (Supp. 1995); Miss. CODE ANN. § 99-19-101(1) (1994); Mo. ANN. STAT.
§ 565.030(3) (Vernon Supp. 1995); MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-18-301 (1993); NEB. REV. STAT.
§ 29-2520 (1989); NEV. REv. STAT. ANN. § 175.552 (Michie Supp. 1993); N.H. REv. STAT.
ANN. § 630:5(11) (Supp. 1994); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:11-3(c)(1) (West 1995); N.M. STAT.
ANN. § 31-20A-1 (Michie Supp. 1995); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 400.27(1) (McKinney
Supp. 1996); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2000(a) (Supp. 1994); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21,
§ 701.10 (West Supp. 1995); OR. REv. STAT. § 163.150(1)(a) (Supp. 1994); 42 PA. CONS.
STAT. ANN. § 9711(a) (1982); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-20(B) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1994); S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 23A-27A-2 (Supp. 1995); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-204 (Supp.
1994); TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 37.071 (West Supp. 1995); UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 76-3-207(1) (1995); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-264A(A) (Michie 1990); WASH. REv. CODE
ANN. § 10.95.050 (West 1990); Wyo. STAT. § 6-2-102(a) (Supp. 1995).
On the same day that the Supreme Court decided Gregg, it also
decided Woodson v. North Carolina,5" another plurality opinion in
which Justice Stewart announced the judgment of the Court and Jus-
tices Powell and Stevens joined.51 In Woodson, the issue was whether
a death penalty scheme that mandatorily imposed death once the jury
found the defendant guilty of a certain homicide violated the Eighth
Amendment's proscription against cruel and unusual punishment.5"
Before answering in the affirmative, the Court examined the statutory
procedures under which North Carolina sentenced a defendant to
death.53
50. 428 U.S. 280 (1976).
51. Id. at 282. Justices Brennan and Marshall concurred in the judgment on the
grounds that the death penalty is always unconstitutional. Id. at 305-06 (Brennan, J., con-
curring in the judgment); id at 306 (Marshall, J., concurring in the judgment). Justice
White, joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justice Rehnquist, dissented. Id. (White, J.,
dissenting). Justices Blackmun and Rehnquist also dissented separately. Id at 307 (Black-
mun, J., dissenting), 308 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
52. Id. at 287, 305. The Court on that day also decided the constitutionality of Louisi-
ana's mandatory death penalty scheme. See Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 (1976);
supra note 4.
Another potential question in Woodson involved a substantive challenge to the death
penalty: whether the imposition of the death penalty on a defendant charged with felony
murder was disproportionate to the crime when the defendant lacked the intent to kill and
had not killed. The plurality did not reach the question because it found the statutory
scheme violated the procedural dictates set out in Gregg and required by the Constitution.
Woodson, 428 U.S. at 305 nA0. The Court took up the issue later in Enmund v. Florida,
458 U.S. 782 (1982), and Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137 (1987). For fuller discussions of
Enmund and Tison, see infra notes 83-118 and accompanying text.
53. Woodson, 428 U.S. at 286-87. The plurality had first examined the objective in-
dicators of the evolving standards of decency to conclude that mandatory imposition of the
death penalty did not comport with society's current standards. Id. at 301. By 1972, ac-
cording to the plurality, mandatory death sentences had been repudiated by juries and,
consequently, also by legislatures. Id. at 292-93, 298. Reportedly, juries had refused to
convict defendants for first-degree murder or other capital offenses because of the auto-
matic imposition of the harshest possible sentence. Id. at 293. Legislatures also moved
away from mandatory schemes and toward discretionary ones in order to insure conviction
and some punishment, even if it were less than death. Id at 293,296-97. For these reasons,
mandatory schemes could not be applied consistently with the evolving standards of de-
cency and hence with Eighth Amendment dictates. Id. at 301.
The plurality noted that even under statutes providing for discretion in jury sentenc-
ing, "[vjarious studies indicate that even in first-degree murder cases juries with sentencing
discretion do not impose the death penalty 'with any great frequency."' Id. at 295 (quoting
H. KALVEN & H. ZEISEL, THE AMEmCAN JURY 436 (1966)). The source quoted by the
plurality showed that less than 20% of those convicted of capital murder received the
death penalty under discretionary schemes. Id. n.31. The Court viewed these figures only
as evidence of juror reluctance to impose the death penalty automatically in every capital
case, rather than as more general proof that jurors in most cases simply did not view the
death penalty as an acceptable punishment.
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The Woodson plurality noted the Furman Court's rejection of
standardless juror decisionmaking and the subsequent response by the
North Carolina legislature to remove all jury discretion by enacting a
mandatory statute.54 But because of the tendency of juries to avoid
the automatic imposition of death by declining to convict, "a
mandatory scheme may well exacerbate the problem identified in
Furman by resting the penalty determination on the particular jury's
willingness to act lawlessly."55 Because the scheme provided no gui-
dance to the jury in deciding whether to impose the death sentence, it
failed "to provide a constitutionally tolerable response to Furman's
rejection of unbridled jury discretion in the imposition of capital
sentences.
56
A corollary to a state's dictate to provide standards to the jury in
the jury's imposition of the ultimate penalty is the state's obligation to
allow juries to consider the individuality of the particular defendant.5 7
The mandatory scheme here, however, failed to provide for the indi-
vidualized sentencing determination mandated by the Eighth Amend-
ment: "in capital cases the fundamental respect for humanity
underlying the Eighth Amendment requires consideration of the char-
acter and record of the individual offender and the circumstances of
the particular offense as a constitutionally indispensable part of the
process of inflicting the penalty of death. '58 The Woodson plurality
reasoned that:
[a] process [such as a mandatory scheme] that accords no signifi-
cance to relevant facets of the character and record of the indi-
vidual offender or the circumstances of the particular offense
excludes from consideration in fixing the ultimate punishment
of death the possibility of compassionate or mitigating factors
stemming from the diverse frailties of humankind. It treats all
persons convicted of a designated offense not as uniquely indi-
vidual human beings, but as members of a faceless, undifferenti-
ated mass to be subjected to the blind infliction of the penalty of
death.59
The Constitution requires these procedures in capital sentencing be-
cause death is different and irrevocable.60 Therefore, the state must
provide mechanisms to ensure that the sentence is warranted in each
54. Id at 286-87.
55. Id. at 303.
56. Id. at 302.
57. See supra notes 44-45 and 47 and accompanying text.
58. Woodson, 428 U.S. at 304 (citation omitted).
59. Id
60. Id. at 322.
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case.61 Because the North Carolina mandatory scheme allowed for
none of the requisite individualized assessment, the Court found that
it violated the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause of the Eighth
Amendment.6'
This elaboration of the underpinnings of Eighth Amendment ju-
risprudence demonstrates various key concepts: substantively, the
Court will evaluate death sentences for their cruel and unusual nature
by looking to the "evolving standard of decency" as reflected in legis-
lative enactments and jury sentencing behavior, and by looking to see
that the death sentence accords with the "dignity of man" by measur-
ing the proportionality of the punishment and its furtherance of the
penological goals of retribution and deterrence. The Court's assess-
ment of the procedures of death penalty imposition will ensure that
two basic requirements are met. First, sentencing juries must be
guided in their decisions to impose death. Second, juries must also be
allowed to individualize the sentence by considering "compassionate
or mitigating factors stemming from the diverse frailties of human-
kind."'63 A survey of the evolution of these basic rules and their appli-
cation is necessary to evaluate the current validity of the "evolving
standards" test and the current Court's clear drift toward a pro-death
and self-fulfilling constitutional test in death penalty cases.
I. Post-Gregg Applications of the Doctrine
A. Substantive Challenges to the Death Penalty
Since Gregg v. Georgia, many of the substantive challenges to the
death penalty have involved classes of defendants and required the
Court to evaluate the imposition of the penalty of death both by its
acceptance at the common law or at the time of the adoption of the
Bill of Rights and in terms of society's evolving standards of decency:
whether contemporary society would approve, as evidenced by jury
sentencing behavior and legislative enactments, of executing a mem-
ber of a particular class of people. As indicated above, however, the
Court would also assess the sentence for excessiveness, for example,
for its furtherance of the penological goals of deterrence and retribu-
tion: whether this class of defendants would be deterred by the possi-
bility of a death sentence and whether such a sentence would satisfy
society's desire that these class members receive their just deserts. Fi-
61. l at 305.
62. Id
63. Id. at 304.
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nally, although the Court has said that as a general matter the punish-
ment of death is proportional to the crime of murder,' the
punishment may nonetheless be disproportionate and so unconstitu-
tionally excessive for members of a particular class. The Court may
thus appraise the propriety of a sentence according to its proportion-
ality to the blameworthiness of the particular class of defendant.65
One of the earliest post-Gregg cases to come before the Court on
a substantive challenge was Coker v. Georgia,66 which involved the
imposition of the death penalty for the rape of an adult woman. In
setting forth the standards to be used in evaluating the claim of cruel
and unusual punishment, the plurality stressed that the Court had
"firmly embraced" the concept that the "Eighth Amendment bars not
only those punishments that are 'barbaric' but also those that are 'ex-
cessive' in relation to the crime committed."67 The plurality further
explained that the punishment is unconstitutionally excessive if it fails
the proportionality test or "makes no measurable contribution to ac-
ceptable goals of punishment. 68 The plurality here employed the ob-
jective factors of legislation and jury sentencing decisions not
separately, as the Court's decision in Gregg had suggested, but as tools
to inform the Court's judgment about excessiveness; those objective
indicia would inform the excessiveness judgment "to the maximum
possible extent."69
The objective evidence revealed that at the time this case was
decided, Georgia was the only state that authorized death for the rape
of an adult woman.70 Remarking that the plurality in Trop v. Dulles7'
had "[taken] pains to note the climate of international opinion con-
64. See Gregg, 428 U.S. at 187; supra note 37 and accompanying text.
65. The Court has since stated that "[a] punishment might fail the test [of excessive-
ness] on either ground," Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584,592 (1977), Le., for lack of propor-
tionality or failure to further penological goals.
66. 433 U.S. 584 (1977) (plurality opinion). Comprising the plurality were Justices
White, Stewart, Blackmun, and Stevens. Id. at 586. Justices Brennan and Marshall con-
curred in the judgment, but on the grounds that the death penalty is unconstitutional in all
contexts. Id. at 600-01 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment); id. at 600-01 (Marshall,
J., concurring in the judgment). Justice Powell concurred in the judgment in part and dis-
sented in part. Id- at 601; see also infra text accompanying notes 80-81.
67. Coker, 433 U.S. at 592.
68. Id.
69. Id-
70. Id. at 595-96. Prior to the Court's decision in Furman, and at different points in
time, 16 to 18 states and the federal government had authorized the death penalty for rape;
however, upon re-enactment, most of the states chose not to include death as a punishment
for rape of an adult woman. Id. at 593-94.
71. 356 U.S. 86 (1958) (plurality opinion).
EVOLVING STANDARD OF DECENCY
cerning the acceptability of a particular punishment," the plurality
here observed that only three of sixty major nations surveyed pro-
vided for death in these circumstances. 72 Juries in Georgia had also
failed to sentence rapists to death in approximately nine out of ten
cases.73 The weight of objective authority was thus against death as an
acceptable punishment in these cases.74
The plurality emphasized, however, that "[t]hese recent events
evidencing the attitude of state legislatures and sentencing juries do
not wholly determine this controversy, for the Constitution contem-
plates that in the end our own judgment will be brought to bear on the
question of the acceptability of the death penalty under the Eighth
Amendment."'75 Thus, addressing for itself the proportionality of the
punishment to the type of crime here at issue, the plurality found that
the punishment of death was excessive because rape did not involve
the taking of a human life.76 The plurality essentially focused on the
blameworthiness or culpability of the rapist, comparing that culpabil-
ity to the penalty and finding it wanting in comparison to that of the
murderer.77 In the end, the plurality's own assessment about the dis-
proportionality of the punishment here78 was only buttressed by con-
clusions reached from analysis of the objective indicia.79
Justice Powell concurred in the judgment but dissented concern-
ing the conclusion that death was always disproportionate for these
crimes.80 He did agree, however, with the plurality's recognition that
although the "objective indicators [of society's evolving standards of
decency] are highly relevant,.., the ultimate decision as to the appro-
priateness of the death penalty under the Eighth Amendment...
72. Coker, 433 U.S. at 596 n.10. The decision did not identify, however, which nations
out of those 60 authorized the death penalty in general.
73. Id. at 597.
74. Id. at 596-97.
75. Id at 597.
76. Id. at 597-98 ("We have the abiding conviction that the death penalty, which 'is
unique in its severity and irrevocability,' is an excessive penalty for the rapist who, as such,
does not take human life." (citation omitted)).
77. The Court stated, "in terms of moral depravity and of the injury to the person and
to the public, it does not compare with murder." Id at 598.
78. Id. at 592. The plurality also indicated that the punishment could violate the
Eighth Amendment on the grounds of disproportionality alone, even if it furthered some
penological goals and so did not violate that component of the analysis. Id & n.4; see also
supra note 65.
79. Coker, 433 U.S. at 597 (stating that "the legislative rejection of capital punishment
for rape strongly confirms our own judgment, which is that death is indeed a disproportion-
ate penalty for the crime of raping an adult woman") (emphasis added).
80. Id. at 601 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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must be decided on the basis of our own judgment in light of the
precedents of this Court."'" Thus, a majority of the Court explicitly
concurred in the rightness of employing its own measurements in ad-
dition to those objective indicia evincing only society's attitude toward
a particular punishment.' The Court's own proportionality analysis
and assessment of the punishment for its furtherance of certain peno-
logical goals remained firmly within the Court's Eighth Amendment
construct.
Another early case was Enmund v. Florida,83 in which the de-
fendant had been convicted of felony murder84 and sentenced to
death. The evidence showed, however, that Emnund had only driven
the getaway car in the course of a robbery and subsequent murder; he
had not actually killed, and claimed that he possessed no intent to
kill. 5 On a petition for certiorari, the defendant asserted that a death
sentence violated the Eighth Amendment when imposed on someone
who did not kill, did not attempt to kill, and had no intent to kill.8 6
In surveying the legislative enactments of various death penalty
jurisdictions8 7 to determine society's attitude toward the execution of
those in defendant's class, and more specifically the attitude toward
the excessiveness or disproportionality of the sentence, 8 the Court
determined that only eight states allowed imposition of the death pen-
alty "solely because the defendant somehow participated in a robbery
in the course of which a murder was committed. ' 89 Nine other states
81. Id. at 603-04 n.2.
82. Chief Justice Burger, however, joined by Justice Rehnquist, dissented. Id. at 604
(Burger, CJ., dissenting).
83. 458 U.S. 782 (1982). The majority in Enmund included Justices White, Brennan,
Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens. Id. at 783. Justice O'Connor, joined by Chief Justice
Burger, and Justices Powell and Rehnquist, dissented but appeared to agree that a Court-
conducted inquiry into proportionality was necessary, in addition to the evolving standards
assessment. Id. at 802, 815-16, 823 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
84. The jury could convict defendant of first-degree murder under Florida's felony
murder statute as long as it found there was a killing committed during the course of a
robbery or attempted robbery and that defendant was present and aiding and abetting that
robbery or robbery attempt; the jury need not have found intent to kill on the part of
defendant to convict him. Id. at 785. Once found guilty of first-degree murder, he was
subject to the death penalty. Id. at 788. Defendant was sentenced, on the jury's recom-
mendation, upon a finding of four statutory aggravating circumstances and no mitigating
circumstances. Id at 785.
85. Id. at 786 & n.2.
86. IL at 787.
87. At the time of decision in this case, 36 jurisdictions provided for capital punish-
ment. Id. at 789.
88. Id. at 788-89.
89. Id. at 792.
allowed a death sentence of such a person if sufficient aggravating cir-
cumstances were shown and outweighed mitigating circumstances. 90
Because a defendant such as Enmund could be sentenced to death in
only a third of American jurisdictions that had the death penalty, and
even though the judgment was not "'wholly unanimous among state
legislatures,"' 9 the Court nonetheless found the evidence to "weigh[ ]
on the side of rejecting capital punishment for the crime at issue."'92
Regarding jury determinations, the Court looked to statistics
gleaned from reported appellate court decisions and a survey of the
country's death-row population to find that "[t]he evidence is over-
whelming that American juries have repudiated imposition of the
death penalty for crimes such as petitioner's. '93 For example, during
the time covered by the survey of appellate decisions, 339 of the 362
persons executed for homicide were the actual killers; nontriggerman
felony murderers accounted for only six of the remaining executions. 94
Similarly, the survey of death-row prisoners sentenced to death for
homicide revealed that 698 out of 739 had participated in the killing,
and sixteen of those who did not participate also were not physically
present when the murder occurred, including defendant in this case.95
The Court thus agreed with the defendant that juries considered death
a disproportionate sentence for someone in his class. 96
Significantly, in assessing the validity of this punishment for this
class, the Court deemed it necessary to consider other countries' treat-
ment of the class. 97 The Court found it "worth noting that the doc-
trine of felony murder has been abolished in England and India,...
and is unknown in continental Europe." 98 In its determination of the
evolving standards, the Court has often consulted the standards of
other nations and has not limited its deliberation to the statutes and
jury determinations of this country.99
90. Id.
91. I. at 793 (quoting Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 596 (1977)).
92. Id.
93. Id. at 794.
94. Id
95. Id at 795.
96. Id at 796.
97. "'[T]he climate of international opinion concerning the acceptability of a particu-
lar punishment' is an additional consideration which is 'not irrelevant."' Id at 796 n.22
(quoting Coker, 433 U.S. at 596 n.10).
98. Id.
99. Trop v. Dulles contains an example of the Court's use of this kind of evidence, as
the Court highlighted the dearth of nations that punished crime with denationalization.
356 U.S. 86, 102-03 (1958). One could argue that the situation in Trop is distinct from
those involving purely state matters, to which comparison to other state statutes and prac-
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Recognizing that it was for the Court "ultimately to judge"
whether the Eighth Amendment was violated, the Court undertook its
own excessiveness inquiry.' Again, the Court's disproportionality
analysis focused on the defendant's culpability in comparison to the
severe nature of the ultimate penalty. 10' As in Coker, the Enmund
Court reasoned that because the defendant robber did not take a life,
death for him was an excessive or disproportionate punishment. 10 2
Finally, the Enmund Court found that the execution of those in
defendant's class was excessive in that it did not further the goals of
punishment because it would not deter someone who had no intent to
kill in the first instance, and would not ensure that he received his just
deserts by avenging murders he neither intended nor did commit.10 3
Because legislative judgment and jury sentencing indicated that the
punishment was excessive and so contrary to the evolving standards of
decency, and because the Court's analysis also found that the punish-
ment would not further recognized penological goals and was dispro-
portionate for this class of offender, imposition of the death penalty
on this class was in violation of the Eighth Amendment."°
tices is relevant, because the punishment of denationalization can only be imposed by a
nation and hence comparison to practices of other nations is necessary. That argument
could have some merit if not for the recognition and use by the Court of the same evidence
in subsequent cases, such as Enmund. And since the Trop decision, the Court itself has
noted the significance of the Trop Court's heeding of international opinion: according to
the Court in Coker, 433 U.S. at 596 n.10 (plurality opinion), the Trop Court "took pains to
note the climate of international opinion concerning the acceptability of a particular pun-
ishment." See also Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 830 & n31 (1988) (plurality
opinion). This historical treatment of evidence of the international community's practices
is important to a critique of the current Court's attitude toward this evidence in assessing
the evolving standards of decency regarding the penalty of death. See infra note 454 and
accompanying text.
100. Enmund, 458 U.S. at 797.
101. Id. at 797-98.
102. Id-
103. Id. at 798-801.
104. Id. at 801. In the next pertinent decision following Enmund, the Court tackled the
problem of execution of the insane and ultimately held that such an execution was violative
of the Eighth Amendment. Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399,409-10 (1986). Execution of
the insane was barred at the common law, ia- at 406, 408, and, at the time of decision in
Ford, "no State in the Union permit[ted] the execution of the insane." Id. at 408 & n.2
(observing that 41 states then had the death penalty). These facts evidenced that many
shared the view that execution of the insane would offend humanity. Id. at 409. Because
the Court also saw little retributive value in executing those who could not understand why
they were being punished, id., the executions were barred by the Eighth Amendment. For
this portion of the opinion, the majority included Justices Marshall, Brennan, Blackmun,
Powell, and Stevens. Id. at 401. Justice O'Connor was joined by Justice White as she con-
curred in the result in part and dissented in part, id. at 427, and Chief Justice Burger joined
Justice Rehnquist in dissent. Id. at 431 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
In Tison v. Arizona,10 5 however, the Court modified the Enmund
rule to permit the execution of those felony murderers who, even
though they did not kill or intend to kill, participated in the felony in a
major way and exhibited "reckless indifference to human life" in the
execution of the felony." 6 Justice O'Connor, as author of the Court's
opinion, 0 7 conducted a two-step proportionality analysis to reach this
result, 08 but did not expressly employ the evolving standards test or
assess whether the penalty in this instance would further penological
goals.10 9
The first step of the Court's proportionality analysis was in-
formed by the various death penalty states' assessments of proportion-
ality, as evidenced by their legislative enactments on the subject. That
is, the Court again found "the state legislatures' judgment as to pro-
portionality in these circumstances relevant to th[e] constitutional in-
quiry," 1 0 but did not consider jury sentencing behavior for this
purpose. Because twenty-one states authorized capital punishment
for a felony murderer who was a major participant in the felony and
only eleven states prohibited a death sentence where there was no
intent to kill,"' the Court saw a consensus approving capital punish-
ment in these circumstances as not excessive or disproportionate." 12
In the second step of its proportionality analysis, the Court con-
ducted its own proportionality assessment and recognized that the
mental state of a defendant has traditionally been a critical measure of
his or her culpability." 3 In the death penalty context, a defendant can
be sufficiently culpable to be deserving of the death penalty even ab-
sent the intent to kill: "the reckless disregard for human life implicit in
knowingly engaging in criminal activities known to carry a grave risk
of death represents a highly culpable mental state" that can warrant
105. 481 U.S. 137 (1987).
106. Il at 158.
107. 1d. at 138. Joining Justice O'Connor in the majority were Chief Justice Rehnquist
and Justices White, Powell, and Scalia. Id. In dissent were Justices Brennan, Marshall,
Blackmun, and Stevens. Ia at 159.
108. Id. at 152-58.
109. ld The same year that the Court decided Tison but failed to examine whether
penological goals were furthered, a six to three majority of the Court in Sumner v. Shu-
man, 483 U.S. 66, 82-85 (1987), found a mandatory death sentence scheme for life-without-
parole prisoners incompatible with the Eighth Amendment partly because it failed to fur-
ther the penological goals of deterrence and retribution. The Justices in the Sumner major-
ity were Justices Blackmun, Brennan, Marshall, Powell, Stevens, and O'Connor. Id. at 66.
110. Tson, 481 U.S. at 152.
111. Id. at 152-54, 158.
112. Id. at 154.
113. Id. at 156.
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the death penalty. 1 4 The culpability requirement for proportionality
set out in Enmund was therefore satisfied in cases in which "major
participation in the felony committed[ ] combined with reckless indif-
ference to human life," and thus the death penalty in those cases was
constitutional. 115
The dissent argued, however, that the Court misleadingly stated
that a "majority of American jurisdictions clearly authorize capital
punishment" in these types of cases because the Court excluded from
the analysis those states that had abolished capital punishment." 6 In-
clusion of abolitionist states in the tally would have revealed that
three-fifths of the jurisdictions opposed execution of felony murderers
who possessed no intent to kill.' 17 The dissent also criticized the ma-
jority for excluding from its analysis evidence of frequency of imposi-
tion of the penalty on these defendants, or jury sentencing behavior,
and evidence of other nations' abolition of capital punishment or,
more specifically, prohibition of execution of these murderers. 1 8
One of the next significant substantive challenges to the death
penalty concerned minors aged fifteen years or less at the time of the
commission of their crimes. In Thompson v. Oklahoma, a plurality of
the Court ruled that executing those who were fifteen years old at the
time of their crimes offended the evolving standards of decency,119
was not proportional to the culpability of these offenders as a class,'20
and served no penological goals. 2 '
Legislative enactments in those states that had considered a mini-
mum age limitation demonstrated that all would exempt fifteen-year-
olds from the death penalty.'" The Court again found it significant
that:
114. Id. at 157-58.
115. Id. at 158.
116. Id at 175 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
117. Id at 175 n.13. According to the dissent, 13 states and the District of Columbia
would not have allowed a death sentence under any circumstance and 11 disallowed it for
felony murderers with no intent to kill. In addition, "[a]t least four other States ... also
restrict the imposition of capital punishment to those who actually commit and intend to
commit murder, and two more States reject the death penalty for most felony murderers."
Id.
118. Id. at 176-79.
119. 487 U.S. 815, 830 (1988) (plurality opinion). The plurality here consisted of Jus-
tices Stevens, Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun. Id. at 818.
120. Id. at 835.
121. Id. at 835-36.
122. Id. at 829. Eighteen states established a minimum age of eligibility for the death
penalty of 16 at the time of the offense; nineteen other states that allowed the death pen-
alty had set no minimum age for eligibility. Id. at 826-27, 829. At the time of argument in
[t]he conclusion that it would offend civilized standards of de-
cency to execute a person who was less than 16 years old at the
time of his or her offense is consistent with the views that have
been expressed ... by other nations that share our Anglo-Amer-
ican heritage, and by the leading members of the Western Euro-
pean community.12
Thus, adding to the views expressed in Trop, Coker, and Enmund, the
plurality reiterated the relevance of international opinion in its assess-
ment of the cruel and unusual nature of a punishment. 124
Statistics showing that only eighteen to twenty defendants were
executed in the twentieth century for crimes they committed when
they were below the age of sixteen, demonstrated to the plurality that
imposition of the death penalty on fifteen-year-old offenders was now
"generally abhorrent to the conscience of the community."'" Statis-
tics of jury sentencing behavior also showed that only five of the 1393
persons sentenced to death during the survey period were under the
age of sixteen at the time of the crime. 126 The evolving standards thus
revealed that death inflicted on fifteen-year-olds was cruel and unu-
sual punishment in the eyes of society.
However, because the analysis must proceed beyond the objec-
tive "evolving standards" assessment, 27 the plurality went on to find
the penalty violative of proportionality requirements, as well as lack-
ing in penological justification. Juveniles as a class are inherently less
this case, 14 states did not authorize the death penalty. Id at 826. Eight of the 14 jurisdic-
tions cited by the plurality in Thompson as not authorizing the death penalty affirmatively
acted to abolish the death penalty by statute; the remainder simply did not include the
punishment among the options. Ia at 826-27 n.25. This is a distinction without a differ-
ence, however, since in either case, the state has affirmatively chosen not to impose the
penalty under any circumstance, either by abolishing it formally or by excluding it from the
available options.
In response to a dissent argument that the defendant could theoretically be executed
in 19 states, the plurality countered by considering those states with, as well as those states
without, capital punishment. A consideration of all states' enactments would show that
half of those states exempted 15-year-olds from society's ultimate punishment: "the execu-
tion would be impermissible in 32 States." Id. at 829 n.29 (emphasis in original). Whether
to consider those states that do not authorize the death penalty in the analysis of evolving
standards of decency has been controversial within the recent Court. See, e.g., text accom-
panying infra notes 433-444.
123. Thompson, 487 U.S. at 830 (footnote omitted). The plurality also took note of the
views of professional organizations such as the American Bar Association and the Ameri-
can Law Institute in its conclusion that society's standards of decency were offended by the
execution of juveniles. Id
124. Id. at 830 n.31.
125. Id. at 832; see also infra note 158 for a discussion of the dissent's rather caustic
rebuke of the plurality for reliance on these figures.
126. Thompson, 487 U.S. at 832-33.
127. See supra notes 24-36 and accompanying text.
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culpable than adults because of their lack of experience, self-control,
and education. 12 Thus, the penalty of death is disproportional in the
sense that it does not relate directly to juveniles' lessened moral culpa-
bility. In addition, the goal of retribution is not served by executing
these less culpable offenders, 29 because it would be inconsistent with
our "respect for the dignity of men" to execute one with lessened cul-
pability. 130 In essence, juvenile conduct is less morally reprehensible
and thus not deserving of the ultimate penalty.
Similarly, the deterrence rationale is not served by execution of
juveniles because they likely do not contemplate or weigh the possibil-
ity of execution when they make decisions to act.' 31 Even if they did
make such calculations, they would not be deterred when knowing
that being executed for a crime committed as a juvenile is as uncom-
mon as being struck by lightning.132 Finally, removing juveniles from
the class of persons eligible for the death penalty would not lessen the
general deterrent effect because the number of those arrested for
death-eligible crimes who are under sixteen years old is so low. 133 In
other words, most of the potential killers will still be deterred because
they could be executed even after the exemption of this class of
offenders.
While not expressly looking to the objective indicators of the
evolving standard of decency for what those indicators had to say
about proportionality, retribution, or deterrence, the plurality seemed
to recognize the linkage between the two when it stated, "these in-
dicators of contemporary standards of decency confirm our judgment
that such a young person is not capable of acting with the degree of
culpability that can justify the ultimate penalty."'" The plurality
nonetheless retained the emphasis that "'it is for [the Court] ulti-
mately to judge whether the Eighth Amendment permits [this] impo-
sition of the death penalty.'"135
With Thompson, several members of the current Court began to
articulate more clearly their differences with the plurality over certain
issues-differences that have continued to manifest themselves in
128. Thompson, 487 U.S. at 834-35.
129. Id. at 837.
130. See id. at 836-37.
131. Id. at 837.
132. Id at 833, 838.
133. Id. at 837. Statistics revealed that only two percent of those arrested for willful
homicide were 16 years of age or younger at the time of their crimes. Id.
134. Id at 823 (emphasis added).
135. Id at 833 (quoting Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 797 (1982)).
more recent decisions. Justice O'Connor, for instance, although con-
curring in the judgment,'36 disagreed with the plurality about the per-
suasiveness of the evidence purporting to show a societal consensus
against executing those under the age of sixteen.' 37 The nineteen
states that set no minimum age for eligibility for the death penalty 38
either chose to make fifteen-year-olds eligible for death (because eve-
ryone was death-eligible) or simply did not consider the issue when
they established their death penalty schemes. Justice O'Connor spec-
ulated that if these states in fact considered the issue and chose to
make fifteen-year-olds eligible for the death penalty, then no clear
consensus against juvenile execution would exist.' 39 For this reason,
Justice O'Connor found a dearth of evidence of societal acceptance of
executions of members of this class, as expressed by legislative enact-
ments. She therefore could only join in the judgment and could not
state as a matter of constitutional law that there was societal opposi-
tion to these executions. 40 In reaching that conclusion, however, she
did consider, in her analysis of those states opposed to the execution
of fifteen-year-olds, those states that had abolished the death penalty
altogether.141
Justice O'Connor also did not believe that statistical proof of jury
sentencing behavior was adequate or accurate enough to inform the
Court about jurors' inclinations toward imposing the death penalty on
juveniles. 4 Acknowledging that "[iun previous cases, we have ex-
amined execution statistics, as well as data about jury determina-
tions"'143 to make these assessments, she nevertheless saw inadequate
evidence of the number of times prosecutors sought the death penalty
against these offenders or the number of times they exercised their
discretion not to seek the penalty. 4 She admitted that the available
statistics tended to establish the requisite consensus against death in
these cases, but concluded that they simply were not reliable enough
in the absence of the aforementioned data.' 45
136. Id. at 848 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
137. Id at 848-49. Justice O'Connor believed a consensus did exist but was not pre-
pared to state that, as a constitutional matter, the evidence was clear. Id.
138. See supra note 122.
139. Thompson, 487 U.S. at 852.
140. Id at 849-52.
141. Id at 849.
142. Id. at 853.
143. Id. at 852.
144. Id. at 853.
145. Id.; see also Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 818-19 (1982) (O'Connor, J., dissent-
ing) (making a similar argument with regard to felony murder cases). Because some of this
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Although Justice O'Connor agreed with the need to perform pro-
portionality analysis to measure a defendant's blameworthiness in re-
lation to his punishment, she disagreed that one could state
definitively that as a class, fifteen-year-olds were less culpable than
adults." In her view, even if members of this class were generally
less blameworthy, "it does not necessarily follow that all 15-year-olds
are incapable of the moral culpability that would justify the imposition
of capital punishment."' 47 In the end, she would leave the decision to
state legislatures to draw the line at which juveniles could not be
executed. 48
Ultimately, Justice O'Connor would have reversed the defend-
ant's death sentence on the more narrow ground that he could not
constitutionally be executed pursuant to a statute that established no
minimum age.' 49 She saw enough evidence of national consensus
against execution of a member of this class to make suspect a death
sentence imposed under a statute silent as to this class member.150
Dissenting in Thompson, Justice Scalia,' joined by Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justice White, stated more absolutely his adherence to
the evolving standards of decency as the sole determinant of a punish-
ment's constitutionality, beyond the historical usage determination. 2
The dissent first concluded that because death for juveniles was ac-
cepted at common law and at the time the Bill of Rights was ratified,
there was no basis under that benchmark for a finding of
unconstitutionality. 153
In addition, according to the dissent, because a full forty percent
of the states at the time of the hearing on this case would have permit-
ted the execution of a fifteen-year-old, there was no evolving standard
of decency evinced by state legislative action against such an execu-
tion.' 5 Justice Scalia went further to note his disagreement with the
evidence would seem nearly impossible to acquire, and even though the Court has ana-
lyzed this question without such evidence in the past, see, e.g., supra notes 93-96 and ac-
companying text, one could argue that Justice O'Connor is raising a nearly insurmountable
burden for death penalty defendants who seek to challenge their sentences on the basis of
the evolving standards of decency as evidenced in part by jury sentencing behavior.
146. Thompson, 487 U.S. at 852.
147. Id (emphasis added).
148. Id. at 854.
149. Id. at 857-58.
150. Id. at 857.
151. Id at 859 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
152. Id.
153. Id. at 864.
154. Id at 868. Nineteen states set no minimum age for eligibility for the death penalty.
See supra note 122. For a discussion of Justice Scalia's disagreement with Justice Brennan
plurality over the use of evidence of international opinion to deter-
mine the evolving standards of decency. 55 Without supporting au-
thority, and despite that the Court has traditionally consulted such
evidence, 156 Justice Scalia opined that the enactments of our nation's
state legislatures were "determinative of the question..., even if that
position contradicts the uniform view of the rest of the world.' 57
Finally, while noting that statistics of jury behavior revealed the
rarity of execution 58 of those who committed their crimes under the
age of sixteen, Justice Scalia stated nonetheless that there was "no
basis.., for attributing that phenomenon to a modern consensus that
such an execution should never occur. '' 59  Rather, the statistics
demonstrated, in Justice Scalia's view, that society agreed the punish-
ment should be imposed on this class only rarely.160
regarding the proper grouping of states whose enactments are to be considered in deter-
mining the evolving standard, see text accompanying infra notes 433-444.
155. Thompson, 487 U.S. at 868 n.4.
156. See supra notes 72, 97-99, 123-124 and accompanying text.
157. Thompson, 487 U.S at 868 n.4.
158. Justice Scalia rebuked the plurality's interpretation of jury sentencing behavior,
stating that it did not deliver an evaluation of that behavior, as it promised, but rather
focused on actual executions of those who committed their crimes under the age of 16. Id.
at 869. By using statistics of executions, he urged, the plurality used a number that was of
course much lower, consisting of 18 or 20 during the entire twentieth century. Id. By
contrast, he cited the "inconvenient fact" that between 1984 and 1986, "no fewer than five
murderers who committed their crimes under the age of 16 were sentenced to death, in five
different States . . . ." Id. Justice Scalia appeared to reject this figure as evidence of any
jury consensus against death for these defendants, yet failed to supply comparative data
regarding the entire population of those sentenced to death during that period, and thus
left the picture incomplete.
Additionally, although he accurately stated that the plurality examined the frequency
of executions of juveniles, he inaccurately implied that the plurality based its evaluation of
sentencing behavior solely on those statistics. See id. In fact, the plurality also noted that
of the 1393 murderers who were sentenced to death between 1982 and 1986, only five of
them were under 16 years of age when they committed their crimes, id. at 832-33; the
plurality opinion then concluded: "Statistics of this kind ... do suggest that these five
young offenders have received sentences that are 'cruel and unusual in the same way that
being struck by lightning is cruel and unusual."' Id" at 833 (quoting Furman v. Georgia,
408 U.S. 238, 309 (1972) (Stewart, J., concurring)).
159. Thompson, 487 U.S. at 870. Justice Scalia noted the "many reasons" that would
explain the drop in juvenile executions, one of which was the general decline in support
among the public, at the time, for the death penalty. Id. at 869-70. The individualized
sentencing mandated by the Court's decision in Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978), see
infra text accompanying note 248, also contributed, in his view, to the overall decline in
imposition of the penalty.
160. 487 U.S. at 870; see also Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 819 (1982) (O'Connor,
J., dissenting) (making a similar argument regarding jury sentencing of felony murderers);
Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 182 (1976) (plurality opinion) ("[T]he reluctance of juries
in many cases to impose the sentence may well reflect the humane feeling that this most
irrevocable of sanctions should be reserved for a small number of extreme cases.");
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Just as significantly, Justice Scalia proffered his view concerning
the role of proportionality review and penological justification as req-
uisites to constitutionality,' 6' or those portions of Eighth Amendment
analysis that the Court has seen as necessary to its constitutional
role. 62 In eschewing any test other than one resorting to public opin-
ion as embodied in legislative enactments and jury sentencing behav-
ior, Justice Scalia outlined his position:
It is assuredly "for us ultimately to judge" what the Eighth
Amendment permits, but that means it is for us to judge
whether certain punishments are forbidden because, despite
what the current society thinks, they were forbidden under the
original understanding of "cruel and unusual," or because they
come within current understanding of what is "cruel and unu-
sual," because of the "evolving standards of decency" of our na-
tional society; but not because they are out of accord with the
perceptions of decency, or of penology, or of mercy, enter-
tained-or strongly entertained, or even held as an "abiding
conviction"-by a majority of the small and unrepresentative
segment of our society that sits on this Court. On its face, the
phrase "cruel and unusual'63 punishments" limits the evolving
standards appropriate for our consideration to those entertained
Furman, 408 U.S. at 388 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) ("The selectivity of juries in imposing
the punishment of death is properly viewed as a refinement on, rather than a repudiation
of, the statutory authorization for that penalty."). One commentator has argued that this
possible interpretation itself rendered suspect the use of jury sentencing behavior:
unless the consensus on cruelty is so complete that no jury ever imposes a particu-
lar penalty, one cannot determine whether a low rate of imposition indicates that
juries think the penalty is cruel or that juries reserve the penalty for those rare
heinous crimes for which they think it is not cruel.
Radin, Jurisprudence of Death, supra note 26, at 1038.
One wonders whether Justice Scalia and the dissenters here would require that no
member of the class have been sentenced or executed before they will find from jury sen-
tencing behavior some societal consensus regarding the death penalty. Such a case would
of course never make it to the Court and jury sentencing behavior as a guide to the evolv-
ing standards of decency would then be an empty, never-employed shell; a sentence then
would only be considered constitutionally "unusual" if it were never imposed. As Justice
Brennan has observed, "resort to the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause would not be
necessary to test a sentence never imposed because categorically unacceptable to juries."
Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 386 (1989) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
161. Thompson, 487 U.S. at 873.
162. See supra notes 26-36 and accompanying text.
163. In this and other opinions, Justice Scalia focuses on the conjunction "and" joining
the words "cruel" and "unusual" to support his narrow reading of the clause, by parsing
out the text of the Eighth Amendment as if it were a statute. See, eg., Harmelin v. Michi-
gan, 501 U.S. 957, 976 (1991) (Scalia, J.); Stanford, 492 U.S. at 378 (plurality opinion).
Historically, however, the Court has not interpreted the clause in that manner, but instead
has recognized that:
[t]he exact scope of the constitutional phrase "cruel and unusual" has not been
detailed by this Court.... The Court recognized in [Weems v. United States, 217
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U.S. 349 (1910)] that the words of the Amendment are not precise .... Whether
the word "unusual" has any qualitative meaning different from "cruel" is not
clear. On the few occasions this Court has had to consider the meaning of the
phrase, precise distinctions between cruelty and unusualness do not seem to have
been drawn.
Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 99-100 & n.32 (1958) (citations omitted) (emphasis added); see
also Furman, 408 U.S. at 376 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) ("Although the Eighth Amendment
literally reads as prohibiting only those punishments that are both 'cruel' and 'unusual,'
history compels the conclusion that the Constitution prohibits all punishments of extreme
and barbarous cruelty, regardless of how frequently or infrequently imposed."); Bedau,
supra note 9, at 880 ("For the Court 'and' in 'cruel and unusual punishment' is not re-
garded as a true conjunction."). But see van den Haag, supra note 26, at 958 n.6 ("Deci-
sions that interpret the conjunctive 'and unusual', as disjunctive 'or unusual,' seem less
than persuasive."). The plurality in Thompson itself noted that the Eighth Amendment's
"broad, vague terms do not yield to a mechanical parsing .... " Thompson, 487 U.S. 815,
833 n.40 (1988). For a discussion of whether the term "unusual" should be treated sepa-
rately from "cruel" and its concomitant moralistic implications, see Bedau, supra note 9, at
880-83.
In his emphasis of the phrase "and unusual," Justice Scalia has interpreted the phrase
to allow a punishment that is rarely inflicted. See Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 670-71
(1990) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) ("[Tihe text did not
originally prohibit a traditional form of punishment that is rarely imposed .... ); see also
Gey, supra note 26, at 93. Further, by requiring that, as with a statute, the punishment
must meet both elements, Justice Scalia essentially reduces the constitutional command to
a nullity. If a punishment, to be prohibited by the Constitution, must not only be cruel but
also be unusual under his definition, then virtually any punishment would, under the right
conditions, not be prohibited. Cf. Goldberg & Dershowitz, supra note 26, at 1782 (arguing
that a requirement of "virtually unanimous condemnation" would result in the Eighth
Amendment's "forbid[ding] only extremely aberrant penalties"). As long as it was ap-
proved by the requisite number of state legislatures, as long as some juries (even though
rarely) imposed the punishment, and if it had been available at the common law, the pun-
ishment of drawing and quartering would be constitutional under Justice Scalia's reading of
the Eighth Amendment; penological goals and proportionality would never factor into the
calculus because those factors would ultimately only impose the Justices' personal predilec-
tions onto an otherwise clearly-written command of the Constitution. See, e.g., Stanford,
492 U.S. at 378 (stating that "our job is to identify the 'evolving standards of decency'; to
determine, not what they should be, but what they are"). In essence, the Constitution
would then sanction a "de-evolving" standard of decency that might permit cruel punish-
ments so long as they were not unusual. Cf. Louis D. Bilionis, Moral Appropriateness,
Capital Punishment, and the Lockett Doctrine, 82 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 283, 298
n.48 (1991) (assuming for purposes of the author's thesis that standards of decency do not
necessarily "evolve" and that "even a reversion to earlier understandings might qualify as
an evolution in contemporary conceptions of decency"). But cf. Packer, supra note 7, at
1076 ("There is nothing irrational about boiling people in oil; a slow and painful death may
be thought more of a deterrent to crime than a quick and painless one. The constitutional
objection that would surely prevail is based on decency."). Justice Scalia himself has
stated: "If it is not [unusual], then the Eighth Amendment does not prohibit it, no matter
how cruel a judge might think it to be." Walton, 497 U.S. at 670 (emphasis added).
As noted, however, the Eighth Amendment has historically not been interpreted in
this manner. The Court has recognized that there are some punishments that are excessive
and simply do not accord with the "dignity of man," which concept is at the heart of the
Amendment. See supra note 25 and accompanying text. To deal with the amorphous qual-
ity of the Amendment's phrasing, the Court has formulated standards relating to penologi-
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by the society rather than those dictated by our personal
consciences. 16
In sum, because he could discern no evolving standard of decency
against the execution of those under sixteen years of age, Justice
Scalia would have upheld the death sentence in this case.
cal goals and proportionality to judge a punishment's conformance to standards of
excessiveness comporting with the dignity of the person. See supra notes 26-36 and accom-
panying text. These standards should serve to ensure an evolving standard of decency, one
that would comport with human dignity, which requires that punishments be proportional
and further certain goals of penology; the alternative would not recognize a certain mini-
mum standard of decency, but would sanction a movement backward into the arguably
more brutal past. In fact, the full phrasing of the evolving standards test itself supports the
former reading: the punishment should accord with the "evolving standards of decency that
mark the progress of a maturing society." Trop, 356 U.S. at 101 (plurality opinion) (em-
phasis added).
164. Thompson, 487 U.S. at 873 (citations omitted) (internal footnote added). Justice
Scalia, and the Chief Justice and Justice White, believed that considerations of proportion-
ality and penological justification were simply irrelevant policy questions. Id. In his total
rejection of the use of the other checks on unconstitutional state action in this context,
Justice Scalia arguably abdicated his role as one of the final arbiters of what is cruel and
unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment. In fact, he stated, "It is not necessary
... that 'we [be] persuaded' of the correctness of the people's views." Id. at 874 (quoting
plurality opinion, id. at 838) (alteration in original). Admittedly, by this approach, public
opinion rather than the Court determines what is cruel and unusual and, so, what is consti-
tutional. But Justice Scalia may have retreated from even that position. See Scott E.
Sunby, The Lockett Paradox: Reconciling Guided Discretion and Unguided Mitigation in
Capital Sentencing, 38 UCLA L. REv. 1147, 1166 (1991). Justice Scalia recently wrote:
Convictions in opposition to the death penalty are often passionate and deeply
held. That would be no excuse for reading them into a Constitution that does not
contain them, even if they represented the convictions of a majority of Ameri-
cans.... If the people conclude that ... brutal deaths may be deterred by capital
punishment; indeed, if they merely conclude that justice requires such brutal
deaths to be avenged by capital punishment; the creation of false, untextual and
unhistorical contradictions within "the Ciurt's Eighth Amendment jurispru-
dence" should not prevent them.
Callins v. Collins, 114 S. Ct. 1127, 1128 (1994) (Scalia, J., concurring in denial of certiorari)
(emphasis added); see also Walton, 497 U.S. at 671-72 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment) ("It is quite immaterial that most States have abandoned the
practice of automatically sentencing to death all offenders guilty of a capital crime ... ; still
less is it relevant that mandatory capital sentencing is (or is alleged to be) out of touch with
'contemporary community values"' regarding the administration of justice.") (citations
omitted). He seemed to argue that even if a majority of Americans opposed capital pun-
ishment, it would still be constitutional. By so arguing, he appears to throw out even the
settled "evolving standards" test, which assumes that the convictions of Americans are
accurately gauged by jury sentencing behavior and legislative enactments. What remains is
the assertion that mere vengeance will sustain a finding of constitutionality for the death
penalty. Cf. Gey, supra note 26, at 125-30 (arguing that Justice Scalia's opinions in Booth
v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496 (1987) and Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808 (1991) demonstrate
his view that satisfaction of society's desire for revenge justifies the death penalty). If that
is indeed his view, then his Eighth Amendment would essentially place no constraints on
punishments.
For critiques of Justice Scalia's originalist position, see authorities cited infra note 188.
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Justice Scalia wrote the majority opinion in the next case to ad-
dress the question of the constitutionality of executing a certain class
of defendants who were sixteen and seventeen years old. In Stanford
v. Kentucky, 165 the Court held that the evolving standards of decency
did not prohibit the execution of either class of defendants and thus
their executions were not cruel and unusual. 66 Justice Scalia noted
that the claims of the defendants boiled down to allegations that their
executions violated the evolving standards of decency component of
Eighth Amendment analysis.' 67 As he had in his Thompson dis-
sent,168 Justice Scalia, whose view now commanded a majority of the
Court,169 stressed that the standards to which the Court should look
are those of "modem American society as a whole,' 70 not those of
other nations. He reiterated that "'Eighth Amendment judgments
should not be, or appear to be, merely the subjective views of individ-
ual Justices; judgment should be informed by objective factors to the
maximum possible extent."" 7' In analyzing these objective factors of
legislative enactments and jury sentencing behavior, Justice Scalia and
the majority did not conflate evolving standards with proportionality
analysis, as they had done in Coker, Enmund, and Tison, and ap-
peared to do in Thompson.172 In rejecting other tests of constitution-
ality, 73 however, Justice Scalia did note that "the two methodologies
165. 492 U.S 361 (1989). Stanford, involving a defendant who was seventeen years old
at the time of his crime, was consolidated with Wilkins v. Missouri, in which the defendant
was sixteen at the time of his offense.
166. lid at 380. Justices O'Connor and Kennedy now joined Justice Scalia, Chief Justice
Rehnquist, and Justice White, to form the majority. Id. at 363.
167. Id. at 369.
168. See supra note 157 and accompanying text.
169. See supra note 166.
170. Stanford, 492 U.S. at 369. "We emphasize that it is American conceptions of de-
cency that are dispositive, rejecting the contention of petitioners and... amii (accepted by
the dissent) that the sentencing practices of other countries are relevant." Id. n.1 (citations
omitted).
171. Id at 369 (quoting Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977) (plurality opinion).
Justice Scalia added that "[t]his approach is dictated both by the language of the Amend-
ment-which proscribes only those punishments that are both 'cruel and unusual'-and by
the 'deference we owe to the decisions of the state legislatures under our federal system."'
I. at 369-70 (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 176 (1976)). Here again, Justice
Scalia emphasized the term "unusual" and seemingly gave it primacy over the "cruel" por-
tion of the clause; this emphasis, although without warrant historically, would seem neces-
sarily to mandate resort only to objective factors and to preclude reliance on any other
indicia, such as those concerning penological goals and proportionality, and explains Jus-
tice Scalia's consequent narrow application of the clause. See supra note 163.
172, See supra notes 69, 88, 110, 134 and accompanying text.
173, See infra notes 185-188 and accompanying text.
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blend into one another, since 'proportionality' analysis itself can only
be conducted on the basis of the standards set by our own society.' 74
In this case, because only fifteen of thirty-seven death penalty
states disallowed the execution of sixteen-year-olds, and only twelve
of thirty-seven disallowed execution of seventeen-year-olds, the Court
found no legislative consensus against the executions of members of
these classes.175 The majority would not consider in its tally those
states that declined to impose capital punishment in all cases, stating
that:
while the number of those jurisdictions bears upon the question
whether there is a consensus against capital punishment alto-
gether, it is quite irrelevant to the specific inquiry in this case:
whether there is a settled consensus in favor of punishing of-
fenders under 18 differently from those over 18 insofar as capital
punishment is concerned." 6
By contrast, the dissent, comprised of Justices Brennan, Marshall,
Blackmun, and Stevens, argued that the Court should consider all the
states that would preclude the execution of these two defendants:
those that specifically prohibited execution of members of the con-
cerned classes and those that authorized no capital punishment at
all. 177 Under that scenario, a majority, or twenty-seven states, would
refuse to execute seventeen-year-olds, and thirty would refuse to exe-
cute sixteen-year-olds. The nineteen states that have general statutes
and have not faced the question, the dissent argued, were not accurate
benchmarks of constitutionality.' Although acknowledging that the
general nature of those nineteen states' death penalty statutes did not
necessarily "cut against the constitutionality of the juvenile death pen-
alty,''1 79 Justice Brennan nonetheless argued that he "would not as-
sume,... in considering how the States stand on the moral issue that
underlies the constitutional question with which we are presented,
that a legislature that has never specifically considered the issue has
made a conscious moral choice to permit the execution of
juveniles."'18
174. Stanford, 492 U.S. at 380.
175. Id. at 370-71.
176. Id. at 370 n.2. Justice O'Connor joined this part of the opinion, see id. at 363, even
though in her Thompson concurrence she had considered abolitionist states in the calculus.
See Thompson, 487 U.S. at 849 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
177. Stanford, 492 U.S. at 384 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
178. Id- at 384-85.
179. Id. at 385 (emphasis added).
180. Id. (emphasis added).
Concerning the behavior of sentencing juries, the Stanford Court
noted that between 1982 and 1988, only fifteen of 2106 death
sentences were imposed on defendants who were sixteen years old or
younger at the times of their offenses, and only thirty were imposed
on defendants who were seventeen or younger.'81 Consistent with
Justice Scalia's dissenting opinion in Thompson,'82 the Court found
these figures indicative only of jurors' feelings that death should rarely
be imposed on these defendants, not that it should never be im-
posed.'1 3 Because neither legislative enactments nor jury sentencing
patterns-the "objective factors"-demonstrated a societal consensus
against executing these defendants, the imposition of capital punish-
ment on them was not cruel and unusual under the Eighth
Amendment. 84
Significantly, Justice Scalia again took the opportunity to disavow
reliance on proportionality and furtherance of penological goals as in-
dicia of a punishment's constitutionality,8 - and this time he was
joined by the Chief Justice and Justices White and Kennedy, making
up a plurality. 186 Reliance on anything other than the text of the Con-
stitution or "demonstrable current standards of our citizens" would be
to "replace judges of the law with a committee of philosopher-
kings";'87 the Justices' own judgments, specifically concerning propor-
tionality and whether goals of punishment were furthered by the pen-
alty, were not only irrelevant but also inappropriate to the
determination.8 8
181. Id at 373.
182. See supra note 172.
183. Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361,373-74 (1989); see also supra notes 158-160 and
accompanying text. Chief Justice Burger, in dissent in Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238,
375 (1972), had noted the irony in a finding that more grants of mercy, illustrated by infre-
quent imposition of death, indicated to the majority of Justices in Furman that death
sentences were contrary to the evolving standard; grants of mercy then set back the evolv-
ing standard of decency. Id at 398.
184. Stanford, 492 U.S. at 377, 380.
185. Id at 377-80.
186. Id at 363.
187. Id at 379. Thus far, this view commands only a plurality of the Court. Because,
however, this view would significantly alter Eighth Amendment jurisprudence and leave
the evolving standards test as the sole determinant of what constitutes cruel and unusual
punishment, the thrust of this Article is to critically evaluate recent developments in death
penalty law and their impact on the evolving standards test.
188. See id at 378-79. A commentator has noted Justice Scalia's "penchant for im-
parting determinate meaning to fundamentally indeterminate text, insisting all along that
the meaning he has divined is in no sense personally supplied .... " Bilionis, supra note
163, at 330 n.153; see also id. at 329-30. Others have more generally discussed his textualist
approach to constitutional adjudication. See M. David Gelfand & Keith Werhan, Federal-
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Justice O'Connor did not join that part of the opinion that re-
jected the Court's use of proportionality and "furtherance of peno-
logical goals" analysis and stated her belief in the relevance and
propriety of the application of proportionality analysis to Eighth
Amendment challenges. 189 Similarly, dissenting Justice Brennan,
joined by Justices Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens, saw the need and
the precedent for invoking other tools beyond the objective indicia for
determining the cruel and unusual nature of a punishment. 190 Specifi-
cally, the dissent recognized the Court's historic role in judging the
constitutionality of a punishment by looking also to its contribution to
accepted goals of punishment and its proportionality to the blamewor-
thiness of the offender) 91
Noting Justice Scalia's circumscription of the constitutional analy-
sis to only those modes evincing public opinion, Justice Brennan
charged that the Court would:
abandon[ ] its proven and proper role in our constitutional sys-
tem when it [would] hand[ ] back to the very majorities the
Framers distrusted the power to define the precise scope of pro-
tection afforded by the Bill of Rights, rather than bringing its
own judgment to bear on that question, after complete
analysis.' -9
In this case, according to the dissent, Justice Scalia and other members
of the plurality would allow political majorities to determine the con-
stitutional boundaries of the Eighth Amendment. 193 Following this
case, however, a majority of the Court continued to consider propor-
tionality and penological goal analyses necessary to Eighth Amend-
ment adjudication.
ism and Separation of Powers on a "Conservative" Court: Currents and Cross-Currents
From Justices O'Connor and Scalia, 64 TUL. L. REv. 1443, 1460-63 (1990); George Kannar,
The Constitutional Catechism of Antonin Scalia, 99 YALE L.J. 1297 (1990). For a scathing
critique of Justice Scalia's death penalty jurisprudence generally, see Gey, supra note 26.
For general critiques of the originalist approach in the Eighth Amendment context, see
Bedau, supra note 9; William J. Brennan, Jr., Constitutional Adjudication and the Death
Penalty: A View From the Court, 100 HARV. L. REv. 313, 324-26 (1986).
189. Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 382 (1989) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part
and concurring in the judgment). But see infra notes 211-214 and accompanying text re-
garding her deference to the legislature on the question of proportionality, raising ques-
tions about her commitment to this prong of the analysis.
190. Stanford, 492 U.S. at 391 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
191. Id at 393.
192. Id. at 392.
193. Id. at 391; see also supra note 164.
Penry v. Lynaugh'94 is the latest case in which the Court was con-
fronted, inter alia, with the issue of the possible exemption of an en-
tire class of defendants from capital punishment. Because defendant
Penry had been assessed as having an IQ of between fifty and sixty-
three, his death sentence presented the question of the propriety of
executing a mentally retarded individual. 95 The majority, which in-
cluded Justice O'Connor, Chief Justice Rehnquist, and Justices White,
Scalia, and Kennedy,196 held that execution of the mentally retarded
offended neither the common law nor the evolving standards of de-
cency.197 A review of state legislative enactments showed that at that
time only one state prohibited the execution of the mentally re-
tarded;198 hence, "the single state statute..., even when added to the
14 States that have rejected capital punishment completely, does not
provide sufficient evidence at present of a national consensus."' 99 Be-
cause the defendant presented no evidence of jury sentencing behav-
ior or behavior of prosecutors in regard to execution of the mentally
retarded, the standards of decency were judged according to legisla-
tive enactments alone.200
Justice O'Connor repeated her commitment to the penological
goals and proportionality assessments, but stated that those assess-
194. 492 U.S. 302 (1989). Penry was decided on the same day as Stanford. Justice
O'Connor wrote the Penry opinion, parts of which were joined by various members of the
Court. Justice Brennan, joined by Justice Marshall, concurred in part and dissented in part.
Id. at 306. Justice Stevens, joined by Justice Blackmun, concurred in part and dissented in
part. fl Justice Scalia, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices White and Ken-
nedy, concurred in part and dissented in part. 1d.
195. 1&i at 307, 313. According to the evidence presented, Penry was considered mildly
or moderately retarded. Id.
196. Id. at 306.
197. hd at 333, 335.
198. Id. at 334 (citing GA. CODE ANN. § 17-7-1310) (Supp. 1988)). Since Penry was
decided, at least eight more states have prohibited execution of the mentally retarded. See,
e.g., COLO. REv. STAT. § 16-11-103 (Supp. 1995); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-50-2-9 (West Supp.
1994); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 532.140 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1990); MD. CODE ANN.,
CRIM. LAW art. 27 § 412 (Supp. 1994); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-20A-2.1 (Michie Supp. 1995);
N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAw § 400.27(12) (McKinney Supp. 1996); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-
203 (Supp. 1994); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 10.95.030(2) (West Supp. 1995). But see N.Y.
CRIM. PROC. LAW § 400.27(12)(d) (McKinney Supp. 1996), (allowing a death sentence
when one found mentally retarded committed first-degree murder, inter alia, while in
prison).
199. Penry, 492 U.S. at 334. The majority here was composed in part of the four who
joined the majority in Stanford and disagreed that the abolitionist states' acts should be
considered. Nonetheless, the majority considered those statutes in the tally, likely because
the case was clearer that there was no settled consensus against death for the mentally
retarded among the death penalty states.
200. Id. at 334-35.
Winter 19961 EVOLVING STANDARD OF DECENCY
494 HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 23:455
ments "[r]ely[ ] largely on objective evidence such as the judgments of
legislatures and juries.120 1 Nonetheless, she appeared to conduct her
own assessments and found no categorical violation of those prongs of
analysis.20 2 For this portion of the opinion, no other member of the
Court joined Justice O'Connor. °3
After noting that a majority in this case and in Stanford reaf-
firmed the necessity of assessing a penalty by its contribution to peno-
logical goals and its proportionality to the culpability of the
offender, 20 4 Justice Brennan, joined in concurrence and dissent by Jus-
tice Marshall, reasoned that mentally retarded persons as a class were
less culpable, and that therefore, the sentence of death was unconsti-
tutionally disproportionate.2 5 He further opined that execution of
the mentally retarded would not further the penological goal of retri-
bution, due to the lessened culpability of these offenders, and would
not further the goal of deterrence, due to the inability of mentally
retarded individuals to reason through various courses of behavior
and their consequences. 20 6
Again Justice Scalia, joined by the Chief Justice and Justices
White and Kennedy, stressed his rejection of the "nonobjective" fac-
tors of Eighth Amendment analysis.2 7 He also again accented the
"and unusual" portion of the Amendment, stating that "[i]f it is not
unusual, that is, if an objective examination of laws and jury determi-
nations fails to demonstrate society's disapproval of it, the punishment
201. Id at 335.
202. i& at 336-40; but see supra note 189. As in Thompson, Justice O'Connor could not
say that all mentally retarded persons could never act with the requisite degree of culpabil-
ity that would subject them to a death sentence, or that imposition of the penalty on mem-
bers of this class is always disproportionate to their levels of culpability. Penry, 492 U.S. at
338.
203. Penry, 492 U.S. at 306.
204. Id at 342-43 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice Bren-
nan made no mention of Justice O'Connor's purported reliance on objective indicia to
make proportionality, retribution, and deterrence evaluations, perhaps because she did not
in fact rely on those objective indicators but conducted her own evaluation.
205. Id. at 346.
206. Id. at 348-49. The removal of this class of persons from those who are eligible for
the death penalty would also not affect any deterrent value of the death penalty in more
general terms, as those who are not mentally retarded would still be subject to the death
penalty. Id. at 348.
A plurality of the Court would have held the punishment unconstitutional, as Justice
Stevens, joined by Justice Blackmun, wrote separately to state his opinion that execution of
the mentally retarded was unconstitutional. Without detailing the bases for his view, he
merely indicated that the arguments outlined in Justice O'Connor's opinion, which in-
cluded that respecting proportionality and penological goals analyses, led him to a result
opposite from hers. lId at 349-50 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
207. Id. at 351 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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is not unconstitutional even if out of accord with the theories of penol-
ogy favored by the Justices of this Court. '20 8  Nonetheless, after
Penry, a majority of the Court held firm to the appropriateness of the
Court's employment of these other modes of analysis, beyond the his-
torical acceptance assessment and the use of the basic objective indi-
cia of evolving standards of decency.
A review of these cases illuminates an adherence by a plurality of
the 1989 Court to the rough construct of a pro-death, self-fulfilling
constitutional framework for analyzing death penalty appeals.20 9
Under this construct, three members of the current Court210-Chief
Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia and Kennedy-would first jetti-
son any requirement that the Court measure a sentence of death
against goals of penology or against proportionality standards, be-
cause these factors purportedly would inject the Justices' own moral
inclinations into the analysis. Justice O'Connor may adhere to a
somewhat tautologically stunted Eighth Amendment analysis con-
cerning these additional checks. In one case she admitted the rele-
vance of proportionality analysis to determine the constitutionality of
a death sentence, and even agreed that defendant's blameworthiness
should be compared to the severity of the punishment.21' Yet she ulti-
mately would have left the proportionality measurement to state legis-
208. Id.; see also supra notes 163-164, 171, 187-188 and accompanying text.
209. The plurality included Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices White, Scalia, and
Kennedy. Justice White has since retired.
210. The group would be restored to a clear plurality if Justice Thomas assumed Justice
White's position. That substitution seems a strong possibility, given that Justice Thomas
elsewhere seems to share Justice Scalia's originalist approach to constitutional interpreta-
tion. See, eg., Clarence Thomas, Toward a "Plain Reading" of the Constitution-The Dec-
laration of Independence in Constitutional Interpretation, 30 How. L.J. 983, 984 (1987)
(urging that the Constitution be interpreted according to the original intentions of the
founders, as embodied in the Declaration of Independence, when determining "the policy
of action towards Black Americans"). Another commentator has observed that Justice
Thomas also shares Justice Scalia's "plain meaning" approach to statutory construction.
See Bradley C. Karkkainen, Note, "Plain Meaning". Justice Scalia's Jurisprudence of Strict
Statutory Construction, 17 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 401, 401 (1994). Justice Scalia's
originalist approach emphasizes the "plain meaning" of the conjunction "and unusual" in
the Eighth Amendment language, as one would with a statute, and therefore looks only to
objective indicators of societal standards to determine whether imposition of the death
penalty is "unusual" in our society. See supra notes 163, 171. Hence, Justice Thomas's
agreement with Justice Scalia's originalism and "plain meaning" approach to statutory con-
struction should lead him to join in the rejection of the Court's assessment of proportional-
ity and penological justification, because that assessment would have no bearing on the
"unusualness" of society's employment of a punishment.
211. See Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 853 (1988) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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latures.212 Under that approach, instead of being a separate check on
a punishment's constitutionality, the Court's proportionality analysis
would become a mere subset of the evolving standards test.213 Be-
cause legislative decisions regarding proportionality would be given
deference, the Court's own proportionality analysis would fall to the
deference accorded legislative enactments. 1 4 In this way, legislative
enactments would become one of the sole determinants of constitu-
tionality while Justice O'Connor abdicated the Court's ultimate power
of judicial review in the death penalty context.
In other cases, however, Justice O'Connor stressed the impor-
tance of the Court's retaining a check on constitutionality by con-
ducting proportionality analysis itself.215 In the most recent case, she
appeared to remain faithful to both of those approaches.216 If Justice
O'Connor returns to that apparent deferential approach to legislative
enactments, she will render the Court's role that of a mere head-
counter. Thus, there may currently be four Justices that favor, even if
de facto, the exclusive use of the so-called objective indicators.
Next, a clear plurality of the Chief Justice and Justices Scalia,
Kennedy, and O'Connor would confine any evaluation of the legisla-
tive-enactment prong of the evolving standards test to a consideration
212. See id. at 854 (stating that "I would not substitute our inevitably subjective judg-
ment about the best age at which to draw a line in the capital punishment context for the
judgments of the Nation's legislatures").
213. If state legislatures found this class of defendants culpable enough to deserve
death, and if this finding was all that the Court looked to, then the Court would rubber-
stamp the culpability determination, and hence the proportionality determination, rather
than conducting its own constitutional inquiry. The Court would then heighten the proba-
tive value of the very instrument the constitutionality of which was at issue; state death
penalty laws would then have had two decisive places in the constitutional analysis, under
the evolving standards of decency test and under proportionality analysis. Rather than
determining what was constitutional, the Court would be abdicating that assessment to the
state legislatures. Cf. Radin, Jurisprudence of Death, supra note 26, at 1036 ("[Conclusive
reliance on [legislative enactments] either through substantive definition or extreme judi-
cial deference is circular. Constitutional doctrine may not be formulated by the acts of
those institutions which the Constitution is supposed to limit.").
214. Cf. Scott W. Howe, Reassessing the Individualization Mandate in Capital Sentenc-
ing: Darrow's Defense of Leopold and Loeb, 79 IOWA L. Rav. 989, 1058 n.402 (1994) (not-
ing that, for Justice O'Connor, "a finding of disproportionality... appears highly unlikely
without a finding that public attitudes are opposed to the death penalty in the relevant
context").
215. See Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 152-54, 155-58 (1987) (Justice O'Connor
authoring opinion for the majority in which legislative enactments were used to gauge pro-
portionality, in addition to Court's own proportionality determination); Enmund v. Flor-
ida, 458 U.S. 782, 815, 824 (1982) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (stressing that proportionality
involves not only consideration of contemporary standards of decency but also the harm
caused and the level of defendant's culpability).
216. See supra notes 201-202 and accompanying text.
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of only those American states that currently authorize the death pen-
alty, thus skewing the calculus away from legitimate evidence of anti-
death penalty sentiment. Finally, and again pertaining to the evolving
standards of decency computation, it is unclear exactly what evidence
of jury sentencing behavior this plurality would require of a defend-
ant; those Justices have viewed even very low numbers of sentences
only as evidence that juries would impose death on those defendants
in rare and essentially horrible circumstances. In effect, they view the
statistics as positive evidence that the jury takes its job very seriously
and only sentences death in those extreme cases when it is warranted.
Before finding a death sentence contrary to the evolving standards,
the plurality thus would potentially require a defendant to show, from
jury sentencing behavior, a virtual impossibility: that no jury would
sentence a defendant to death under these circumstances.217
It is clear that there is at least a three-member plurality218 consist-
ing of the Chief Justice and Justices Scalia and Kennedy that would
eliminate the Court's own measurements and rely only on historical
usage and the objective indicia of the evolving standards of decency.
By examining only public opinion as evidenced by legislative enact-
ments in pro-death penalty states, and accepting as further evidence of
public opinion only those jury decisions that show virtually no one in
defendant's position has been sentenced to death and thus essentially
eliminating that index from the calculus, the plurality has structured a
test that by itself would more likely lead to a conclusion of constitu-
tionality in death penalty cases.
Because, however, these cases deal only with the substantive
challenges concerning the constitutionality of executing certain classes
of defendants, one can discern only the outlines of the pro-death con-
struct. The possibility that new members of the Court219 would join
this plurality makes it imperative that the evolving standards test be
further critically evaluated for its objectivity and reliability on the con-
stitutional question. To that end, an examination of early procedural
challenges to death sentences is necessary because other, later lines of
cases addressing procedural issues have been decided in ways that fur-
ther steer the constitutional analysis in cases involving substantive
challenges toward the inevitable conclusion of constitutionality for
217. See supra note 160.
218. But see supra note 210.
219. Justices Souter, Thomas, Ginsburg, and Breyer have yet to take a position on this
issue, but see supra note 210 for a prediction of Justice Thomas's approach. Justice Stevens
adheres to the doctrine set out in Gregg and its progeny.
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sentences of death, by combining as pro-death influences on jury
decisionmaking.
B. Procedural Challenges to Death Sentences
Defendants have challenged death penalty schemes both for the
failure of aggravating circumstances to guide the jury and for the in-
ability or failure of the sentencer to consider relevant mitigating cir-
cumstances. Through these challenges, the Court has refined its
jurisprudence to find the unequivocal requirements in the Eighth
Amendment of both channeling the jury's discretion to impose death
and individualizing sentencing. The latter contemplates that the jury
not be precluded from hearing and considering evidence about the
circumstances of the crime or character and record of the offender
that might counsel for a sentence less than death. These doctrines
influence jury sentencing patterns and are therefore relevant to a criti-
cal evaluation of the evolving standards test. This section will set the
stage for later discussion in Part IV.A., which details some of the more
recent and significant modifications to these basic doctrines and these
modifications' contribution to the rigging of the evolving standards
test.
1. Aggravating Circumstances and Vagueness
In keeping with the dictates of Gregg v. Georgia,"2° to avoid the
arbitrary imposition of the death penalty on those who are not truly
deserving, the Court has required that states develop schemes that
narrow the class of murderers and to cull from that class only those
most deserving of the ultimate punishment. The Court recognized
that "[a] system could have standards so vague that they would fail
adequately to channel the sentencing decision patterns of juries with
the result that a pattern of arbitrary and capricious sentencing like
that found unconstitutional in Furman could occur."2'2 Based on
these doctrinal outlines, challenges could be brought against the
broad, nonlimiting nature of aggravating factors in state death penalty
schemes.
220. 428 U.S. 153, 189, 204-06 (1976) (plurality opinion).
221. Id. at 195 n.46. More recently, the Court noted in Zant v. Stephens that "an aggra-
vating circumstance must genuinely narrow the class of persons eligible for the death pen-
alty and must reasonably justify the imposition of a more severe sentence on the defendant
compared to others found guilty of murder." 462 U.S. 862, 877 (1983); see also Richmond
v. Lewis, 506 U.S. 40, 46 (1992) ("[A] statutory aggravating factor is unconstitutionally
vague if it fails to furnish principled guidance for the choice between death and a lesser
penalty.").
The Court began to refine its jurisprudence regarding the treat-
ment accorded aggravating circumstances in Godfrey v. Georgia2 "
and Maynard v. Cartwright. 3 The specific challenge in those cases
was whether an aggravating factor supplied by the statute was uncon-
stitutionally vague 4 in that it provided "'no meaningful basis for dis-
tinguishing the few cases in which [death] is imposed from the many
cases in which it is not."' '2 s In Godfrey, the plurality opinion reiter-
ated the precept that vague aggravators, in their failure to channel the
sentencer's discretion to impose the death penalty, were unconstitu-
tional under the Eighth Amendment. 6
The statutory aggravator challenged in Godfrey allowed the jury
to sentence to death provided it found that the crime "'was outra-
geously or wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman in that it involved tor-
ture, depravity of mind, or an aggravated battery to the victim.1' ' 1 7
The jury found only that the murder was "outrageously or wantonly
vile, horrible and inhuman."'  Because almost any murder could be
characterized as "horrible," "vile," or "inhuman," the finding by itself
failed to show that the sentencer's discretion to impose death had
been narrowed by a restriction on the class of murders for which
death was an appropriate punishment.229 Although conceding that
the state supreme court could provide a constitutional narrowing con-
struction to an otherwise vague aggravator and thus save the provi-
sion, there was no evidence that the trial court had instructed with the
narrowed construction.230 The state supreme court on appeal of this
case had also failed to apply a limiting construction.231
Similarly, in Maynard, the Court examined the alleged vagueness
of the aggravator permitting the imposition of death if the murder was
"'especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel."'" 2 Relying on Godfrey, the
Court found this aggravating circumstance no more certain than the
222. 446 U.S. 420 (1980) (plurality opinion).
223. 486 U.S. 356 (1988); see also Shell v. Mississippi, 498 U.S. 1 (1990) (per curiam).
224. See Godfrey, 446 U.S. at 423; Cartwright, 486 U.S. at 360.
225. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 188 (1976) (plurality opinion) (quoting Furman v.
Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 313 (1972) (White, J., concurring)).
226. 446 U.S. at 428.
227. Id. at 422 (quoting GA. CODE ANN. § 27-2534.1(b)(7) (1978)).
228. Id. at 428.
229. Id. at 428-29.
230. Itd at 429.
231. Id. at 432. The Georgia Supreme Court had, in other cases, narrowed the ag-
gravator to apply only to murders evidencing some torture to or an aggravated battery on
the victim. Id. at 431.
232. Maynard v. Cartwright, 486 U.S. 356, 359 (1988) (quoting OK.A. STAT. tit. 21,
§ 701.12(4) (1981)).
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Georgia provision: "an ordinary person could honestly believe that
every unjustified, intentional taking of human life is 'especially hei-
nous."' 233 Additionally, the appellate court's finding that the verdict
was supported by the horrible facts of the case was not sufficient "to
cure the unfettered discretion of the jury and to satisfy the commands
of the Eighth Amendment. '234 The aggravator, therefore, was uncon-
stitutionally vague and the death sentence could not stand 3 5
In Walton v. Arizona,2 36 the Court assessed the constitutionality
of an aggravator nearly identical to that evaluated in Maynard.237 The
Court upheld1 8 this aggravator because the Arizona Supreme Court
had supplied a construction that guided the sentencer:239 "especially
cruel manner" was interpreted to mean "'when the perpetrator inflicts
mental anguish or physical abuse before the victim's death,' and that
'[m]ental anguish includes a victim's uncertainty as to his ultimate
fate," '24 while "especially depraved manner" meant "when the per-
petrator 'relishes the murder, evidencing debasement or perversion,'
or 'shows an indifference to the suffering of the victim and evidences a
sense of pleasure' in the killing."'24 Because these interpretations
"provide[d] some guidance to the sentencer,"' 42 to separate those
murders appropriate for a death sentence from those that were not,
the aggravator was not unconstitutionally vague.
From these cases, then, it is evident that a statutory aggravator
cannot, under the Eighth Amendment, be so vague as to sweep within
its purview virtually any murder; to do so would be to revert to pre-
Furman arbitrariness. The aggravator may, however, be vague on its
233. ML at 363-64. For a persuasive argument that these types of aggravators are inca-
pable of being narrowed even by judicial construction, that they thus fail to provide the
guidance that Gregg required, and that they are therefore terminally and unconstitution-
ally vague, see Richard A. Rosen, The "Especially Heinous" Aggravating Circumstance in
Capital Cases-The Standardless Standard, 64 N.C. L. RIv. 941 (1986).
234. Id. at 364.
235. Id.
236. 497 U.S. 639 (1990). Comprising the majority for this portion of the opinion were
Justice White, Chief Justice Rehnquist, and Justices O'Connor, Scalia, and Kennedy. Id. at
641.
237. See id. at 643. The aggravator required the sentencer to determine whether the
murder was committed in "an especially heinous, cruel, or depraved manner." Id.; see also
Lewis v. Jeffers, 497 U.S. 764 (1990).
238. Walton, 497 U.S. at 655.
239. The sentencer in this case was the trial judge, so the Court presumed that the judge
knew the limiting construction and applied it. Id. at 653.
240. Id. at 654 (quoting Walton v. State, 769 P.2d 1017, 1032 (Ariz. 1989) (alteration in
original)).
241. Id. at 655 (quoting Walton, 769 P.2d at 1033).
242. Id. at 654 (emphasis added).
face and still pass constitutional muster if the state courts have articu-
lated a sufficiently narrow definition that will serve to guide the sen-
tencer in its determination whether death is the appropriate sentence.
The subsequent judicial narrowing will suitably channel the sen-
tencer's discretion to those cases deemed appropriate for society's ul-
timate punishment. The problem arises, for purposes of the thesis
presented here, when even the Supreme Court upholds as constitu-
tional a purportedly "narrowed" construction that is itself vague and
hence useless in performing the guiding function. This phenomenon
adds to the combined effects of the Supreme Court's rulings in other
areas to rig the evolving standards test and will be addressed, in that
regard, below. 243
2. Mitigating Circumstances and Unbridled Discretion
a. General Principles
The early cases that addressed alleged deficiencies regarding miti-
gating evidence and refined this line of doctrine were Lockett v.
Ohio,24 and Eddings v. Oklahoma.245 Lockett involved a death pen-
alty scheme that required the imposition of the penalty, after the jury
returned a certain verdict with a finding of specified aggravating fac-
tors, unless the sentencer found the existence of one of three mitigat-
ing factors.2 4 6 In expanding on Woodson's command that the
character and record of the individual offender be considered in the
243. The fact of this phenomenon is what is significant for the thesis advanced here; a
thorough critique of the propriety of the Court's decisions in this area is therefore beyond
the scope of this Article. For other decisions upholding death sentences after application
of arguably vague aggravating factors, see Arave v. Creech, 113 S. Ct. 1534 (1993); Lewis v.
Jeffers, 497 U.S. 764 (1990); Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862 (1983). But see Stringer v.
Black, 503 U.S. 222 (1992); Espinosa v. Florida, 505 U.S. 1079 (1992); Richmond v. Lewis,
506 U.S. 40 (1992).
244. 438 U.S. 586 (1978) (plurality opinion). In the plurality on this point were Chief
Justice Burger and Justices Stewart, Powell, and Stevens. Id. at 589. Justice Brennan took
no part, id. at 609, while Justice Marshall concurred in the judgment. Id. at 619. Justices
White and Rehnquist dissented as to this portion of the opinion. Id. at 621 (White, J.,
concurring in part, dissenting in part, and concurring in the judgments of the Court); id. at
628 (Rehnquist, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). See also Bell v. Ohio, 438
U.S. 637 (1978) (decided with Lockett).
245. 455 U.S. 104 (1982).
246. Specifically, the trial judge could decline to impose the death penalty if, in consid-
ering defendant's "'history, character, and condition,"' he or she found that "(1) the victim
had induced or facilitated the offense, (2) it was unlikely that [defendant] would have com-
mitted the offense but for the fact that she 'was under duress, coercion, or strong provoca-
tion,' or (3) the offense was 'primarily the product of [defendant's] psychosis or mental
deficiency."' Lockett, 438 U.S. at 593-94 (quoting OHIO REV. CODE §§ 2929.03-2929.04(B)
(1975)).
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determination of the appropriate sentence, a plurality of the Court
reversed a sentence of death and struck down the portion of the stat-
ute that limited the sentencer's discretion to those three mitigating
factors. 247
Most significantly, the Lockett Court stated definitively that "the
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments require that the sentencer, in all
but the rarest kind of capital case, not be precluded from considering,
as a mitigating factor, any aspect of a defendant's character or record
and any of the circumstances of the offense that the defendant prof-
fers as a basis for a sentence less than death."24 8 The rationale ad-
vanced by the Court was again that:
the imposition of death by public authority is so profoundly dif-
ferent from all other penalties [that] we cannot avoid the con-
clusion that an individualized decision is essential in capital
cases....
There is no perfect procedure ... [, b]ut a statute that pre-
vents the sentencer in all capital cases from giving independent
mitigating weight to aspects of the defendant's character and
record and to circumstances of the offense proffered in mitiga-
tion creates the risk that the death penalty will be imposed in
spite of factors which may call for a less severe penalty. When
the choice is between life and death, that risk is unacceptable
and incompatible with the commands of the Eighth and Four-
teenth Amendments.24 9
Whereas the mandatory statute in Woodson v. North Carolina2 s had
unconstitutionally precluded the consideration of any mitigating fac-
tors, the statute at issue in Lockett unconstitutionally limited the sen-
tencer's discretion to only three narrow factors that did not permit
consideration even of such mitigating factors as age or defendant's
minor role in the crime.251 The sentencer, therefore, could not accord
247. Id- at 608-09.
248. Id- at 604 (footnotes omitted).
249. Id. at 605.
250. 428 U.S. 280 (1976); see also supra notes 50-62 and accompanying text.
251. Lockett, 438 U.S. at 608. The Court contrasted this statutory scheme with those
examined in Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976), Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976),
and Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976). The statute in Gregg passed constitutional muster
because it did not at all limit the sentencer's discretion regarding mitigating factors. Lock-
ett, 438 U.S. at 606; see also supra note 45 and accompanying text. Although the Florida
statute in Proffitt had enumerated mitigating factors to be considered by the sentencer,
those factors were not necessarily the only ones that the sentencer could consider in miti-
gation; thus, the Court had not viewed the statute as unconstitutionally limiting discretion.
Lockett, 438 U.S. at 606. Finally, the Texas statute in Jurek had not listed and restricted the
sentencer to certain mitigating factors, but also did not on its face allow unbridled discre-
tion as to those factors. The Court nonetheless found that the statute's provision of three
special issue questions allowed a jury to consider a defendant's proffered mitigating evi-
the defendant the individualized consideration that she was due under
the Eighth Amendment. 2
The statute at issue in Eddings v. Oklahoma s3 directed the sen-
tencer to consider both aggravating and mitigating factors in deter-
mining the appropriate sentence and so appeared to have complied
with the constitutional dictate set forth in Lockett.254 Although the
statute directed the sentencer to consider "any mitigating factor," the
only mitigating evidence the trial court considered was of defendant's
youth;15 . the trial judge as sentencer declined to consider, and appar-
ently thought he was precluded from considering, the mitigating evi-
dence of defendant's violent upbringing and disadvantaged
childhood." 6
Noting that Lockett v. Ohio mandated that a sentencer cannot be
precluded from considering any aspect of a defendant's background as
a mitigating factor,z 7 the Eddings Court traced the Lockett mandate
to the Court's historical insistence on the consistent and fair imposi-
tion of capital punishment as evidenced by its decisions in Gregg and
Woodson.2- 8 Gregg ensured the consistent application of the death
penalty by its requirement that state statutes guide the sentencer's dis-
cretion, as by the enumeration of aggravating and mitigating circum-
stances to be weighed; the Woodson and Lockett cases required that
dence through those questions; the statute therefore survived scrutiny. Id at 607; see gen-
erally infra notes 272-280 and accompanying text.
252. In fact, the sentencing judge in Lockett very nearly bemoaned this result when, in
imposing the sentence of death, he stated "that he had 'no alternative, whether [he] like[d]
the law or not' but to impose the death penalty." Lockett, 438 U.S. at 594 (alterations in
original).
253. 455 U.S. 104 (1982). Justice Powell authored the majority opinion, to which Jus-
tices Brennan and O'Connor filed concurrences. Chief Justice Burger dissented and was
joined by Justices White, Blackmun, and Rehnquist.
254. The Oklahoma statute at the time provided, in pertinent part, that
"evidence may be presented [in the sentencing hearing] as to any mitigating cir-
cumstances or as to any of the aggravating circumstances enumerated in this act."
Eddings, 455 U.S. at 106 (quoting OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 701.10 (1980)).
255. Defendant was 16 when, after having been pulled over on the highway, he shot a
police officer. The trial judge found the existence of three aggravating factors: "that the
crime was 'heinous, atrocious, and cruel,'... that the crime was 'committed for the purpose
of avoiding or preventing a lawful arrest or prosecution,' ... [and] that Eddings posed a
continuing threat of violence to society." See Eddings, 455 U.S. at 108 n.3. These three
aggravating factors outweighed the only mitigating factor that the court considered, that of
defendant's youth, and so the trial judge imposed the death penalty. See id. at 108-09.
256. Id. at 109. The Supreme Court noted: "it is clear that the trial judge did not evalu-
ate the evidence in mitigation and find it wanting as a matter of fact; rather he found that
as a matter of law he was unable even to consider the evidence." Id. at 113.
257. Id. at 110 (citing Lockett, 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978)).
258. Id at 110-12.
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the death penalty be imposed fairly, by according weight, through the
consideration of any mitigating factor, to the character and record of
each offender.25 9
Applying those principles to the facts in Eddings, the Court went
one step further:
[j]ust as the State may not by statute preclude the sentencer
from considering any mitigating factor, neither may the sen-
tencer refuse to consider, as a matter of law, any relevant miti-
gating evidence .... The sentencer, and the Court of Criminal
Appeals on review, may determine the weight to be given rele-
vant mitigating evidence. But they may not give it no weight by
excluding such evidence from their consideration.260
Although the Oklahoma death penalty statute permitted the presenta-
tion of evidence regarding "any mitigating circumstances," and so
complied with Lockett in that regard, the Court further emphasized
that "Lockett requires the sentencer to listen. ' 261 Because the trial
judge did not believe he was allowed to consider evidence of defend-
ant's turbulent childhood, there was a risk that the death penalty was
imposed without full consideration of this defendant's character and
record, thereby risking that the death penalty was imposed unfairly
without regard to the uniqueness of this particular individual.262
Lockett and Eddings thus expanded the role of mitigating factors
in death penalty cases.2 63 Initially, the Court adhered to this line of
259. Id at 111-12.
260. Id at 113-15 (second emphasis added).
261. Id at 115 n.10 (citing OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 701.10 (1980)).
262. The dissent believed that the majority was playing semantics by parsing the lan-
guage of the trial judge's ruling. 455 U.S. at 124-26 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). Instead of
finding that the Oklahoma courts did not consider the mitigating evidence, other than
youth, presented by the defendant, the dissent would have found that the courts consid-
ered the evidence but found it "not a sufficiently mitigating factor to tip the scales, given
the aggravating circumstances." Id at 125. More generally, it was clear to the dissent that
the Oklahoma courts believed "that 'evidence in mitigation' must rise to a certain level of
persuasiveness before it can be said to constitute a 'mitigating circumstance."' Id. at 126.
The Chief Justice persuasively supported this position by noting that the trial judge took
extensive testimony on that evidence, id. at 124, and that the Court of Criminal Appeals
also summarized the evidence in its ruling. Id. at 125. The dissent believed the majority,
by contrast, wrongly "'require[d] that any potential mitigating evidence be described as a
'mitigating factor'-regardless of its weight." Id. at 126. This objection foreshadows the
dispute over mitigating evidence that would emerge more forcefully in later cases. See
infra notes 294-303, 339-374 and accompanying text.
263. For discussions of Lockett and its effect, see Randy Hertz & Robert Weisberg, In
Mitigation of the Penalty of Death." Lockett v. Ohio and the Capital Defendant's Right to
Consideration of Mitigating Circumstances, 69 CAL. L. REv. 317 (1981); Howe, supra note
214; Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, Let God Sort Them Out?: Refining the Individu-
alization Requirement in Capital Sentencing, 102 YALE L.J. 835, 853 (1992); see generally
Bilionis, supra note 163; Sunby, supra note 164; Radin, Super Due Process, supra note 26.
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decisions,264 but then began a piecemeal and eventually substantial
retreat from it.265 Discussion of a different type of death penalty
scheme and the Court's evaluation of it, however, is necessary to illus-
trate generally the eventual constriction of the reach of Woodson,
Lockett, and Eddings.266 This constriction is yet another thread in a
death penalty jurisprudence that channels the jury to decisions of
death and thus helps predetermine the result from the evolving stan-
dards calculus.2 67
264. See McKoy v. North Carolina, 494 U.S. 433, 435 (1990) (holding that "[a statutory]
requirement [that] prevents the jury from considering, in deciding whether to impose the
death penalty, any mitigating factor that the jury does not unanimously find[ I . .. violates
the Constitution by preventing the sentencer from considering all mitigating evidence");
Franklin v. Lynaugh, 487 U.S. 164 (1988) (deciding that the Texas death penalty scheme
allowed jury to give effect to defendant's mitigating evidence) (Justices O'Connor and
Blackmun adhering in concurrence, and Justices Stevens, Brennan, and Marshall adhering
in dissent); Mills v. Maryland, 486 U.S. 367, 384 (1988) (recognizing that "the sentencer
must be permitted to consider all mitigating evidence" and so vacating death sentence
arrived at when jury could have interpreted instructions as precluding their consideration
of mitigating evidence unless jurors were unanimous about the existence of a particular
mitigating circumstance); Sumner v. Shuman, 483 U.S. 66, 73-82, 85 (1987) (holding uncon-
stitutional a Nevada statute imposing mandatory death sentence on prisoner serving life
term with no possibility of parole because defendant did not receive individualized consid-
eration); Hitchcock v. Dugger, 481 U.S. 393, 398-99 (1987) (Justice Scalia authoring opin-
ion for a unanimous Court and holding that state trial court's instruction to jury and own
consideration of evidence violated dictates of Lockett and Eddings because the judge lim-
ited consideration of mitigating circumstances to only those enumerated in the pertinent
statute); Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1, 4 (1986) (stating that "[tihese rules [from
Lockett and Eddings] are now well established ... " and require that the sentencer be
allowed to consider, as mitigating evidence, testimony regarding defendant's good post-
arrest behavior in jail and "probable future conduct if sentenced to life in prison").
265. See Johnson v. Texas, 113 S. Ct. 2658,2672 (1993); Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639,
649 (1990); Boyde v. California, 494 U.S. 370, 377 (1990); Saffle v. Parks, 494 U.S. 484, 490
(1990); California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538, 543 (1987); infra notes 339-374 and accompany-
ing text.
266. As noted, it is the fact of this constriction that is important for the purposes of this
Article. Complete analysis of the Court's changing treatment of mitigating evidence would
itself merit a separate article and so is beyond the scope of this one. For some instances of
that treatment, see decisions upholding certain mandatory death sentences, Blystone v.
Pennsylvania, 494 U.S. 299 (1990); Boyde v. California, 494 U.S. 370 (1990); Walton v.
Arizona, 497 U.S. 639 (1990); decisions allowing antisympathy instructions, Saffle v. Parks,
494 U.S. 484 (1990); California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538 (1987); and decisions generally
permitting states to guide the jury's use of mitigating evidence, see supra note 265. Discus-
sion of certain cases in these last two groupings, however, will be used to illustrate how the
Court's general refinement of the principles of Woodson and its progeny affects the evolv-
ing standards test. See infra section IV.A.2.
267. See infra section IV.A.2.
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b. The Texas Cases
The principles of Woodson and its progeny, although etched out
in cases dealing with statutes that follow the Georgia model detailed
in Gregg, govern also those schemes that do not follow the Georgia
model. The Texas statute, which the Court reviewed on a number of
occasions,268 differed from the Georgia model in various respects.
The statute did not specify aggravators that would guide a jury in
its imposition of the penalty, but did restrict to five the types of
murders for which death could be imposed.2 69 In a subsequent hear-
ing, a jury would hear evidence relevant to its determination of three
special issues, and could impose death only if it answered "yes" to
each of the three questions.2 0 The statute otherwise contained no
clear dictate that a jury weigh mitigating evidence vis-d-vis aggravat-
ing circumstances or consider mitigating evidence at all. It was un-
clear, therefore, whether the statute permitted a sentencer's
consideration of mitigating evidence and whether it thus allowed the
jury to individualize this defendant, as required initially by
Woodson.271
The Court first had occasion to assess the constitutionality of the
Texas statute2 72 in Jurek v. Texas,2 73 which was decided with Gregg
268. The Court determined the general constitutionality of the statute in Jurek v. Texas,
428 U.S. 262 (1976) at the same time it evaluated the Georgia, Florida, Louisiana, and
North Carolina statutes in 1976. It later examined the statute in response to various other
challenges in Franklin v. Lynaugh, 487 U.S. 164 (1988) (plurality opinion), Penry v.
Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989), Graham v. Collins, 113 S. Ct. 892 (1993), and Johnson v.
Texas, 113 S. Ct. 2658 (1993).
269. See Jurek, 428 U.S. at 268 (citing Tnx. PENAL CODE § 19.03 (1974)).
270. Id. at 269 (citing TEx. CODE CRIM. PROc. art. 37.071 (Supp. 1975-1976)). The
questions the jury was required to answer were as follows:
"(1) whether the conduct of the defendant that caused the death of the deceased
was committed deliberately and with the reasonable expectation that the death of
the deceased or another would result;
(2) whether there is a probability that the defendant would commit criminal acts
of violence that would constitute a continuing threat to society; and
(3) if raised by the evidence, whether the conduct of the defendant in killing the
deceased was unreasonable in response to the provocation, if any, by the
deceased."
Id- (quoting art. 37.071(b)).
271. See Jurek, 428 U.S. at 272 ("The Texas statute does not explicitly speak of mitigat-
ing circumstances; it directs only that the jury answer three questions. Thus, the constitu-
tionality of the Texas procedures turns on whether the enumerated questions allow
consideration of particularized mitigating factors.").
272. The concern here is with the Texas statute in effect until 1991, enacted in response
to the decision in Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972). The Court had struck down the
previous Texas statute in Branch v. Texas, which was decided with Furman. The statute
currently in force requires the sentencer to answer three special issue questions, but the
and Woodson. In Jurek, the same three-Justice plurality held that the
statute's limiting of death as an available punishment to only five
types of murders served much the same purpose as did aggravating
factors, such as those set out in the Georgia statute.2 74 Because the
jury had to determine whether the defendant's crime fell within one of
those categories before it even reached the special issues,275 in the
judgment of the Court, the jury was essentially required to find the
existence of aggravating factors.276 The jury's discretion to impose
death was thus limited and guided by the statute in accordance with
the dictates of Gregg.
Whether the statute met the commands of Woodson, however,
proved to be a bit more problematic. The Texas statute did not explic-
itly mention mitigating factors; "[t]hus, the constitutionality of the
Texas procedures turn[ed] on whether the [three] enumerated ques-
tions allow[ed] consideration of particularized mitigating factors. 277
The plurality opinion found that the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
would interpret the statute's second special issue, regarding future
dangerousness, as allowing the sentencer's consideration of any miti-
gating evidence the defendant could bring forth:278
"In determining the likelihood that the defendant would be a
continuing threat to society, the jury could consider whether the
defendant had a significant criminal record. It could consider
the range and severity of his prior criminal conduct. It could
further look to the age of the defendant and whether or not at
the time of the commission of the offense he was acting under
duress or under the domination of another. It could also con-
sider whether the defendant was under an extreme form of
mental or emotional pressure, something less, perhaps, than in-
questions are different and are submitted to the jury through a different process. See TEx.
CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 37.071 (West Supp. 1995). The scheme also now specifies
eight types of murder for which death may be imposed. See TEx. PENAL CODE ANN.
§ 19.03 (West 1994).
273. 428 U.S. 262 (1976) (plurality opinion). The plurality was comprised of Justices
Stewart, Powell, and Stevens. Chief Justice Burger and Justices White, Rehnquist, and
Blackmun concurred in the judgment. Justices Brennan and Marshall dissented in a sepa-
rate opinion to the decisions in Gregg, Jurek, and Proffitt.
274. Id. at 269.
275. The Texas statute required this finding in the guilt stage, id. at 269, whereas the
Georgia statute required a similar finding during the sentencing phase. Gregg v. Georgia,
428 U.S. 153, 163-66 (1976); see also text accompanying supra note 45.
276. Jurek, 428 U.S. at 269.
277. Id at 272.
278. Id. A plurality of the Court also later stated that the defendant was not entitled to
special jury instructions to the effect that the jury could give effect to the mitigating evi-
dence by declining to sentence to death even if it answered "yes" to all special issue ques-
tions. Franklin v. Lynaugh, 487 U.S. 164, 180 (1988) (plurality opinion).
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sanity, but more than the emotions of the average man, however
inflamed, could withstand. 279
Because the statute permitted individualized consideration of the de-
fendant under the second special issue and yet also guided the jury in
its decision whether to impose death, the plurality held that the stat-
ute comported with the dictates set out in Gregg and Woodson and
was constitutional.8 °
More recently, in Penry v. Lynaugh,28' one issue was whether the
three statutory questions permitted the sentencer to consider and give
effect to evidence of defendant's mental retardation, which he had
presented in mitigation.28 2 Comprising the majority, Justices
O'Connor, Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens,28 3 again exam-
ining the Texas statute, reiterated that "Eddings makes clear that it is
not enough simply to allow the defendant to present mitigating evi-
dence to the sentencer. [For the statute to comply with the Eighth
Amendment, t]he sentencer must also be able to consider and give
effect to that evidence in imposing sentence."'  The Court
emphasized,
[i]ndeed, it is precisely because the punishment should be di-
rectly related to the personal culpability of the defendant that
the jury must be allowed to consider and give effect to mitigat-
ing evidence relevant to a defendant's character or record or the
circumstances of the offense. Rather than creating the risk of an
unguided emotional response, full consideration of evidence
that mitigates against the death penalty is essential if the jury is
279. Jurek, 428 U.S. at 272-73 (quoting Jurek v. State, 522 S.W.2d 934, 939-40 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1975)).
280. Id at 274, 276.
281. 492 U.S. 302 (1989).
282. Id at 312-13. Penry had also challenged the trial court's failure to instruct the jury
to consider all of his evidence in mitigation, and challenged generally the constitutionality
of executing a mentally retarded defendant. Id. For a discussion of the latter issue, see
supra notes 194-208 and accompanying text.
283. Penry, 492 U.S. at 306, 319-28.
284. Id. at 319 (emphasis added). Although neither the plurality opinion in Lockett v.
Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978) nor the majority opinion in Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104
(1982) used precisely the words "give effect to" in their discussions of what the jury was to
be allowed to do with mitigating evidence, the Lockett opinion did state: "a statute that
prevents the sentencer in all, capital cases from giving independent mitigating weight to
aspects of the defendant's character and record and to circumstances of the offense prof-
fered in mitigation creates the risk that the death penalty will be imposed in spite of factors
which may call for a less severe penalty." Lockett, 438 U.S. at 605 (emphasis added). It
would seem to follow logically that the only way to give weight to evidence would be to
give it effect.
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to give a "'reasoned moral response to the defendant's back-
ground, character, and crime."'-s
The majority opinion, analyzing the three questions separately,
held that the jury could not adequately give effect to Penry's mitigat-
ing evidence through the special issues;286 if the jury felt that Penry's
moral culpability due to his mental retardation was such that he was
undeserving of the death penalty, it had no way of expressing that
belief under the Texas scheme. For example, the jury could find that
Penry posed a future danger precisely because of his mental retarda-
tion and so answer "yes" to the second question even if it believed
Penry was undeserving of the ultimate penalty because of his mental
disability.287 In that situation, the sentencer had no "vehicle for ex-
pressing its 'reasoned moral response' to that evidence in rendering its
sentencing decision." '288 The Court found that the jury should have
been instructed that it could, upon consideration of the evidence
presented by the defendant, refuse to impose the death penalty and
thereby give effect to defendant's mitigating evidence.28 9
The State had argued that to instruct the jury that it could decline
to impose death because of Penry's mitigating evidence-in essence,
that it "could render a discretionary grant of mercy"-would intro-
duce unconstitutional unguided discretion into the sentencing pro-
cess.290 Recognizing that the Furman decision had struck down state
death penalty laws because they had allowed unbridled discretion and
had not guided juries in their sentencing decisions, the Court here
nonetheless stressed that the decision not to impose the death penalty
is different:
[A]s we made clear in Gregg, so long as the class of murderers
subject to capital punishment is narrowed, there is no constitu-
tional infirmity in a procedure that allows a jury to recommend
mercy based on the mitigating evidence introduced by a defend-
ant .... 'In contrast to the carefully defined standards that must
narrow a sentencer's discretion to impose the death sentence,
the Constitution limits a State's ability to narrow a sentencer's
285. Penry, 492 U.S. at 327-28 (quoting California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538, 545 (1987)
(O'Connor, J., concurring)).
286. Id. at 328.
287. Id. at 323-24. "Penry's mental retardation and history of abuse is thus a two-edged
sword: it may diminish his blameworthiness for his crime even as it indicates that there is a
probability that he will be dangerous in the future." Id. at 324.
288. Id. at 328.
289. Id.
290. Id. at 326.
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discretion to consider relevant evidence that might cause it to
decline to impose the death sentence.'29 '
Once the field of offenders is narrowed to those for whom death may
be appropriate, then, the only way that the state can be assured that
the penalty is a just one for this offender, with his or her level of cul-
pability, is to allow the jury virtually unbridled discretion to grant
mercy, 92 despite the existence of aggravators that ordinarily would
counsel a finding for death. 93 In this case, a plurality of the current
Court, led by Justice Scalia and including Chief Justice Rehnquist and
Justices White and Kennedy,294 stressed opposition to the develop-
ment of the Woodson, Lockett, and Eddings tenets relating to mitigat-
ing evidence.
The dissent first attacked the majority's opinion as an eviscera-
tion of the holding in Jurek,295 but then more generally denounced
both the Court's holding on this issue and the place of this doctrine in
the Court's death penalty jurisprudence. The dissent further ex-
plained that the Texas scheme did permit the jury's consideration of
all mitigating evidence, but simply channeled that consideration. It
noted,
we have never held that "the State has no role in structuring or
giving shape to the jury's consideration of these mitigating fac-
tors." . . . [N]either Lockett nor Eddings "establish[ed] the
weight which must be given to any particular mitigating evi-
291. Id. at 327 (quoting McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 304 (1987) (emphasis in
McCleskey)).
292. Cf. Radin, Super Due Process, supra note 26, at 1153 (stating that "the 'unfettered'
discretion found impermissible in Furman, is [after Lockett] not merely permissible but
constitutionally required"). But see Bilionis, supra note 163, at 328 (arguing that this dis-
cretion is not unfettered, because that would violate Furman; rather, "[t]he sentencer's
discretion under Woodson and Lockett... is the limited and structured discretion to give a
life sentence because of moral considerations arising from mitigating evidence ...").
293. This line of doctrine has caused a rift in the current Court. See infra notes 294-303,
339-374 and accompanying text.
294. Penry, 492 U.S. at 350.
295. Id. at 353-56. The dissent argued that Jurek upheld the constitutionality of the
Texas statute because it did allow for consideration of that mitigating evidence pertinent to
answering the three questions and therefore relevant to the verdict. What Jurek did, in the
dissent's view, was to ensure that the evidence could be considered and yet to allow the
state to determine the "precise effect of [its] consideration," id. at 355; the state could
channel the jury's use of that information as long as it allowed the jury to consider the
information and give effect to it in some manner. The dissent conceded only this: "Of
course there remains available, in an as-applied challenge to the Texas statute, the conten-
tion that a particular mitigating circumstance is in fact irrelevant to any of the three ques-
tions it poses, and hence could not be considered." Id. at 356. This case, however, was not
such a case, because evidence of defendant's mental retardation was relevant to, for exam-
ple, the first special question, whether defendant's conduct in killing the victim was "delib-
erate." Id.
dence, or the manner in which it must be considered; they sim-
ply condemn any procedure in which such evidence has no
weight at all." '296
Thus, the dissent would have allowed the state to "channel" discretion
not to impose the death penalty by allowing consideration of mitigat-
ing circumstances only for certain specified purposes and would have
taken a significantly different tack than had previous decisions.2 97
More generally, Justice Scalia introduced298 his concern about the
broad, essentially unbridled discretion in juries to decline to impose
the death penalty and previewed his later, more broadscale assault on
the Court's jurisprudence in this area.299 According to Justice Scalia,
the Court replaced a scheme of guided discretion with one that re-
quired "an unguided, emotional 'moral response,'.., an outpouring
of personal reaction to all the circumstances of a defendant's life and
personality, an unfocused sympathy.... [T]he line of cases following
Gregg sought to eliminate precisely the unpredictability it pro-
296. Ma at 357 (quoting Franklin v. Lynaugh, 487 U.S. 164, 179 (1988) (plurality opinion
on that point) and Barclay v. Florida, 463 U.S. 939, 961 n.2 (Stevens, J., concurring in the
judgment) (second alteration in Penry)).
297. Whereas the Penry majority read precedent as requiring unfettered discretion in
the jury to decline to impose the death penalty by allowing unbridled consideration of
mitigating circumstances, the dissent was instead led "to the conclusion that all mitigating
factors must be able to be considered by the sentencer, but need not be able to be consid-
ered for all purposes." Id. at 358. In effect, the dissent believed that the Constitution did
not require, as a part of individualized sentencing, that a jury be provided an outlet for a
general grant of mercy.
By advocating for channeled discretion regarding consideration of mitigating factors
in this and later cases, in which the view carried a majority of the Court, the dissent would
eventually in effect accomplish an overruling of the Woodson line of cases and a conse-
quent elimination of the individualized sentencing requirement. It would thus do through
the back door what it could likely not have done outright. See infra notes 343-374 and
accompanying text.
298. A plurality, led by Justice White and joined by the Chief Justice and Justices Scalia
and Kennedy, had touched on this issue in the prior term in Franklin v. Lynaugh, 487 U.S.
164 (1988), another opinion analyzing the Texas procedure. The plurality stated: "this
Court has never held that jury discretion must be unlimited or unguided; we have never
suggested that jury consideration of mitigating evidence must be undirected or unfocused;
we have never concluded that States cannot channel jury discretion in capital sentencing
...." Id. at 181. Justice O'Connor, joined in concurrence by Justice Blackmun, espoused
an opinion similar to the one she would advocate in Penry: that the scheme would pass
constitutional muster if the special issue questions permitted the jury to give effect to de-
fendant's mitigating evidence. See id. at 183-85; Penry, 492 U.S. at 316-17. The Franklin
concurrences thus agreed with the Franklin dissenters on this point. See supra note 264;
Franklin, 487 U.S. at 189-200.
299. See Callins v. Collins, 114 S. Ct. 1127, 1127-28 (1994) (Scalia, J., concurring in
denial of certiorari); Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 656-73 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring
in part and concurring in the judgment).
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duces. ''30 0 In Justice Scalia's view, such a "dump[ing]" '30 1 of unfocused
evidence produced freakish and arbitrary results and thus was not re-
quired by the Constitution. 02
Despite, however, the rather strong affirmance by the majority in
Penry of the need to allow the jury latitude to grant mercy in an ap-
propriate case, in the very next term the Court began to come more in
line with the dissent in Penry and began to scale back the protections
afforded defendants under this line of doctrine.0 3 The retreat from
Woodson and its progeny by a majority of the Court began in 1990
and was complete in 1993. Two cases, one from each of those years,
illustrate the Court's employment of this distinction between the sub-
stance of mitigating evidence and the manner in which it is consid-
ered, a distinction enabling states to cripple defendants in their
presentations and juries in their considerations of mitigating evidence.
The skirting and arguably effective evisceration of the Woodson-Lock-
ett-Eddings line of doctrine is significant standing alone, but is also
significant in its effect on the application of the jury-sentencing prong
leading to the rigging of the evolving standards of decency test.
Thus far, the discussion has shown that the Court has employed
various yardsticks of constitutionality under the Eighth Amendment
Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause. To determine when a death
penalty is substantively cruel and unusual or is "excessive," the Court
has evaluated it with respect to its historical acceptance and has ex-
amined society's evolving standards of decency as evidenced by legis-
lative enactments and jury sentencing behavior. A majority of the
Court has also measured the severity of the crime and culpability of
the offender against the severity of the death sentence to determine
proportionality, and has assessed whether the punishment would fur-
ther the valid penological goals of retribution and deterrence. In this
way, the Court has conducted its own excessiveness inquiry.
In addition, to insure that death sentences are not cruel and unu-
sual because of the manner in which they are imposed, the Court has
required that the procedures for imposition guide the jury in the exer-
cise of its discretion to impose the penalty and yet permit individuali-
300. Penry, 492 U.S. at 359. But see Hertz, supra note 263, at 373-76 (arguing that
allowing unbridled discretion to afford mercy is not inconsistent with Furman's guided dis-
cretion requirement because reliability of death sentences is at the root of Furman; "[alan
erroneous decision to extinguish the defendant's life is far more opprobrious than an erro-
neous decision to spare the defendant and sentence him to life imprisonment").
301. Penry, 492 U.S. at 359.
302. Id. at 359-60.
303. See infra notes 343-374 and accompanying text.
zation of the sentence to the particular defendant before the court.
This seemingly settled doctrine has been altered, however, by deci-
sions of a Court of more recent composition.
The central contention of this Article is that the evolving stan-
dards test, one of the main tests of constitutionality, must be re-evalu-
ated because a plurality of the Court may favor employing it as the
only test. In that re-evaluation, this Article must go beyond the cases
involving substantive challenges to the death penalty to argue that the
jury sentencing prong of the test can be and has been manipulated in
such a way that the inevitable conclusion shows approval of the death
penalty. Specifically, the recent modifications of the Court's proce-
dural death penalty jurisprudence play a role by altering the doctrine
in ways that have significant ramifications for jury sentencing behav-
ior, and thus for the evolving standards test, since they tilt, rather than
simply guide, the jury's discretion toward death. Additionally, and as
noted earlier, the Court has also selectively analyzed pro-death pen-
alty statutes in its computation of the evolving standards, demonstrat-
ing that this prong can be manipulated to a pro-death bias as well.
The evolving standards test is thus rigged to favor death and should
not be the sole determinant of constitutionality.
IV. The Rigging of the "Evolving Standards" Test
A. Jury Decisionmaking is Systematically Channeled to Return Death
Sentences
Decisions of the Court involving antisympathy instructions, vic-
tim impact evidence, use of mitigating evidence, clarity and certainty
of aggravating factors, and death qualification of juries, standing
alone, appear as rather innocuous procedural rules that developed
logically during the course of the development of death penalty juris-
prudence. When these factors merge, however, they insidiously help
to manipulate sentencing juries into death sentences and thus skew
this indicator of the evolving standards of decency when the Court
employs it to evaluate substantive challenges to the death penalty." 4
304. Critiquing the Court's approach to cruel and unusual punishment determination,
one writer opined that "jury behavior as an indicator of contemporary moral standards is
not so obviously vulnerable to criticism [as are legislative enactments]. At least those who
serve on juries have been solemnly charged to bring their best moral judgment to bear on
the cases brought before them." Radin, Jurisprudence of Death, supra note 26, at 1037-38.
Professor Radin was writing in 1978, however, prior to the bulk of the decisions relied
upon herein. Even then, she did have some criticisms of this index of society's views. See
supra note 160.
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1. Antisympathy Instructions and Victim Impact Evidence Coalesce to
Favor Death
Three cases decided by the Court work in tandem to allow a state
to preclude the jury from acting on any emotion except that favoring a
verdict of death: two decisions305 permitted the states to instruct the
jury that it cannot be swayed by sympathy for the defendant in reach-
ing its sentencing decision, and one case 306 held that the prosecution
could introduce evidence of the impact of the loss of the victim,
thereby implicitly allowing the jury to be swayed by sympathy for the
victim. Together, these cases allow a jury's emotions to be driven to-
ward a death determination.
In California v. Brown, 307 the Court addressed a question con-
cerning a jury's use of feelings of sympathy produced by defendant's
mitigating evidence. The California trial court had instructed the jury
that, in weighing the aggravating and mitigating circumstances, it
"must not be swayed by mere sentiment, conjecture, sympathy, pas-
sion, prejudice, public opinion or public feeling. '308 Upholding the
constitutionality of the instruction, the Court found that it did not vio-
late any of the principles set out in Woodson, Lockett, and Eddings.30 9
Although the California Supreme Court had agreed with the de-
fendant that the instruction would divert the jury from considering
sympathetic factors in defendant's favor and so would unconstitution-
ally preclude the jury from acting on defendant's mitigating evi-
dence, 310 the majority in Brown determined that a reasonable juror
would not have understood the instruction as precluding him or her
305. California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538 (1987); Saffle v. Parks, 494 U.S. 484 (1990).
306. Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808 (1991).
307. 479 U.S. 538 (1987). Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote the majority opinion in which
Justices White, Powell, O'Connor, and Scalia joined. Id. Justices Brennan, Marshall, Ste-
vens, and Blackmun dissented. Id at 547, 561.
308. Id. at 540 (quoting Appellate Record at 20).
309. Im at 541-43. Justice O'Connor, concurring in the decision, agreed that "the sen-
tence imposed at the penalty stage should reflect a reasoned moral response to the defend-
ant's background, character, and crime rather than mere sympathy or emotion," id. at 545
(O'Connor, J., concurring), and so concurred that the instruction did not by itself violate
the Constitution. Id. Justice O'Connor did recognize, however, that "one difficulty with
attempts to remove emotion from capital sentencing through instructions such as those at
issue in this case is that juries may be misled into believing that mitigating evidence about a
defendant's background or character also must be ignored." Id. at 545-46. She therefore
wanted to ensure that on remand the California Supreme Court determined that in fact the
jury was informed of its responsibility to consider all of defendant's mitigating evidence.
Id. at 546. See also infra notes 343-376 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
danger that these instructions will prevent the jury from considering and giving effect to
mitigating evidence.
310. Brown, 479 U.S. at 540 (citing People v. Brown, 709 P.2d 440, 453 (Cal. 1985)).
from so acting. The majority emphasized that the instruction forbade
acting on mere sympathy, which a juror would know meant that he or
she was "to ignore only the sort of sympathy that would be totally
divorced from the evidence adduced during the penalty phase."31' In
fact, the majority stated, "[e]ven a juror who insisted on focusing on
this one phrase[, 'sympathy,'] in the instruction would likely interpret
the phrase as an admonition to ignore emotional responses that are
not rooted in the aggravating and mitigating evidence introduced dur-
ing the penalty phase. '312 The instruction was constitutional because
311. IdL at 542. The majority employed interesting reasoning to reach its conclusion
here. It argued that defendant's interpretation was "strained" because it concentrated on
the word "sympathy" rather than reading the entire section, which was modified by the
adjective "mere." Id. The admonition not to be influenced by "mere sympathy," in the
majority's view, made it clear to the jury that it was to confine its "deliberations to consid-
erations arising from the evidence presented, both aggravating and mitigating." Id. at 543.
The majority argued in addition, however, that "it [was] highly unlikely that any reason-
able juror would almost perversely single out the word 'sympathy' from the other nouns
which accompany it in the instruction ... ." Id. at 542. The Court found no contradiction
with its reasoning that the jury would single out the word "mere" and apply it as a modifier
to every noun in the instruction. Id.
312. Id. The Court would not concede the danger that the jury would conclude that it
was not to base its decision on any sympathy at all, as the defendant had argued. But
because a defendant's mitigating evidence would serve to evoke precisely that response,
and because that evocation is arguably the sole purpose of mitigating evidence, even the
risk that a jury would interpret the instruction in the way argued by the defendant would
seem to veer too close to the constitutional line set by Woodson, Lockett, and Eddings. Cf.
Sunby, supra note 164, at 1197 ("[I]f the death penalty decision is regarded as based in part
on emotional, or at least not 'rational' factors as traditionally conceived, then such proce-
dures [as antisympathy instructions, which purport to foster rational decisionsJ frustrate
the 'individualized' decisionmaking process of Lockett."). The instruction should have vio-
lated those procedural guarantees because a jury could have ignored the mitigating evi-
dence in response to the instruction. See infra notes 343-361 and accompanying text.
Indeed, this was the very argument advanced by the dissents. Justice Brennan noted
first that the California Supreme Court itself interpreted the instruction as precluding the
jury from considering mitigating evidence concerning defendant's character or record,
Brown, 479 U.S. at 547-48 (Brennan, J., dissenting), and that the Court was "strain[ing] to
find a way to override the state court's construction of its own jury instruction." Id. at 561.
According to the dissenters,
[i]n forbidding the sentencer to take sympathy into account, this language on its
face precludes precisely the response that a defendant's evidence of character and
background is designed to elicit, thus effectively negating the intended effect of
the Court's requirement that all mitigating evidence be considered. As the plu-
rality noted in Woodson v. North Carolina, such evidence is intended to induce
consideration of "compassionate or mitigating factors stemming from the diverse
frailties of humankind."
Id. at 548 (citations omitted) (quoting Woodson, 428 U.S. 280,304 (1976)). The possibility
that the jury would interpret it in the way argued by the defendant, therefore, created the
unacceptable risk of their ignoring mitigating factors.
The inclusion of the adjective "mere" in the instruction did not serve to cure the de-
fect, as the jury could just as easily have believed "mere" modified only the first noun in
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it guided the jury's use of mitigating evidence 31 3 by disallowing a sym-
pathetic response to anything but admissible mitigating evidence.
By this holding, the Brown Court seems to have implicitly en-
dorsed the notion that a jury could base a decision on sympathy that
was "rooted in the aggravating and mitigating evidence,1314 and in
that way give effect to that mitigating evidence as required by Wood-
son and its progeny. But the Court later removed even this merciful
safety net; in Saffle v. Parks,315 the Court316 made clear that the im-
plicit endorsement by Brown did not exist.317
In Parks, the trial judge had instructed the jury to "'avoid any
influence of sympathy, sentiment, passion, prejudice, or other arbi-
trary factor when imposing sentence.' 31 8 The instruction thus dif-
fered from that in Brown in that it did not draw any distinctions
between sympathy tethered to the mitigating evidence and sympathy
untethered to any relevant sentencing factors. In upholding the con-
stitutionality of the instruction, the Court stated that Lockett and Ed-
dings only forbid the state from barring consideration of relevant
mitigating evidence; those cases did not preclude the state from guid-
the string, so that all considerations of sympathy were forbidden, not merely those "unteth-
ered" to mitigating evidence. Id at 549. Additionally, confronted with a long list of imper-
missible emotions, the jury more than likely believed that "any response rooted in emotion
was inappropriate. ... The vast majority of jurors thus can be expected to interpret 'sympa-
thy' to mean 'sympathy,' not to engage in the torturous reasoning process necessary to
construe it as 'untethered sympathy."' Id. at 550-51.
Justice Blackmun, in a separate dissent, would have reversed based on the strongly
held belief that "sentencers should have the opportunity to spare a capital defendant's life
on account of compassion for the individual.. . ." Id- at 562 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); see
also Callins v. Collins, 114 S. Ct. 1127, 1133 (1994) (Blackmun, J., dissenting from denial of
certiorari). He emphasized the special role that mercy plays in capital cases, and its link to
"contemporary values," and stated that the mere possibility that this instruction could
quash any humane response evoked in the juror by defendant's mitigating evidence was
unacceptable in a capital case. Brown, 479 U.S. at 561-63.
313. Although the Court did not write specifically in terms of guiding the jury's discre-
tion in regard to mitigating evidence, it did state that the instruction here at issue "serves
the useful purpose of confining the jury's imposition of the death sentence by cautioning it
against reliance on extraneous emotional factors .... " Brown, 479 U.S. at 543 (emphasis
added). The Court thus in effect found acceptable a state's limiting the manner in which
the jury used mitigating evidence, while not explicitly limiting the kind of evidence that it
could consider. The Court later drew this distinction much more clearly. See infra notes
340-376 and accompanying text.
314. Brown, 479 U.S. at 542.
315. 494 U.S. 484 (1990).
316. Justice Kennedy authored the opinion for the majority, which included Chief Jus-
tice Rehnquist and Justices White, O'Connor, and Scalia. Id. at 485.
317. Id. at 494.
318. Id. at 487 (quoting Appellate Record at 13) (emphasis added).
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ing that consideration, such as by instructing the jury that it could not
act on any sympathy evoked by the mitigating evidence.319
The decisions in Brown and Parks engender various odious ef-
fects, 320 but specifically relevant are two consequences of these hold-
ings. First, the silencing of the jury's sense of compassion dilutes the
accuracy of the jury's determination as a reflection of the evolving
standard.32' The Court has said that "[]ury sentencing has been con-
sidered desirable in capital cases in order 'to maintain a link between
contemporary community values and the penal system-a link without
which the determination of punishment could hardly reflect "the evolv-
ing standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing soci-
ety.""'" 32  A jury whose compassion is muzzled, however, will not
deliver judgments that accurately reflect "community values" that in-
elude compassionate, sympathetic responses. The "link" is thus sev-
ered and the resultant jury decision is of questionable value as an
"objective index of contemporary values. ' 3z
The second result compounds the first, not only because the link
is severed, but also because positive reactions toward the defendant
are squelched. The upshot of severing the jury's compassionate re-
sponse from its decisionmaking is a stronger emotional case against
the defendant. A jury that silences its compassion is much less likely
to grant a defendant mercy and so more likely to sentence to death in
response to the emotional horrors of the crime.32 4 In this way, the
Court's decisions in the antisympathy cases have helped to rig the re-
sult against defendants and in favor of death, and thus also to rig fur-
ther the evolving standards test.
Moreover, the rule from those cases works with another proce-
dural-evidentiary rule to further lead a sentencer to a conclusion that
319. Id. at 490.
320. See also infra notes 343-361 and accompanying text.
321. Cf. Howe, supra note 214, at 1070 ("[The Eighth Amendment rationale for an
expansive individualization mandate could only stem from a notion that requiring a sen-
tencing inquiry with broad boundaries helps to ensure an unfettered voice for a possible
societal consensus about deserts.").
322. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 190 (1976) (plurality opinion) (quoting Wither-
spoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 519 n.15 (1968) (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101
(1958) (plurality opinion))) (emphasis added).
323. Id. at 181 (emphasis added).
324. A related argument is that these instructions effectively preclude the sentencer
from considering and giving effect to mitigating evidence, with the consequent failure to
accord the defendant the individualization that has heretofore been constitutionally man-
dated. This argument is discussed in the text accompanying infra notes 343-361.
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death is the appropriate punishment. In Payne v. Tennessee,325 the
Court held that in assessing whether the death penalty is appropriate,
the jury can hear and consider evidence of the "harm" caused by de-
fendant's crime in the form of evidence about the victim and state-
ments detailing the impact of the crime on the victim's family.326 The
powerful impact of this evidence, in evoking sympathy for the victim,
coupled with admonitions prohibiting jurors from allowing sympathy
for the defendant to infect their deliberations, emotionally directs
those jurors toward death decisions.327
The Court in Payne reasoned that "the assessment of the harm
caused by the defendant as a result of the crime charged has under-
standably been an important concern of the criminal law.., in deter-
mining the appropriate punishment. ' 38 In the death penalty context,
the harm caused to the family and society is relevant to the defend-
ant's blameworthiness, it is a legitimate factor for the jury to consider,
and its consideration does not introduce arbitrariness into the sentenc-
ing process.329
325. 501 U.S. 808 (1991). Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote the majority opinion, in which
Justices White, O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, and Souter joined. Id. at 810.
326. Id. at 825-27, 830. Payne overruled the holdings in South Carolina v. Gathers, 490
U.S. 805 (1989) and Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496 (1987) that "evidence and argument
relating to the victim and the impact of the victim's death on the victim's family are inad-
missible at a capital sentencing hearing." Payne, 501 U.S. at 830 n.2. The majority in those
two cases had reasoned that because evidence of the impact of the crime often does not
factor into defendant's personal culpability or moral guilt for the crime charged, that evi-
dence was usually irrelevant to a death penalty determination; the focus of that determina-
tion is on blameworthiness, or the character and record of the defendant and the
circumstances of the crime, whereas the victim impact evidence focuses on the victim's
character and family. Gathers, 490 U.S. at 810-11; Booth, 482 U.S. at 502, 504-05. Allow-
ance of victim impact evidence, according to the Booth Court, "create[d] an impermissible
risk that the capital sentencing decision will be made in an arbitrary manner," 482 U.S. at
505, and thus not individualized to this defendant as required by prior rulings.
The decision in Payne has been the subject of commentary because of the manner in
which the Court overruled the two cases. See, e.g., Michael Vitiello, Payne v. Tennessee: A
"Stunning Ipse Dixit," 8 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETmics & PUB. PoL'Y 165, 179-208 (1994);
Ranae Bartlett, Case Note, Payne v. Tennessee: Eviscerating the Doctrine of Stare Decisis
in Constitutional Law Cases, 45 ARK. L. REv. 561 (1992); see also Payne, 501 U.S. at 844-
45, 848-56 (Marshall, J., dissenting); Payne v. Tennessee, 498 U.S. 1076, 1076-77 (1991)
(Stevens, J., dissenting from grant of certiorari); Michael J. Gerhardt, The Role of Prece-
dent in Constitutional Decisionmaking and Theory, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 68 (1991).
327. See infra notes 337-338.
328. Payne, 501 U.S. at 819.
329. Id. at 825. The Court stated only that "[w]e think the Booth Court was wrong in
stating that this kind of evidence leads to the arbitrary imposition of the death penalty."
Id. Any evidence that might be unduly prejudicial, apparently in the sense of promoting
arbitrariness, could be challenged under the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause.
Id. The opinion was otherwise devoid of any reasoning tending to persuade that the admis-
sion of victim impact evidence did not introduce arbitrariness.
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Arguably, and contrary to the Payne Court's assertions, the ad-
mission of victim impact evidence permits the jury unconstitutionally
to impose death on "whim and caprice. '330 The Court has required
that the decision to impose death be channeled and directed,331 so that
the jury can distinguish those cases in which death is appropriate from
those in which it is not. Generally, this "channeling" has been accom-
plished through an enumeration of aggravating factors that the jury
must find before imposing death.332 In Payne, however, the Court
failed to indicate the relationship of victim impact evidence to those
aggravators. For instance, it failed to indicate whether to be admissi-
ble the evidence must tend to prove the existence of one or more of
the aggravating factors, or, conversely, whether the jury could con-
sider the evidence in any manner it chose. Because it failed to so limit
the admission of the evidence, one can only conclude that there is no
such restriction;333 the jury must be able to consider victim impact evi-
dence as it sees fit and for any purposes and so sentence based on its
"gut reaction" to the victim impact evidence, or on "whim and ca-
price." Such a result seems clearly inconsistent with the requirements
of Gregg and its progeny that a sentencer be guided in its decision
whether to impose the death penalty.334
330. Justice Stevens in dissent in Payne made this argument rather forcefully. Payne,
501 U.S. at 860-67 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also id, at 845-46 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
331. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 189, 199 (1976).
332. See supra notes 45-46 and accompanying text.
333. Cf Gey, supra note 26, at 75 ("Except in exceptional circumstances, victim impact
statements also do not relate to the specific aggravating factors in death penalty statutes
... .") (footnote omitted).
334. See, e.g., supra note 47 and text accompanying notes 54-56,291; see also Payne, 501
U.S. at 857-59, 861, 863-64 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The observation made here is merely
one to further the general point of the Article and is not intended as a definitive appraisal
of the propriety, impact, or consequences of the holding in Payne. Such an appraisal is
beyond the scope of this Article, but has been undertaken by numerous other commenta-
tors. See Vivian Berger, Payne and Suffering-A Personal Reflection and a Victim-Centered
Critique, 20 FLA. ST. U. L REv. 21 (1992); David R. Dow, When Law Bows to Politics:
Explaining Payne v. Tennessee, 26 U.C. DAvis L. REv. 157 (1992); Markus D. Dubber,
Regulating the Tender Heart When the Axe is Ready to Strike, 41 BuFF. L. REv. 85 (1993);
see generally Gey, supra note 26; Vitiello, supra note 326, at 223-36; see also Catherine
Bendor, Recent Developments, Defendants' Wrongs and Victims' Rights: Payne v. Tennes-
see, 27 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 219 (1992); Matthew V. Brammer, Note, Eighth Amend-
ment No Longer Bars Victim Impact Statement Admission in Capital Sentencing
Proceedings: Payne v. Tennessee, 61 U. GIN. L. REv. 261 (1992); Christopher W. Ewing,
Note, Payne v. Tennessee: The Demise of Booth v. Maryland, 23 PAC L.J. 1389 (1992);
Patrick M. Fahey, Note, Payne v. Tennessee: An Eye for an Eye and Then Some, 25 CONN.
L. Rev. 205 (1992); Michael I. Oberlander, Note, The Payne of Allowing Victim Impact
Statements at Capital Sentencing Hearings, 45 VAND. L. Rev. 1621 (1992); K. Elizabeth
Whitehead, Note, Mourning Becomes Electric: Payne v. Tennessee's Allowance of Victim
Impact Statements During Capital Sentencing Proceedings, 45 ARu. L. REv. 531 (1992).
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That result has the additional effect, however, of allowing the jury
unfocused consideration of evidence that can only be described as that
which would evoke sympathy for the victim. 335 The unbridled, and
purely and powerfully visceral, reaction to the loss created by the de-
fendant's crime would clearly favor the state's case.336 In the penalty
phase, such unchecked sympathy would doubtlessly pull the jury to-
ward the conclusion of death 337 and thus pull the evolving standards
test to a conclusion of constitutionality for the death penalty.
Antisympathy instructions and admission of victim impact evi-
dence, both of which have been sanctioned by the Court, by them-
selves would incline the sentencer in favor of death, thus impugning
the reliability of the jury's decision as an objective benchmark of the
evolving standards. The distortion of the objectivity of the process is
further exaggerated when the two rules unite; the lines of decision
coalesce to favor death when, in the penalty phase, states can preclude
jurors from acting on sympathy for the defendant while inundating the
jury with victim impact evidence that arouses sympathy for the vic-
tim.338 In this way, the Court's decisions inevitably permit a state to
335. Justice Stevens in dissent recognized this effect of the decision when he stated that
the evidence "serves no purpose other than to encourage jurors to decide in favor of death
rather than life on the basis of their emotions rather than their reason.... Evidence that
serves no purpose other than to appeal to the sympathies or emotions of the jurors has
never been considered admissible." Payne, 501 U.S. at 856-57 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see
also Dubber, supra note 334, at 152 ("Payne opens the door for evidence that, at the very
least, creates a substantial risk of evoking the jury's sympathy for the victim . . .);
Bendor, supra note 334, at 236 ("The only clear role for this evidence is to serve as a direct
appeal to the emotional sympathies of the jurors .... " a role the Court has previously
found to be unacceptable.).
336. Professor Dubber has remarked, "Payne seeks to match the supposedly extrava-
gant rights of the capital defendant by creating rights of the accuser, long after Parks has
burnt this strawman of the hyper-protected defendant. Payne's purported balancing act
therefore creates a fundamental imbalance in favor of the State." Dubber, supra note 334,
at 152 (emphasis added).
337. Other commentators have recognized this danger. See Bendor, supra note 334, at
241 ("The practical result of this decision [in Payne] is that it will become easier for states
to sentence criminal defendants to death."); Brammer, supra note 334, at 292 (footnotes
omitted) ("The introduction of an emotionally charged [victim impact statement] may irra-
tionally bias the sentencing authority toward a death sentence based solely on its irresisti-
ble emotional appeal."); cf. Whitehead, supra note 334, at 558 (noting that, after Payne,
"the imposition of the death penalty stands to become an increasingly frequent occur-
rence"). Professor Dubber opined more categorically that victim impact evidence should
be excluded altogether to ensure as much accuracy as possible in the decision to impose
death. Dubber, supra note 334, at 116-17, 126-49.
338. The Court in Payne noted no contradiction between its decision here and its prior
rulings in California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538 (1987) and Saffle v. Parks, 494 U.S. 484 (1990);
see supra notes 307-319 and accompanying text. In those cases, the Court was troubled by
the jury's succumbing to any feelings of sympathy, not only that unfocused sympathy not
channel juror sympathies against the defendant and ineluctably drive
the jury decisionmaking process toward death. Thus manipulated, re-
sultant death sentences are invalid gauges of societal standards of de-
cency and should be given little probative force in the constitutionality
determination.
2. Evisceration of the Woodson Line of Decisions Permits
Circumscription of Mitigating Evidence and Thus Gives
Deleterious Primacy to Aggravators
Over a period of approximately five years, the Court saw
grumblings of internal hostility33 9 to the Woodson-Lockett-Eddings
rooted in the evidence, because the jury then would be unguided in its decision. The Court
reached those decisions despite long-standing precedent that allowed jurors unbridled dis-
cretion not to sentence to death. In Payne, by contrast, the Court had no difficulty allowing
jurors apparently free rein in responding to the sympathy evoked by the victim impact
evidence, even though the Court has traditionally required strict guidance of the jury re-
garding its decision to impose death. For a persuasive explication of the combined effects
of Parks and Payne, an explication similar to the one presented here, see Dubber, supra
note 334, at 98-156. Professor Dubber states, for example, that "Payne illustrates the awe-
some combined impact of an antisympathy instruction that deprives the defendant of any
opportunity to appeal to the jury's sense of mercy and a barrage of victim impact evidence
that opens the floodgates of compassion for victims and their family." Id. at 129. Professor
Dubber's conclusion is that Payne and Parks illustrate the desire of the Court for uniform-
ity in the death penalty process, even at the expense of accuracy. ld. at 154-55. Because
Parks permits the states to circumvent the individualization mandate, accuracy in sentenc-
ing is sacrificed. Id. at 91, 98-117. Payne then permits the state to stack the emotional
evidence against the defendant, further ensuring that the defendant is dehumanized and
that the sentence is not accurately individualized to him or his culpability. kd. at 123-45.
339. For a selection of statements recognizing a "tension" in the Court's jurisprudence
between the line of cases that requires that a jury be allowed to consider any mitigating
factor and that line that requires that the sentencer's discretion to impose death be guided,
see Tuilaepa v. California, 114 S. Ct. 2630, 2635 (1994); Callins v. Collins, 114 S. Ct. 1127,
1127-28 (1994) (Scalia, J., concurring in denial of certiorari); Callins, 114 S. Ct. at 1133-35
(Blackmun, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari); Graham v. Collins, 113 S. Ct. 892, 903-
04, 910-11 (1993) (Thomas, J., concurring); Graham, 113 S. Ct. at 923 n.9 (Souter, J., dis-
senting); Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 656-73 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment); Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 358-60 (1989) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting in part and concurring in part); Franklin v. Lynaugh, 487 U.S. 164, 182 (1988)
(plurality opinion); McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 363 (1987) (Blackmun, J., dissent-
ing). For commentary discussing and/or attempting to resolve the purported conflict, see
Vivian Berger, Black Box Decisions on Life or Death-If They're Arbitrary, Don't Blame
the Jury: A Reply to Judge Patrick Higginbotham, 41 CASE W. RES. L. Rnv. 1067, 1079-82
(1991); Bilionis, supra note 163, at 298-300, 326-32; Susie Cho, Comment, Capital Confu-
sion: The Effect of Jury Instructions on the Decision to Impose Death, 85 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 532, 53847 (1994); David R. Dow, The Third Dimension of Death Penalty
Jurisprudence, 22 AM. J. CRIM. L. 151 (1994); Stephen Gillers, Deciding Who Dies, 129 U.
PA. L. REv. 1, 26-38 (1980); Patrick E. Higginbotham, Juries and the Death Penalty, 41
CAsE W. Rus. L. REv. 1047, 1057-59 (1991); Howe, supra note 35, at 362-401; Ronald J.
Mann, The Individualized-Consideration Principle and the Death Penalty as Cruel and Unu-
sual Punishment, 29 Hous. L. REv. 493 (1992); Randall K. Packer, Struck By Lightning:
Winter 19961 EVOLVING STANDARD OF DECENCY
522 HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 23:455
line of doctrine ripen into majority opinions that essentially overruled,
through the backdoor, those principles safeguarding unbridled discre-
tion to decline to impose death.340 The majority dislodged the settled
The Elevation of Procedural Form Over Substantive Rationality in Capital Sentencing Pro-
ceedings, 20 N.Y.U. Rv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 641, 647-49 (1993-94); Radin, Super Due
Process, supra note 26, at 1149-55; Steiker & Steiker, supra note 263, at 859-68; Sunby,
supra note 164, at 1161-90.
340. Although complete discussion of this phenomenon is beyond the scope of this Ar-
ticle, a chronology and skeletal explication of the doctrine's evolution may prove helpful.
The grumblings seem to have begun in earnest in the 1988 case of Franklin v. Lynaugh, 487
U.S. 164, 179-82 (1988), in which a plurality led by Justice White argued that nothing in the
Court's jurisprudence precluded a state's guiding of the jury's consideration of mitigating
evidence. See also supra note 298 and accompanying text; Howe, supra note 35, at 394
(seeing "open conflict" begin in 1987 in California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538 (1987)); Sunby,
supra note 164, at 1191 (suggesting the grumblings may have begun in 1986 in Skipper v.
South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1 (1986)). That plurality of Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices
White, Scalia, and Kennedy then formed the dissent in Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302
(1989), making the argument more strongly through the voice of Justice Scalia. See id. at
351-60 (Scalia, J., dissenting). The four continued the point in McKoy v. North Carolina,
494 U.S. 433 (1990), Justice Kennedy in concurrence, see id. at 456-57, and Justice Scalia,
joined by the Chief Justice and Justice O'Connor, in dissent, see id. at 465-66, 469-71. In
Boyde v. California, 494 U.S. 370, 372, 377 (1990), the majority, comprised of Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justices White, O'Connor, Scalia, and Kennedy, made only passing refer-
ence to a state's ability to "structure and shape consideration of mitigating evidence" and
the absence of a constitutional requirement that the jury have unfettered discretion in sen-
tencing. Regarding the Boyde majority's retreat from the requirement of unfettered dis-
cretion in the decision to decline to impose death, one commentator noted that "Justice
O'Connor's defection from the old [Penry] majority on this issue cemented a new one,"
which leaned away from the Woodson-Lockett-Eddings principles. Berger, supra note 339,
at 1078 n.67. The plurality in Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 649 (1990) (second empha-
sis added), consisting of Justice White, the Chief Justice, and Justices O'Connor and Ken-
nedy, opined that "it does not follow from Lockett and its progeny that a State is precluded
from specifying how mitigating circumstances are to be proved." The last two cases, one in
1990 and the last in 1993 and discussed in the text infra, found a majority of the Court
clearly supporting and employing the distinction that allows states to structure the jury's
consideration of mitigating evidence. See Saffle v. Parks, 494 U.S. 484 (1990); Johnson v.
Texas, 113 S. Ct. 2658 (1993); see also Graham v. Collins, 113 S. Ct. 892, 898-903 (discussing
the issue in deciding the case under Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989)); Graham, 113 S.
Ct. at 903-15 (1993) (Thomas, J., concurring) (arguing that "it is consistent with the Eighth
Amendment for States to channel the sentencer's consideration of a defendant's arguably
mitigating evidence so as to limit the relevance of that evidence in any reasonable
manner").
Justice Scalia has indicated openly, however, that he would overrule the Wood-
sonLockett-Eddings principles. Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 656-674 (1990) (Scalia, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment); id. at 673 ("I will not, in this case or in
the future, vote to uphold an Eighth Amendment claim that the sentencer's discretion has
been unlawfully restricted."); see also Callins v. Collins, 114 S. Ct. 1127, 1128 (1994)
(Scalia, J., concurring in denial of certiorari); Tuilaepa v. California, 114 S. Ct. 2630, 2639
(1994) (Scalia, J., concurring); Richmond v. Lewis, 506 U.S. 40, 53 (1992) (Scalia, J., dis-
senting); Espinosa v. Florida, 505 U.S. 1079, 1083 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Sochor v.
Florida, 504 U.S. 527, 553 (1992) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part);
Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 833 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring). For criticism of this
doctrine by distinguishing between the substance of mitigating evi-
dence and the manner of its consideration. 41 The majority found no
constitutional infirmity in a state's guiding the jury's use of mitigating
evidence by instructing the jury how to consider the evidence, so long
as the defendant was allowed to present the substance of the evidence
to the sentencer. It is in this manner, however, that the Court success-
fully nullified the commands of Woodson and its progeny.342 In so
position, see Gey, supra note 26, at 90-102; Howe, supra note 214, at 1047-48. Justice
Thomas also implied his agreement with Justice Scalia when he advocated the overruling of
Penry, see Graham, 113 S. Ct. at 913 n.10, and indicated he might overrule Woodson. See
id. at 908 (stating that "we are not now confronted with a mandatory sentencing provision,
and I have no occasion here to flesh out my disagreement with the Court's prohibition of
such schemes").
Justice Stevens disagreed with Justice Scalia in Walton, arguing that the two doctrines
requiring guidance and discretion were constitutionally prescribed and complementary.
Walton, 497 U.S. at 714-19 (Stevens, J., dissenting). For a discussion of the Scalia-Stevens
Walton debate, see Howe, supra note 35, at 402-18; Steiker & Steiker, supra note 263, at
860-64. Justice Blackmun similarly found the tension to be constitutionally required but
for the same reason also found it unworkable; in his view, that unworkability rendered the
death penalty as a whole unconstitutional. See Callins v. Collins, 114 S. Ct. 1127, 1128-38
(1994) (Blackmun, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari).
341. See generally Sunby, supra note 164, at 1190-1206 (discussing "The Attack on
Lockett's Rearguard: Controlling the Substance Through the Procedure"). This approach
is hereinafter referred to as "the substance-procedure distinction." Id. at 1190.
342. See Howe, supra note 214, at 1048 (arguing that "[s]everal of the Court's decisions
after Penry have opened the door to states to begin neutralizing the Lockett mandate," and
citing, for example, Saffle v. Parks, 494 U.S. 484 (1990) and Johnson v. Texas, 113 S. Ct.
2658 (1993)); Sunby, supra note 164, at 1150 ("Perhaps most importantly, the distinction
ultimately may provide an indirect means to accomplish much of Justice Scalia's goal of
removing Lockett's restrictions on state death penalty procedures.").
Another decision that permits state circumvention of the Woodson-Lockett-Eddings
mandate is Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639 (1990). Although the decision does not fall
within the cases employing the semantic distinction discussed in this section, it nonetheless
further assists in the rigging of the evolving standards test and so is relevant to the overall
thesis advanced throughout this Article. A plurality of the Court in Walton held that states
could place the burden on defendants of proving by a preponderance of the evidence the
existence of mitigating factors "sufficiently substantial to call for leniency." Id. at 649-51
(plurality opinion). Justice White was joined by the Chief Justice and Justices O'Connor
and Kennedy.
First, the Woodson-Lockett-Eddings problem arises if a defendant cannot meet the
proof burden. In that situation, some mitigating evidence will not be considered by the
sentencer even though the Lockett decision had specified that "the [capital] sentencer...
[can]not be precluded from considering, as a mitigating factor, any aspect of a defendant's
character or record and any of the circumstances of the offense that the defendant proffers
as a basis for a sentence less than death." Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978) (plu-
rality opinion). The Walton ruling seems to be in clear conflict with this principle of Lock-
ett. But see Walton, 497 U.S. at 649.
Second, the significance of Walton's burden of proof ruling on the evolving standards
test is similar to that of those cases discussed here in the text. Specifically, if a state can
successfully deprive the jury of consideration of some mitigating evidence relating to the
defendant's background or to the circumstances of the crime, then it can increase the sig-
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doing, the Court permits states to emphasize aggravating factors, pos-
sibly even to the exclusion of mitigating ones. Again, the result is a
jurisprudence that, combined with other developments in death pen-
alty law, permits the funneling of jurors' judgments inescapably to-
ward death and renders jurors' judgments questionable as objective
indicators of the evolving standard of decency.
The decision in Saffle v. Parks,343 discussed earlier regarding the
effects of antisympathy instructions on the evolving standards test,344
works another noxious effect on the objective nature of that test and,
in so doing, illustrates the application of the substance-procedure dis-
tinction. The Parks Court firmly embraced345 the substance-proce-
dure distinction it had merely alluded to in California v. Brown,346 and
would later employ in Johnson v. Texas: 7
[The defendant] asks us to create a rule relating, not to what
mitigating evidence the jury must be permitted to consider in
making its sentencing decision, but to how it must consider the
mitigating evidence. There is a simple and logical difference be-
tween rules that govern what factors the jury must be permitted
to consider in making its sentencing decision and rules that gov-
er how the State may guide the jury in considering and weigh-
ing those factors in reaching a decision."4
In the Parks Court's view, a state's guiding of the jury's consideration
of mitigating evidence did not prevent the jury from "considering,
weighing, and giving effect to all of the mitigating evidence that [the
nificance of the aggravating evidence by that evidence's mere presence; the fewer items of
mitigating evidence the sentencer considers, the fewer are the reasons for declining to im-
pose death. Although the sentencer in Walton was the judge, see Walton, 497 U.S. at 643
(citing ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-703(B) (1989)), the effect of the burden on what the
sentencer eventually considers is the same. The burden of proof requirement in this way
alters the jury sentencing index by heightening the chance that a death sentence will result.
This decision, too, therefore, affects not only the principles of Woodson and its progeny but
also the reliability of the jury sentencing prong of the evolving standards test.
343. 494 U.S. 484 (1990). The majority here was comprised of Justice Kennedy, Chief
Justice Rehnquist, and Justices White, O'Connor, and Scalia. Id. at 485.
344. See supra notes 315-324, 338 and accompanying text.
345. Parks was before the Court on habeas corpus, or collateral review, and so was
controlled by Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989), which generally precludes the Court
from announcing and applying a "new rule" when a case is before it in that posture. See
Parks, 494 U.S. at 487. Although the Court in Parks held that a decision holding an-
tisympathy instructions unconstitutional would constitute a "new rule" and so would not
be announced, id. at 489, the Court nonetheless "firmly embraced" the substance-proce-
dure distinction to reach even this result.
346. 479 U.S. 538 (1987); see supra note 313; cf Sunby, supra note 164, at 1207 (finding
the Court to have truly employed the distinction for the first time in Walton v. Arizona,
497 U.S. 639 (1990)).
347. 113 S. Ct. 2658 (1993); see also infra notes 362-376 and accompanying text.
348. Parks, 494 U.S. at 490.
defendant] put before them," 9 as Lockett and Eddings commanded
that the jury be allowed to do. Rather, in denying the jury the discre-
tion to act on sympathy for the defendant, the state was simply requir-
ing that the jury not sentence "according to its own whims or
caprice. '3 5 0 At the heart of Lockett and Eddings was the requirement
that the jury be supplied with the information necessary to make a
"'reasoned moral response,' rather than an emotional one."'351 The
state could, therefore, require that the jury use the evidence in that
manner, to reach a moral result, and prohibit jurors from using the
evidence in a way that would pacify their sympathetic feelings.
By drawing this substance-procedure distinction, recognizing that
the state may not limit the substance of mitigating evidence352 but
may limit the process or manner of its use, the Court essentially oblit-
erated the constitutional safeguards of Woodson, Lockett, and Ed-
dings. In fact, the dissent in Parks astutely noted:
[t]he majority struggles mightily to distinguish rules that govern
a jury's ability to "consider," "weigh," and "give effect to" miti-fating evidence from rules relating to the "manner in which
the] mitigating evidence can be considered." This distinction is
meaningless for a rule that limits the manner in which the jury
considers mitigating evidence is unconstitutional if it limits the
jury's ability to consider and give effect to that evidence. But
under the majority's approach, a law requiring the jury to dis-
count the weight of all, or of certain, mitigating factors would be
consistent with Lockett so long as the majority could describe
the statute as relating to the "manner" in which the jury consid-
349. leL at 491.
350. Id. at 493.
351. 1L (quoting California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538, 545 (1987) (O'Connor, J., concur-
ring)). The majority assumed, without discussing it, that sympathy has nothing at all to do
with a "moral" response from the jurors. But see 494 U.S. at 513 (Brennan, J., dissenting)
(stating that the "cases have not clearly defined the difference between a 'reasoned moral
response' and an 'emotional' one"). The assumption raises interesting jurisprudential is-
sues that, while significant, are beyond the scope of this Article. Other commentators have
addressed the "blurred lines" between moral and emotional responses and the jurispruden-
tial issues involved. See, e.g., Dubber, supra note 334, at 104-17; Samuel H. Pillsbury, Emo-
tional Justice: Moralizing the Passions of Criminal Punishment, 74 CORNELL L. Rnv. 655
(1989).
352. Because the Parks Court was only evaluating the issue in relation to Teague v.
Lane and whether a ruling for defendant would constitute a "new rule," see supra note 294
and accompanying text, most of the opinion was dicta. In ruling, however, that precedent
did not dictate a finding of unconstitutionality, the Court effectively ruled that an-
tisympathy instructions would survive constitutional scrutiny and so arguably gave the
states the power to preclude jurors' acting on sympathetic responses. Parks, 494 U.S. at
490-94; see also Dubber, supra note 334, at 89 n.19 (recognizing that even though the Court
did not technically reach the merits of the issue, the substantive analysis that it employed
nonetheless indicated that it would have ruled the same way on the merits).
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ers the evidence despite such a statute's obvious preclusive
effect.353
This observation lays bare the perceived desire of the Court to temper
if not nullify the precepts established in Woodson and its progeny.
The nullification is in turn a component of the rigging of the evolving
standards test, although the relevance of this line of decisions to the
rigging is not at once apparent.
In Parks, the Court permitted a state to imprison the compassion
of the jury, even though the Woodson Court had stressed the danger
of excluding "the possibility of compassionate or mitigating factors
stemming from the diverse frailties of humankind. 3 54 If Woodson's
caution was not meant to ensure that the jury must be allowed to con-
sider and give effect to the compassion evoked by defendant's mitigat-
ing evidence, then it accomplishes nothing at all. Rather, the
statement must mean that the state must not only permit the jury to
hear mitigating evidence, but must also allow the jury to feel whatever
compassionate responses that "stem[ ] from the diverse frailties" of
this defendant3 55 In this way, Woodson and its progeny help to en-
353. Id- at 504 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (alteration in original) (citations omitted).
354. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304 (1976).
355. Commentators have identified types of relevant mitigating evidence as including
"the client's childhood, upbringing, education, relationships, friendships, formative and
traumatic experiences, personal psychology, and present feelings." Gary Goodpaster, The
Trial for Life: Effective Assistance of Counsel in Death Penalty Cases, 58 N.Y.U. L. Rnv.
299, 324 (1983). Others have said that mitigating evidence includes:
evidence that a death sentence would be unjust because the defendant's personal
responsibility for the offense is lessened by youth, stunted intellectual and emo-
tional growth, mental retardation or impaired capacity, mental or emotional dis-
turbance, provocation by others, insanity, the influence of alcohol or drugs at the
time of the offense, or shared or limited participation in the actual crime....
[Also included would be evidence] that the defendant suffered tragic or horrible
circumstances in his or her formative years, such as abuse, neglect, poverty, or
domestic turbulence ....
Bilionis, supra note 163, at 302-04 (footnotes omitted). Referring to evidence of this kind
and advancing a standard for effective assistance of counsel, one commentator recognized
the penalty phase determination as "the highly-charged moral and emotional issue of
whether the defendant, notwithstanding his crimes, is a person who should continue to
live." Goodpaster, supra, at 334-35 (emphasis added). He added that counsel should pres-
ent evidence that "may spark in the sentencer the perspective or compassion conducive to
mercy ... [or] elicit a compassionate response from the sentencer." Id. at 336 (emphasis
added). There is thus support for the contention that one of the purposes of mitigating
evidence, of the types identified above, is to reach the humanity, compassion, and emo-
tions of jurors who will make the ultimate decision. See also Dubber, supra note 334, at
110-17 (arguing that individualization, accomplished through defendant's presentation of
mitigating evidence, requires recognition and implementation of some appropriate emo-
tional responses). Another commentator has suggested that "cruelty," as used in constitu-
tional provisions forbidding it, results from an absence of mercy. Bruce Ledewitz, Could
the Death Penalty Be a Cruel Punishment?, 3 WIDENER . PUB. L. 121, 157 (1993). He
sure that jury sentences indeed reflect the societal evolving standard
of decency regarding the death penalty.
The very purpose of mitigating evidence is to allow consideration
of this defendant as an individual, with all the factors that went into
producing this defendant and this crime. A necessary component of
this individualization is the vision of the defendant as a human being,
with all the frailties that come with that status. This portrayal and
individualization, through the mitigating factors, must of necessity be
bound up with any sympathetic reaction. It would be a rare sentencer
who could personalize a defendant, judge his or her moral culpability,
and yet be able completely to divorce any feelings of sympathy. 6
These feelings are generated by jurors' standards of decency and thus
must find recognition in the sentence if the sentence is to be an accu-
rate and reliable index of those standards.
Nonetheless, the Parks Court permitted the state to strip the facts
of their essence, rendering them sterile and the defendant one dimen-
sional.357 This process fails to meet constitutional dictate of according
the defendant his or her right to an individualized determination 358
and so in itself should render the antisympathy instruction violative of
those principles embodied in Woodson and its progeny. The process
argues that even if a punishment is just, it still may be "cruel" if merciless: "justice unre-
lieved by mercy is cruel." Id. at 158. The first dictionary definition given for "mercy" is
"compassion or forbearance shown to an offender or subject: clemency or kindness ex-
tended to someone instead of strictness or severity." WEBsrER's THIRD NEw INTERNA-
TIONAL DICrIONARY 1413 (3d. ed. 1986). In providing synonyms, the dictionary further
explains: "Mercy, a word of much emotional force and hence one applicable to extreme
situations, indicates a kindly refraining from inflicting punishment or pain, often a re-
fraining brought about by genuinely felt compassion and sympathy .... " Id. (emphasis
added). According to Webster's, then, dispensations of mercy by definition involve emo-
tion and sympathy. If "justice unrelieved by mercy" is cruel, and if emotional or sympa-
thetic responses are a sine qua non to the dispensation of mercy, then the Court's
allowance of antisympathy instructions would render death sentences imposed pursuant to
those instructions inherently "cruel."
356. See generally Dubber, supra note 334, at 110-17; supra note 351. A related argu-
ment is that any "reasoned moral response" of a sentencer must of necessity include the
consideration of sympathetic factors generated by defendant's mitigating evidence. See
supra note 355.
357. See Parks, 494 U.S. 484 (1989).
358. The language in Woodson would support this interpretation. The Court empha-
sized the danger that a death penalty procedure, rather than treating each defendant as an
individual, could "treat all persons convicted of a designated offense not as uniquely indi-
vidual human beings, but as members of a faceless, undifferentiated mass to be subjected
to the blind infliction of the penalty of death." Woodson, 428 U.S. at 304; cf. Dubber, supra
note 334, at 111 ("The individualized sentencing requirement not only permits but requires
that the sentencer consider the very individual significance of the defendant's past and
future life.").
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should also be identified as one distorting jury sentencing and thus
contributing to the rigging of the evolving standards test.
Additionally, and perhaps more importantly, if a sentencer must
be allowed to consider and give effect to mitigating evidence under
Woodson, then the only way to give effect to that evidence would be
to act, at least in some part, on the sympathy or compassion so pro-
duced. By indicating how the sentencer must use the evidence,359 the
state is essentially telling the sentencer what evidence it cannot con-
sider;360 if a sentencer cannot act on feelings of sympathy inevitably
produced by the mitigating evidence, then it cannot give effect to and
essentially cannot consider the mitigating evidence.36' Such a result
should clearly be a violation of the precepts of Woodson, Lockett, and
Eddings and is a further distortion of the jury-sentencing prong of the
evolving standards test. Removal of mitigating evidence from the sen-
tencing determination can only result in the amplification of aggravat-
ing evidence and pitch the sentence toward death. Jury sentencing
determinations so manipulated from the outset cannot be reliable, ob-
jective indicators of societal standards.
Employment of the substance-procedure distinction to avoid the
dictates of Woodson has not been limited to the antisympathy cases,
however, and so has more far-reaching effects on the evolving stan-
359. Arguably, in Parks, the state was not telling the sentencer how to use the evidence,
but was only telling it how not to use the evidence. It would be a completely different case
if the state told the jury not to be swayed by sympathy but to use the mitigating evidence to
give a reasoned moral response. See 494 U.S. at 514 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Because this
extra instruction is not given, however, there is an impermissible risk that the jury will
disregard the mitigating evidence altogether, in violation of longstanding constitutional
rules, because consideration of it is too intertwined with a sympathetic reaction.
360. See Sunby, supra note 164, at 1199, 1205 (seeing the "possibility that the proce-
dural 'exception' will swallow Lockett's substantive rule," and recognizing in 1991 that
"[w]hat remains to be seen is whether the Court will uphold procedures that allow the
states to accomplish indirectly what Lockett forbids directly: determining for the sentencer
what mitigating evidence may be used in deciding if the death penalty is appropriate").
361. Defendant in Parks had argued precisely that:
his jury could have interpreted the antisympathy instruction as barring considera-
tion of mitigating evidence. More specifically, he claims that because much of the
mitigating evidence relevant to his culpability also evoked sympathy, a juror who
reacted sympathetically to the evidence would have believed that he was not enti-
tled to consider that evidence at all-not even for its "moral" weight.
494 U.S. at 498-99 (Brennan, J., dissenting); see also Howe, supra note 214, at 1048 ("The
Court has approved anti-sympathy instructions ... through which states can suggest to
sentencing jurors the irrelevance of a defendant's mitigating evidence."); Dubber, supra
note 334, at 105. For an argument similar to the one presented here concerning the effect
of Parks on the sentencer's ability to give effect to or consider mitigating evidence and the
desirability of allowing some sympathetic emotions to play a role in the determination of
sentence, see Dubber, supra note 334, at 98-117.
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dards calculus. In Johnson v. Texas,362 the Court used the device in
deciding whether the Texas death penalty statute allowed adequate
consideration of youth as a mitigating factor.3 63
The Johnson Court3" found that the jury could still give effect to
evidence of defendant's youth through the second special issue con-
cerning future dangerousness. 365 The Court explained that the de-
fendant in Johnson could have been found less culpable because of his
age and that the jury could effectuate that finding by answering "no"
to the second special issue on future dangerousness. 366 "As long as
the mitigating evidence is within 'the effective reach of the sentencer,'
the requirements of the Eighth Amendment are satisfied. 3 67 Empha-
sizing again that the sentencer's discretion regarding the use of miti-
gating evidence could be "structured" and guided, the Court upheld
the Texas scheme under these circumstances.368
That the evidence could also become a two-edged sword when
used as an aggravator in answering "yes" to the future dangerousness
issue was irrelevant to the Eighth Amendment inquiry, according to
the majority.3 69 The Court distinguished Penry, where evidence of de-
fendant's mental retardation could only be used as an aggravator; be-
cause Penry's mental abilities would never change, and thus arguably
he would always be dangerous, the jury had no outlet for a decision
that he was nonetheless less culpable.370 By contrast, because the jury
could have given effect to Johnson's evidence by finding him unlikely
to be dangerous when he grew up, no violation of the Woodson, Lock-
ett, and Eddings rules existed.
The concerns raised in Penry's dissent about the virtually unbri-
dled discretion in juries not to impose the death penalty, as com-
362. 113 S. Ct. 2658 (1993).
363. The Court had been presented with the same issue in Graham v. Collins, 113 S. Ct.
892 (1993), but denied relief to petitioner as a decision would have required application of
a "new rule" that was impermissible under Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989). The Court
had also considered a similar challenge in Franklin v. Lynaugh, 487 U.S. 164 (1988) (plural-
ity opinion), in which a plurality had found acceptable Texas's "guidance" of the jury's
consideration of mitigating evidence. See supra note 298 and accompanying text.
364. Justice Kennedy wrote the majority opinion, in which Chief Justice Rehnquist and
Justices White, Scalia, and Thomas joined. 113 S. Ct. at 2661. Justices Scalia and Thomas
also filed concurring opinions. Justice O'Connor was joined in dissent by Justices Black-
mun, Stevens, and Souter.
365. Id. at 2669.
366. Id. at 2670.
367. Id. at 2669 (quoting Graham, 113 S. Ct. at 901).
368. Id at 2672.
369. Id.
370. Id at 2669-70.
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manded by Woodson and its progeny, reached their most damaging
culmination in Johnson. Clearly now the majority ignored the spirit of
Woodson and condoned a state's "guiding" of a jury's use of mitigat-
ing evidence to such an extent that the mitigating effect of that evi-
dence could be completely eliminated. 371 By dictating how the jury
used the evidence, the state could even transform mitigating evidence
into aggravating evidence. In the majority's view, as long as the lan-
guage of Woodson was followed and the state did not exclude pieces
of evidence, then it mattered not that the spirit was violated.
Justice O'Connor, dissenting with Justices Blackmun, Stevens,
and Souter,372 excoriated the majority for its departure from "the
proposition that the sentencer in a capital case must be able to give
full effect to all mitigating evidence concerning the defendant's char-
acter and record and circumstances of the crime. '37 3 The four dissent-
ers did not agree that the state could so channel the jury's
consideration of evidence that the jury could not give that evidence
full mitigating effect.37
In sum, the assault by the new majority375 on mitigating evidence,
and that assault's blatant hostility to defendants facing possible death
sentences as illustrated in Johnson, is another development that assists
371. Professor Sunby had foreseen this eventuality in 1991 when he stated that "the
[substance-procedure] distinction ultimately may provide an indirect means to accomplish
much of Justice Scalia's goal of removing Lockett's restrictions on state death penalty pro-
cedures." Sunby, supra note 164, at 1150. Professor Howe has more recently catalogued
the effect of Johnson as "an even more frontal assault on the Lockett mandate." Howe,
supra note 214, at 1049. Professor Howe argued that, under the Texas special issues stat-
ute, "the sentencer could not effectively consider the evidence regarding the offender's
deserts," id. at 1050, and yet the Supreme Court upheld the Texas scheme because it al-
lowed the sentencer "the opportunity to consider a defendant's evidence for some mitigat-
ing purpose." Id. (emphasis added) (footnote omitted). For another discussion of
Johnson's assault on the Lockett individualization and mitigating evidence principles, see J.
Michael Brown, Note, Eighth Amendment-Capital Sentencing Instructions, 84 J. CRiM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 854, 874-82 (1994).
372. Johnson v. Texas, 113 S. Ct. 2658, 2672 (1993) (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
373. Id. at 2675 (emphasis added).
374. Justice O'Connor quoted McCleskey v. Kemp to support her position: "'the State
cannot channel the sentencer's discretion, but must allow it to consider any relevant informa-
tion offered by the defendant."' ld. at 2676-77 (quoting McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279,
305 (1987)) (emphasis by Justice O'Connor). Justice O'Connor's opinion here may seem
contradictory to her joining of the majority in Parks, in which the Court permitted the
guidance of the jury in its use of sympathetic responses. She reconciled the two, however,
by arguing that sympathy has nothing at all to do with the jury's "'reasoned moral re-
sponse'; this response is how the jury "gives effect" to defendant's mitigating evidence.
Id. at 2680 (quoting Saffle v. Parks, 494 U.S. 484, 493 (1990)).
375. Justice Thomas was one of the new members of the Court. He now joined the four
who had comprised the minority on this issue in Penry and Franklin v. Lynaugh to make up
the majority in this case.
EVOLVING STANDARD OF DECENCY
in the creation of a pro-death construct that warps the results of the
evolving standards test. Under this line of doctrine, as long as a state
has constitutionally "guided" the jury's consideration of mitigating ev-
idence, there is no constitutional infirmity in the possibility that a jury
would give aggravating effect to the evidence defendant presented in
mitigation, as allowed under the Texas scheme. This consequence is
acceptable to the Court even though the jury's prerogative to use the
evidence instead as an aggravator in an appropriate case 376 would ne-
gate any cogency the mitigating evidence might have. The impact of
this development on the evolving standards test is thus twofold: first,
the negation of the evidence's effectiveness as mitigating evidence es-
sentially removes the evidence from the sentencing scales and so in-
creases the dominance of the aggravators in the balance. Second, the
metamorphosis of mitigating evidence into aggravating evidence could
literally increase the dominance of the aggravating evidence itself by
adding yet another piece to it. Both of these contortions of the jury's
consideration of mitigating evidence invidiously tilt the scales toward
death and thus toward more jury determinations that death is an ap-
propriate sentence. The Court's mitigating evidence jurisprudence
thus skews the jury sentencing prong of the evolving standards test
and renders it a nonobjective and unreliable index.
The rulings on antisympathy instructions only add to the pro-
death effects created by the Johnson ruling. By precluding the jury's
sympathetic response, those compassionate standards of decency are
removed from the sentencing process. Cutting the link between the
jury and the sentence again renders the sentence a questionable indi-
cator of society's standards. A further effect is worked when compas-
sionate impulses that can only favor life are wholly silenced; the
inevitable consequence is that a defendant's chances for life are di-
minished while the odds for death are increased. The sentence, as a
reflection of the evolving standard, is no longer reliable since it has
been further artificially directed toward death.
In addition, the confusion among jurors that would seem inevita-
bly to result from the antisympathy instructions could lead the jury to
ignore mitigating evidence.3 77 By blessing the use of antisympathy in-
376. See Johnson, 113 S.Ct. at 2672.
377. TWo researchers have found that juror confusion over burdens of proof and other
aspects of the capital sentencing process "works against the defendant because the jurors'
strong initial inclination is to sentence to death." Theodore Eisenberg & Martin T. Wells,
Deadly Confusion: Juror Instructions in Capital Cases, 79 CORNELL L. REv. 1, 2 (1993).
They elaborated: "indecision tends to be resolved in favor of death. When jurors report
predeliberation indecision about either guilt or sentence, the undecided jurors tend to vote
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structions, the Parks decision allows the state somewhat surrepti-
tiously to heighten the emphasis placed on aggravators and so helps to
skew a sentencer's discretion toward a death decision that is again not
reliable.
Finally, and as more generally argued by the Parks dissent,378
under the guise of instructing the jury how to use the evidence rather
than restricting what the jury can consider, any state could more af-
firmatively "guide" the jury's discretion regarding the use of mitigat-
ing factors in ways that subtly but purposely distract the jury from
according the mitigating evidence any weight or completely prevent
the jury from giving mitigating effect to the evidence. The inescapable
consequence would again be greater emphasis on the aggravators; the
vacuum created by the absence of mitigating factors would be filled
by, and the penalty phase would thus be dominated by, evidence tend-
ing to prove the existence of the aggravators. The inexorable result is
the tipping of the scales toward a death determination and a conse-
quent impugning, at the outset, of jury sentencing behavior as a relia-
ble index of society's views.
Thus, through a challenge to the Texas statute and its quirky ma-
nipulation of the jury's discretion to decline to impose death, together
with an attack on evidence evocative of sympathy, the challengers to
the Woodson line of cases were able successfully to unravel the net of
mercy provided by the Court's longstanding jurisprudence with re-
spect to mitigating circumstances. Again, the result is a jurisprudence
that, combined with other developments in death penalty law, permits
the funneling of jurors' judgments inescapably toward death. The per-
verting effects on the evolving standards test are undeniable.
3. Sanctioning of Vague Definitions of Aggravators Gives Additional
Breadth to Death Class
Since Gregg, and more recently in Zant v. Stephens, the Court has
emphasized that "an aggravating circumstance must genuinely narrow
for death," in part because confused jurors choose the default sentence, or death. Id. at 12.
"[A] defendant with a confused jury may receive a death sentence by default, without
having a chance to benefit from legal standards designed to give him a chance for life." Id.
In this context, jurors confused over how they are to give effect to mitigating evidence, if
not through some sympathetic impulse, then may, according to this study, choose death as
the default sentence. See also Mann, supra note 339, at 535 ("[T]hese instructions pose a
significant risk of confusing jurors regarding the nature of the evidence they should focus
their attention on, thus causing the jurors to fail to exercise their judgment with respect to
mitigating evidence that they might have found compelling.") (citing California v. Brown,
479 U.S. at 562-63 (Blackmun, J., dissenting)).
378. See supra text accompanying note 353.
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the class of persons eligible for the death penalty. '' 379 Just as the
Court has permitted the restriction of a jury's use of mitigating evi-
dence, the Court has conversely and deftly allowed broader definition
of aggravating factors, which, concomitantly, permits the states to ex-
pand subtly the class of those sentenced to death. This aspect of the
Court's death penalty jurisprudence further seals the fate of the capi-
tal defendant and thus influences the calculation of the evolving stan-
dards test.
In Arave v. Creech, the Court gave states greater latitude to em-
ploy vague aggravating factors.3 80 The statutory aggravating circum-
stance at issue in Creech was that "'[b]y the murder, or circumstances
surrounding its commission, the defendant exhibited utter disregard
for human life.' 381 The Idaho Supreme Court had provided the fol-
lowing for a narrowing construction: ""'the phrase is meant to be re-
flective of acts or circumstances surrounding the crime which exhibit
the highest, the utmost, callous disregard for human life, i.e., the cold-
blooded, pitiless slayer. ' ' "''3 2 Despite that a portion of the limiting
construction duplicated the language of the aggravator itself, that part
describing the "utmost ... disregard for human life," the United
States Supreme Court found this aggravator sufficiently channeled the
sentencer's discretion to survive an Eighth Amendment challenge. 83
379. Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862,877 (1983); see also Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153,
189, 199 (1976).
380. 113 S. Ct. 1534 (1993); cf Cheri L. Bugajski, Recent Decisions, 32 DuQ. L. REv.
347,359 (1994) ("[W]hen the United States Supreme Court announced its holding that the
'utter disregard' aggravating circumstance was constitutional, the Court took a step back-
wards and reinstated the very arbitrariness ... it sought to avoid in Furman v. Georgia.");
Daryl Kessler, Note, Eighth Amendment-Sentencer Discretion in Capital Sentencing
Schemes, 84 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 827, 853 (1994) ("[T]he Court has opened the
door to the validation of capital sentencing schemes that might defy definition by all but
the Justices of the Court," and by so doing has set a dangerous precedent.). The Court's
decision in Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808 (1991) also broadened the scope of permissi-
ble aggravating evidence when it sanctioned the state's use of victim impact evidence. See
supra notes 328-334 and accompanying text. Payne thus works two effects on jury decision-
making and hence on the evolving standards test: first, it colludes with decisions allowing
antisympathy instructions to turn the jury's emotions toward death; second, it permits the
state to pad its case at the sentencing phase with victim impact evidence, which apparently
need not be relevant to specific enumerated aggravators, and so to expand the scope of
aggravation.
381. 113 S. Ct. at 1538 (quoting IDAHO CODE § 19-2515(g)(6) (1987)) (alteration in
original).
382, Id. at 1539 (quoting State v. Creech, 670 P.2d 463, 471 (Idaho 1983) (quoting State
v. Osborn, 631 P.2d 187, 200-01 (Idaho 1981))).
383. 1d. at 1542, 1543.
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In reaching its decision, the Court3 4 relied on dictionary defini-
tions of the terms "cold-blooded" and "pitiless," which it distilled
down to "kill[ing] without feeling or sympathy. 3 85 An aggravator
that "[i]n ordinary usage" limited death sentences to those that in-
volved "a killer who kills without feeling or sympathy," the Court rea-
soned, effectively performed the narrowing function required of
aggravators under Gregg and its progeny.38 6 The Court then dis-
missed charges that the term "cold-blooded" applied to whatever
murder the auditory beholder thought it should: "[w]e are not faced
with [subjective] pejorative adjectives such as 'especially heinous,
atrocious, or cruel,"' but with a word that described the fact of a de-
fendant's state of mind, which a jury could objectively ascertain from
the circumstances of the crime.387 Because the state provided a "nar-
rowing" construction that was objective, admitted of no ambiguity,
and narrowed the class of those to be sentenced to death, the ag-
gravator withstood this vagueness challenge.
The Court's reasoning is problematic for a number of reasons.
First, the Court provided a construction to the state court's construc-
tion of its seemingly vague aggravator and then found that twice-re-
moved construction to be constitutional.388 Hence, when it found the
state's judicial construction of "cold-blooded" to be definite and not
vague, it actually found its own construction, "acts without feeling or
sympathy," to be nonvague.389 Not only does the Court's very need to
define "cold-blooded" demonstrate the vagueness of the term, but in
conflating the state's judicial construction with its own, the Court also
384. Justice O'Connor authored the opinion. Others making up the majority included
Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices White, Scalia, Kennedy, Souter, and Thomas. Id. at
1537.
385. Id- at 1541; see infra note 399. The Court later described the terms to mean "acts
without feeling or sympathy." See Creech, 113 S.Ct. at 1542.
386. Creech, 113 S.Ct. at 1541, 1542.
387. Id. at 1541-42.
388. The dissent strenuously objected to this twist, stating that "a 'facial' challenge of
this nature ... cannot be defeated merely by a demonstration that there exists a narrowing
way to apply the contested language. The entire point of the challenge is that the lan-
guage's susceptibility to a variety of interpretations is what makes it (facially) unconstitu-
tional." Id. at 1546 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). One writer noted that "the Court merely
substituted one admittedly vague and broad phrase ('utter disregard for human life') with
another ('the utmost callous disregard for human life, i.e., the cold-blooded, pitiless
slayer')." Bugajski, supra note 380, at 358; see also infra notes 391-392.
389. See Creech, 113 S. Ct. at 1542. For instance, in comparing this construction to that
in Walton, the Court stated, "[w]hether a defendant 'relishes' or derives 'pleasure' from his
crime arguably may be easier to determine than whether he acts without feeling or sympa-
thy .... "Id. (emphasis added). The Court had also defined "cold-bloodedness" to mean
"kills without feeling or sympathy." Id. at 1541.
demonstrated how far it will go in its proclivity to insulate death
sentences from constitutional challenge.39 0
Moreover, as the dissent cogently argued, the majority erred in
refusing to admit that the term "cold-blooded" can be applied to
many cases that fit outside the definition constructed by the major-
ity.39 1 A jury will be applying the term "cold-blooded," not the
Court's artful definition, and so it is the ambiguity of that term that
must be assessed.392 Because in everyday parlance people use the
term to describe virtually any murder, despite the majority's conten-
tion to the contrary, the words chosen by the state to limit the sen-
tencer's discretion to impose the death penalty fail to achieve that
constitutional channeling to impose the penalty only on those who kill
without feeling or sympathy.3 93  "A person of ordinary sensibility
could fairly characterize almost every murder as ['cold-blooded']."3 94
The words could potentially sweep all first-degree murderers into the
net and permit imposition of death in more cases than is warranted, in
clear violation of the Eighth Amendment as construed in Furman,
Gregg, and subsequent cases.395
The breadth of the terms "cold-blooded" and "pitiless" becomes
clearer when contrasted with the terms used to narrow the Arizona
statute in Walton v. Arizona. Although not the model of clarity them-
390. Cf. Kessler, supra note 380, at 850 ("[W]hen presented with an unconstitutional
construction in [Creech], the Court went to great pains to derive a serviceable definition.");
Diale Taliaferro, Casenote, 72 U. DET. MERCy L. REV. 229, 236 (1994) (arguing that the
Court "established precedent for the practice of engaging upon its own construction of
arguably vague state statutes in an effort to make that statute: (1) fall in line with constitu-
tional requirements; and (2) fall in line with precedent").
391. Creech, 113 S. Ct. at 1547 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); see also Kessler, supra note
380, at 851 (stating that "[lt is not at all apparent how one would objectively determine
whether an individual is a 'cold-blooded pitiless slayer"'); Benjamin J. Lantz, Comment,
Arave v. Creech: A "Cold-Blooded, Pitiless" Disregard for Constitutional Standards, 21
NEW ENO. J. ON CRIM. & Civ. CoNFnNEMENT 97, 116-17 (1995) (agreeing that the term
"cold-blooded" is vague and could apply to many cases).
392. A commentator has observed that we have no way of knowing how the state courts
themselves interpreted the terms "cold-blooded" and "pitiless slayer," so the result was
that "the Court gave the terms meaning which: (1) the Idaho Supreme Court never did;
and (2) were vague in themselves." Taliaferro, supra note 390, at 236, 237.
393. Creech, 113 S. Ct. at 1547; see also Bugajski, supra note 380, at 359; Kessler, supra
note 380, at 850-51; Lantz, supra note 391, at 123.
394. Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 428-29 (1980).
395. Creech, 113 S. Ct. at 1548; cf. Bugajski, supra note 380, at 359 (arguing that by
sanctioning a vague but supposedly narrowing construction, the Court has once again al-
lowed arbitrariness to enter the process); Kessler, supra note 380, at 351-52 (finding that
the vague state court construction failed to narrow the class of those eligible for the death
penalty); Taliaferro, supra note 390, at 237-39, 240 (agreeing with the dissent in Creech that
the supposed narrowing construction failed at its purpose).
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selves,396 they nonetheless arguably provide some guidance to a sen-
tencer faced with the sentencing task. Those terms restricted the
sentencer to cases in which the offender inflicted mental anguish or
physical abuse, relished the murder, or showed indifference to the vic-
tim's suffering and found pleasure in the killing.397 Arguably, those
terms in Walton admit of less ambiguity in the mind of the average
person, precisely because they do describe a state of mind that can be
determined from the circumstances, as opposed to the term "cold-
blooded,"3 98 on which the Creech majority substantially relied.399 As
stressed previously, the term "cold-blooded" by itself does not so
clearly refer, "[i]n ordinary usage," only to killings without emotion.
If it did, the majority would not have had to so define it in this case.
In yet another instance of the Court's disturbing inclinations to-
ward rulings that work distortions on jury sentencing behavior, the
Court in Creech endorsed vague statutory language by validating an-
other ambiguous construction. Even more disturbing is the Court's
396. Arguably, the terms employed by Arizona courts are not so certain as, for exam-
ple, a requirement that the murder have involved some form of torture, a limiting device
apparently approved in Maynard v. Cartwright, 486 U.S. 356, 365 (1988). See Walton, 497
U.S. 639, 697-99 (1990) (Blackmun, J., dissenting). A commentator has voiced tepid ap-
proval, if indeed it could be called approval, of the Walton narrowed aggravator by describ-
ing it as "an abstractly adequate definition." Louis D. Bilionis, Legitimating Death, 91
MICH. L. REv. 1643, 1654 (1993). But that narrowed construction may provide the jury
with a way to sort out death-appropriate cases from others. But see Walton, 497 U.S. at
690-99 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
397. Walton, 497 U.S. at 654-55.
398. The Creech Court itself even acknowledged that "the question is close." 113 S. Ct.
at 1542.
399. The Creech Court stated,
We acknowledge that ... the word "pitiless," standing alone, might not narrow
the class of defendants eligible for the death penalty. A sentencing judge might
conclude that every first-degree murderer is "pitiless," because it is difficult to
imagine how a person with any mercy or compassion could kill another human
being without justification. Given the statutory scheme, however, we believe that
a sentencing judge reasonably could find that not all Idaho capital defendants are
"cold-blooded."
113 S. Ct. at 1543. Although the Court here essentially admitted the vagueness of the
purported narrowing construction "pitiless," it nonetheless upheld the use of a term, "cold-
blooded," to which it had attributed a definition nearly identical to that given to "pitiless":
the Court defined "pitiless" to mean "devoid of, or unmoved by, mercy or compassion."
Id. at 1541 (citing WEBS-ER'S, supra note 355, at 1726). It had defined "cold-blooded" as
"'marked by absence of warm feelings: without consideration, compunction, or clemency."'
Id. (quoting WEBSTER'S, supra note 355, at 442). It then acknowledged that these defini-
tions "mirror" each other, id., and summarized by indicating that "cold-blooded" meant
"kill[ing] without feeling or sympathy." Id. Justice Blackmun criticized this inconsistency
in dissent and argued that if one was unconstitutionally vague, the other was also. Id. at
1546 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); see also Lantz, supra note 391, at 117-21; Taliaferro, supra
note 390, at 238.
willingness to provide the state with a construction that the Court
could find constitutional. Neither of these developments bodes well
for capital defendants or for the evolving standards test. By insulating
from challenge a vague but supposedly "narrowing" construction, and
by seemingly going out of its way to do it, the Court opens the door to
more death sentences, imposed when more and more cases are able to
fall within the ambit of the aggravating circumstances; "a vague ag-
gravator creates the risk of an arbitrary thumb on death's side of the
scale .... ."' Again, more death sentences then factor into the ele-
ment measuring jury sentencing behavior and evince an evolving stan-
dard of death. The Court's own jurisprudence in this additional way
thus assists in predetermining the result of the constitutional analysis.
4. Death Qualification of Juries Further Stacks the Deck
Yet another strand of death penalty jurisprudence adds to the mix
to demonstrate the rigging of the evolving standards test. Because the
Court has found constitutional states' practices of "death qualifying"
juries, sentences can be returned that fail to reflect the views of those
members of society who oppose the death penalty. As a result and in
this additional way, jury sentencing behavior, an integral component
of the evolving standards test for cruel and unusual punishments, falls
woefully short as an accurate index of society's views.
Before the Furman case held completely discretionary death pen-
alty statutes unconstitutional,4"' the Supreme Court had held in
Witherspoon v. Illinois that "a sentence of death cannot [constitution-
ally] be carried out if the jury that imposed or recommended it was
chosen by excluding veniremen for cause simply because they voiced
general objections to the death penalty or expressed conscientious or
religious scruples against its infliction. '40 2 Unless the venireperson
400. Tuilaepa v. California, 114 S. Ct. 2630, 2642 (1994) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
401. 408 U.S. 238 (1972). In subsequent decisions, however, the Court has indicated
that, even though unguided discretion of the pre-Furman era no longer exists, the princi-
ples articulated in Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510 (1968), still direct this area. See,
e.g., Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U.S. 719, 731 n.6 (1992); Adams v. Texas, 448 U.S. 38, 46
(1980).
402. 391 U.S. 510, 522 (1968). The Court relied on the Sixth Amendment and Four-
teenth Amendment right to an impartial jury. Id. at 518; see also Wainwright v. Witt, 469
U.S. 412, 416 (1985).
The Court was unable to decide, on the evidence presented, whether the Constitution
prohibited exclusion of these objectors from the guilt phase of a capital case. 391 U.S. at
517-18. It decided later, in Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 171-73 (1986), that there still
was not enough evidence of death-qualified jurors' predispositions toward guilt to an-
nounce a per se rule regarding the exclusion of these jurors from the guilt phase. See also
Buchanan v. Kentucky, 483 U.S. 402,414-15 (1987) (holding in McCree controlled claim of
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stated unambiguously that he or she would never impose the penalty
in any case, the juror could not be stricken for cause.40 3 Those consti-
tutionally stricken under this case came to be called "Witherspoon-
excludables. ' 4o
The Court reasoned that people who opposed capital punishment
could nonetheless make discretionary judgments about life and death
and so fulfill their obligations as jurors.4 15 If these people were ex-
cluded, however, the remaining jury would be unable to do what it
was charged by law to do: "express the conscience of the community
on the ultimate question of life or death. 40 6  Rather, the resulting
jury would be one "uncommonly willing to condemn a man to die. '40 7
Recognizing the significance of jury decisionmaking in the computa-
tion of societal standards of decency, the Court elaborated:
one of the most important functions any jury can perform in
making ... a selecti6n [between life and death] is to maintain a
link between contemporary community values and the penal
system-a link without which the determination of punishment
could hardly reflect "the evolving standards of decency that
mark the progress of a maturing society. 4 °8
The removal from the jury pool of some portions of society therefore
can break the link between the penal system and societal standards of
decency, skew the results of the sentencing process by producing
greater numbers of death sentences, and hence affect the constitu-
tional determination of what is decent and not cruel and unusual.
noncapital defendant in joint trial with capital defendant that death qualification prior to
guilt phase violated noncapital defendant's Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights).
403. The Court elaborated in a footnote:
Just as veniremen cannot be excluded for cause on the ground that they hold
[conscientious or religious objections to the death penalty], so too they cannot be
excluded for cause simply because they indicate that there are some kinds of
cases in which they would refuse to recommend capital punishment .... The most
that can be demanded of a venireman in this regard is that he be willing to con-
sider all of the penalties provided by state law, and that he not be irrevocably
committed, before the trial has begun, to vote against the penalty of death regard-
less of the facts and circumstances that might emerge in the course of the
proceedings.
391 U.S. at 522 n.21. Opposition in principle to the death penalty, then, under Wither-
spoon, did not alone justify striking for cause. Id. at 520.
404. See, e.g., Buchanan, 483 U.S. at 407-08 n.6; Lockhart, 476 U.S. at 167 & n.1. For an
analysis of Witherspoon, its impact, and the problems of application it created, see Eric
Schnapper, Taking Witherspoon Seriously: The Search for Death Qualified Jurors, 62 Tx.
L. Rn-v. 977 (1984).
405. Witherspoon, 391 U.S. at 519.
406. Id.
407. Id. at 521.
408. Id. at 519 n.15 (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958)).
Significantly, the Witherspoon Court indicated in a footnote that
the striking for cause of venirepersons would be appropriate on the
grounds that they "would automatically vote against the imposition of
capital punishment without regard to any evidence that might be de-
veloped at the trial of the case before them."" The question never-
theless later arose whether a juror's qualms about the death penalty
had to be so absolute in order for him or her to be excludable for
cause, or whether the juror had to be unequivocal in his or her rejec-
tion of the death penalty in all cases before exclusion would be
constitutional.410
Because of this perceived unresolved question, a pivotal decision
in the evolution of this line of doctrine is Adams v. Texas,4 ' which
purported to apply the Witherspoon standard to Texas's bifurcated
death penalty scheme.412 The Adams Court had gleaned the following
standard from precedent:
[the line of cases since Witherspoon] establishes the general
proposition that a juror may not be challenged for cause based
on his views about capital punishment unless those views would
prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties as
a juror in accordance with his instructions and his oath.4 13
Despite the addition of the "substantially impair" language to the
Witherspoon standard, it was nonetheless clear that the Adams Court
focused on jurors' inability to "follow the law or obey their oaths. 414
409. Id at 522 n.21; see also supra note 403. This is the oft-cited "footnote 21." See
Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 418-19 (1985). Witherspoon's footnote nine is also rele-
vant to this proposition:
Unless a venireman states unambiguously that he would automatically vote
against the imposition of capital punishment no matter what the trial might re-
veal, it simply cannot be assumed that that is his position.
391 U.S. at 515-16 n.9; Wainwright, 469 U.S. at 418-19. One commentator has dubbed the
"requirement of unmistakable clarity... the linchpin of Witherspoon." Schnapper, supra
note 404, at 990.
410. See text accompanying infra notes 418-421.
411. 448 U.S. 38 (1980).
412. Id. at 45; see supra notes 268-270 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
Texas scheme. The Texas scheme differed from the one at issue in Witherspoon in that the
former scheme was bifurcated, existed in post-Furman days when a jury's discretion to
impose death was not unfettered, and did not require the jury directly to impose the pen-
alty. See 448 U.S. at 45-46. Nonetheless, because Texas juries still exercised a range of
discretion, albeit less of a range, the Witherspoon principles still applied. Id. at 46-47 & n.4.
413. Adams, 448 U.S. at 45 (citing Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 595-96 (1978) and
Boulden v. Holman, 394 U.S. 478, 483-84 (1969)).
414. Adams, 448 U.S. at 48; see also John C. Belt, Note, Morgan v. Illinois: The Right to
Balance Capital Sentencing Juries as to Their Views on the Death Sentence is Finally
Granted to Defendants, 24 N.M. L. REv. 145, 154 (1994) ("[M]ost courts that have followed
Adams interpreted the 'substantial impairment' language to be a clear endorsement of the
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The Court stated, "[w]e repeat that the State may bar from jury ser-
vice those whose beliefs about capital punishment would lead them to
ignore the law or violate their oaths.1415 The state could not exclude,
however, those who "frankly concede that the prospects of the death
penalty may affect what their honest judgment of the facts will be or
what they may deem to be a reasonable doubt. '4 16 Clearly then, the
Adams Court did not dilute the rule of Witherspoon that the juror
make unmistakably clear, as a prerequisite to the state's striking for
cause, his or her inability to follow the law or obey the oath because of
opposition to the penalty.
The Court therefore recognized that constitutional guarantees of
an impartial jury require that the defendant be sentenced by a jury
from which are not excluded those whose convictions may merely "af-
fect" their judgments; the very nature of the jury system is such that
juries will inevitably be composed of people who will make judgments
and assess facts based upon their own views and beliefs.41 7 Excluding
those who do not make clear their inability to perform their duties
thus risks the exclusion of a discrete class and hence the seating of a
partial jury. Fidelity to the strict Witherspoon requirement is essential
to the production of a jury whose decisions truly represent the evolv-
ing standard of decency in society.
Witherspoon standard .... "); Valerie T. Rosenson, Note, Wainwright v. Witt: The Court
Casts a False Light Backward, 66 B.U. L. REv. 311, 327 (1986) ("Adams interpreted the
Witherspoon test as a general recognition of the state's legitimate interest in obtaining
jurors who will follow their instructions and obey their oaths.").
415. Adams, 448 U.S. at 50 (emphasis added). Nowhere has the Court clearly ex-
plained why a juror's refusal to sentence to death, based on principle, constitutes a failure
to "follow the law or obey the oath." Id. The Court's jurisprudence preserves the preroga-
tive of the jury to grant mercy to a defendant, to accord mitigating weight to any aspect of
the defendant's character and record and circumstances of the crime, and essentially to
have discretion to decline to impose death. See supra notes 244-263 and accompanying text.
But cf notes 339-374 and accompanying text (indicating a trend in the Court to allow states
to guide sentencers' discretion even regarding mitigating factors). Those with scruples
against the ultimate penalty could arguably "follow the law" when they deemed each case
worthy of mercy and exercised their discretion to decline to impose death. Cf. Stephen
Gillers, The Quality of Mercy: Constitutional Accuracy at the Selection Stage of Capital
Sentencing, 18 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 1037, 1078 (1985) ("There is no objective right answer.
The discretionary sentencing decision-life or death-is entirely subjective. Sentencing ju-
rors obey their oaths simply by exercising their moral judgments ... .") (emphasis added).
Because this Article is only examining the effect of these decisions on the application of
the evolving standards test, however, whether the Court is correct in its disposition of
Witherspoon or any of its progeny is a question beyond the scope of this Article.
416. Adams, 448 U.S. at 50 (emphasis added).
417. Id.
In professing an attempt to settle questions purportedly created
by precedent such as Adams, the Court in Wainwright v. Witt418 sub-
stantially relaxed419 the standard set by the Witherspoon Court,
thereby signalling the application of the pro-death approach to juror
exclusion cases. Rather than seeing in Adams's distillation of prece-
dent the implicit inclusion of the Witherspoon "unmistakably clear"
standard, the Witt Court saw exclusion: "the requirement that a juror
may be excluded only if he would never vote for the death penalty is
now missing; gone too is the extremely high burden of proof."420
Constricting the law, the Court sanctioned the Adams standard as
the proper test, but absent "Witherspoon's reference to 'automatic'
decisionmaking[;] this standard likewise does not require that a juror's
bias be proved with 'unmistakable clarity."' 421 This jettisoning of the
higher threshold of proof makes it much easier for the state to chal-
lenge a juror for cause if the juror exhibits at least some hesitancy
418. 469 U.S. 412 (1985). Justice Rehnquist wrote the majority opinion, in which Chief
Justice Burger and Justices White, Blackmun, Powell, and O'Connor joined. Id. at 413.
Justice Stevens concurred in the judgment only, protesting that much of the majority's
opinion was "inconsistent with the standard announced in Adams v. Texas, which the entire
Court continues to endorse today." Id. at 436 (citation omitted). Justice Marshall joined
Justice Brennan in dissent. Id. at 439 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
419. As Justice Brennan noted in dissent, the majority in Witt viewed Adams as a re-
trenchment from the Witherspoon principles, when Witt actually provided the definitive
curtailment of Witherspoon's reach. See Witt, 469 U.S. at 450-53 (Brennan, J., dissenting);
see also Belt, supra note 414, at 154 ("Witt was the first case to treat Adams as creating a
new standard."). Another commentator has also noted that "[t]his most recent formula-
tion [in Witt] of the standard for the exclusion of opponents of capital punishment from
death penalty trial juries expands the range of prosecutorial challenges beyond that which
had been thought permissible under [Witherspoon]." F. Thomas Schornhorst, Preliminary
Screening of Prosecutorial Access to Death Qualified Juries: A Missing Constitutional Link,
62 IND. L.J. 295,296 n.7 (1987); see also Robert A. Burt, Disorder in the Court: The Death
Penalty and the Constitution, 85 MICH. L. REv. 1741 (1987); id. at 1785, 1786 (arguing that
"Witt... posit[ed] a substantive standard that invited state trial judges to exclude more
jurors than before. . . " and that it "effectively dismantle[d] Witherspoon"); Geimer, supra
note 37, at 775 n.184 (arguing that, in Witt, the Court "effectively abandoned serious review
of trial court exclusion of jurors with reservations about the death penalty"); Belt, supra
note 414, at 155 ("[T]he Supreme Court significantly reduced the standard of proof re-
quired in excluding capital sentencing jurors."); Rosenson, supra note 414, at 328-29 ("The
Witt Court's dismissal of the unmistakable clarity standard results in an increased ability to
exclude veniremembers who have feelings against the death penalty.").
420. Witt, 469 U.S. at 421.
421. Id. at 424; see also id. at 424 n.5 (stating "we simply modify the test stated in
Witherspoon's footnote twenty-one to hold that the State may exclude from capital sen-
tencing juries that 'class' of veniremen whose views would prevent or substantially impair
the performance of their duties in accordance with their instructions or their oaths"). One
commentator even suggested that Witt effectively overruled Witherspoon. See The
Supreme Court, 1984 Term, Leading Cases, 99 HARv. L. Rnv. 120, 127-28 (1985) [hereinaf-
ter The Supreme Court].
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regarding his or her ability to impose the death penalty.422 The dan-
ger then is that the jury not only may be "uncommonly willing to con-
demn a man to die, '423 but also is unrepresentative of some segment
of society that opposes capital punishment to some degree.
Even if the Court is correct that the Sixth and Fourteenth
Amendments do not require the heightened Witherspoon standard,
the consequences of all of these holdings for the evolving standards
test should be obvious. In its quest to procure a jury that will enforce
the death penalty, the prosecution can constitutionally exclude those
segments of society who would not or who simply might not enforce
it.424 If opponents of the death penalty can be excluded without une-
422. Cf supra note 419. In naming the "unmistakable clarity" aspect of Witherspoon
the "linchpin" of its protections, a commentator articulated the reason for that clarity re-
quirement. See Schnapper, supra note 404, at 990. He argued essentially that unmistaka-
ble clarity was required for "implementing the majority's fundamental premise that the
disposition of challenges to scrupled jurors must be based on what those jurors actually
say, not on what a judge assumes or infers that the jurors feel, mean, or might have said
had they been asked." Id. The Witherspoon majority's premise was clearly not shared by
the Witt Court, as is evident from the latter's annihilation of the requirement and conse-
quent apparent approval of a judge's "assum[ption] or infer[ence] about what a juror might
feel, mean, or might have said." Id.
Schnapper's research also indicated that "the attitude of individual veniremen toward
the death penalty is often as uncertain, divided, and wavering as that of society itself." Id.
at 1077. For that reason, the Witt decision is all the more damaging in its impact on the
pro-death composition of the jury, because hesitancy in responding to questions about
their "scruples" and ability to follow the law will much more easily lead to exclusion of
those hesitant jurors.
Further protecting the exclusion of these jurors is the standard of review on appeal;
the Court in Witt recognized that a judge's finding of juror bias was one of fact and so
accorded a presumption of correctness, either on direct appeal or collateral review. 469
U.S. at 427-29. A commentator has argued that this standard of review, or lack of it, "insu-
lat[es] any such [Win] exclusion from federal constitutional review," Burt, supra note 419,
at 1785, and that the "'presumption of correctness' is likely to be irrebuttable." Id. at 1786;
see also Rosenson, supra note 414, at 337-38.
For other analyses of Witherspoon, Adams, and Witt, see Burt, supra note 419, at 1746-
51, 1785-86; Gillers, supra note 415, at 1064-84; Belt, supra note 414; Rosenson, supra note
414; The Supreme Court, supra note 421.
423. Witherspoon, 391 U.S. at 521.
424. Justice Black had seen the Witherspoon decision as "making it impossible for
States to get juries that will enforce the death penalty." Witherspoon, 391 U.S. at 532
(Black, J., dissenting). Thus, there is support for the proposition that exclusion of oppo-
nents assures that the death penalty will be enforced, that death sentences will be imposed,
and that opponents will not subvert the process by preventing imposition of death
sentences. The necessary by-product of that assurance, however, is a skewing of the evolv-
ing standard of decency.
One commentator has noted the possibility of subversion of the process by death pen-
alty opponents, but has argued nonetheless that opponents' presence on the jury is re-
quired. To deal with the possibility of subversion, he has proposed that states be able to
repeal a requirement of juror unanimity at sentencing. See Gillers, supra note 339, at 89-97.
quivocal proof that they can nonetheless serve faithfully as jurors, the
remainder of the pool consists of those who are more ready, willing,
and able to render a death sentence.4" The jury may then in some
fashion be more disposed to sentence to death. 26 In that event, jury-
imposed death sentences are unreliable as an expression of the con-
science of the community or society's standard of decency.4 27 The rig-
ging of the evolving standards test comes into sharper focus as it
becomes clearer that the indicia used to determine the evolving stan-
dards are anything but objective.
Even assuming again, however, that jurors with scruples against
the death penalty can ignore those convictions and serve on a jury,
and even if the resultant jury is no more prone to sentence to death,
the skewing effect on the evolving standards test remains. The Court
in two subsequent cases reminded defendants that:
not all who oppose the death penalty are subject to removal for
cause in capital cases; those who firmly believe that the death
penalty is unjust may nevertheless serve as jurors in capital cases
425. Another commentator has argued that "[t]he state's ability to stack the jury
against the accused through the death qualification process is even greater than the major-
ity in [Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162 (1986)] was willing to acknowledge."
Schornhorst, supra note 419, at 322-23. He explained:
The prosecutor will challenge peremptorily prospective jurors whose doubts
about the death penalty are not sufficiently strong to justify exclusion by way of
the WitherspoonlWitt criteria, thereby increasing the jury's tilt toward the state.
Since the percentage of persons disfavoring capital punishment is decreasing ....
the state will not only be able to exclude most of the "soft" jurors, but also to
distort the representativeness of the jury. The defendant, on the other hand, is
likely soon to run out of his or her equal number of peremptory challenges if the
defendant exercises them to exclude people who favor the death penalty. The
defendant will, in the end, be able to exclude only the most avid capital punish-
ment devotees.
Id. at 323 (footnotes omitted).
426. Another commentator observed that "[t]he exclusion of any scrupled juror,
whether protected by Witherspoon or not, benefits a prosecutor seeking the death pen-
alty," Schnapper, supra note 404, at 992, ostensibly because that exclusion better ensures a
jury that is more likely to return a death sentence. Studies have shown, too, that even the
death-qualification process in itself produces a jury that is more likely to sentence a de-
fendant to death. See Craig Haney, On the Selection of Capital Juries: The Biasing Effects
of the Death-Qualification Process, 8 LAw & HuM. BEHAV. 121, 129 (1984) (finding that
the process "led jurors to choose the death penalty as an appropriate punishment much
more frequently than persons not exposed to it").
427. Cf. Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 387 n.3 (1989) (Brennan, J., dissenting)
("Capital sentences for juveniles would presumably be more unusual still were capital ju-
ries drawn from a cross section of our society, rather than excluding many who oppose
capital punishment .... a fact that renders capital jury sentences a distinctly weighted
measure of contemporary standards.") (citing Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162 (1986)).
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so long as they state clearly that they are willing to temporarily
set aside their own beliefs in deference to the rule of law.42
If those beliefs can truly be set aside, as posited by the Court, the
beliefs would then find no expression in the verdict. Any principled
dissent may very likely be obliterated from the evolving standards
calculus in the name of enforcement of the death penalty scheme.429
The amalgamation of the Court's decisions in this area allows the
prosecution to secure a jury from which is excluded people wholly
opposed to or even possessing "conscientious scruples" against the
death penalty and who purportedly may not follow the law and obey
their oaths. Those prospective jurors with scruples against the death
penalty can be seated, however, if they swear that they are able to set
aside their beliefs and ignore them throughout the sentencing process.
Whatever the trait that allows their dismissal from the jury venire or
permits at least the exclusion of their views from the process, the
Court's decisions lead ineluctably to the conclusion that there will
never be a sentence that reflects opponents' beliefs against the death
penalty.
It follows, then, that the evolving standards calculus will never
include the standards of those members of society with scruples
against the imposition of death. The result is an "evolving standard"
that ignores the standards of relevant segments of society and is thus
unreliable as a gauge of what is cruel and unusual. In this way, the
Court's decisions have further "stacked the deck" 430 of jury decision-
making to indicate a standard of societal decency more in favor of
death than may in fact exist.431
428. Lockhart, 476 U.S. at 176 (emphasis added); see also Buchanan v. Kentucky, 483
U.S. 402, 416 (1987).
429. See Gillers, supra note 339, at 85-91 (arguing that death penalty opponents cannot
constitutionally be excluded from juries because of the Eighth Amendment's reliability
requirement and the need that the jury express the evolving standards of decency); Craig
Haney, Epilogue: Evolving Standards and the Capital Jury, 8 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 153, 157
(1984) ("[T]he capital jury serves as a gauge of the Eighth Amendment values. Yet, once
we begin to systematically limit the range of community opinion and personal experience
that is reflected on the jury, how can the gauge ever operate effectively?").
430. Witherspoon, 391 U.S. at 523.
431. This argument is not changed by the holding in Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U.S. 719
(1992). Morgan presented the "reverse-Witherspoon" or "life-qualifying" case. Id. at 724,
734 n.8. The Court held that the Fourteenth Amendment required that prospective jurors
be asked whether they would vote to impose death in any case in which the defendant was
found guilty of a capital offense, and that defendant be permitted to strike for cause those
prospective jurors answering that question in the affirmative. Id. at 736, 729; see also Ross
v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 81 (1988) (addressing the same issue in a case in which defendant
had been denied removal of a prospective juror for cause and so exercised a peremptory
strike to dismiss prospective juror). Exclusion of those who would always vote to execute
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The preceding discussion has demonstrated the unreliability of
jury sentencing behavior as an "objective" indicator of the evolution
of society's standard of decency. Antisympathy instructions and vic-
tim impact evidence coalesce to favor death because together they
permit the heaping onto the jury and the expression, in the form of a
death sentence, of strong emotions for the loss of the victim, and yet
prohibit the jury's venting of emotions that might favor the defendant.
In the death penalty sentencing context, the jury's emotions are thus
channeled toward a death decision and the index of jury sentencing
behavior indicates approval for the death penalty. The Court's deci-
sions regarding a state's ability to guide the sentencer's discretion with
regard to mitigating evidence essentially permits circumscription of
mitigating evidence and thus allows aggravating evidence to fill the
void and tip the scales toward death; jury sentencing behavior is then
more likely to evince approbation of death penalties. Additionally, in
its recent lenient treatment of a vague aggravator, the Court has
shown its willingness to sanction aggravators that fail to narrow the
death class but instead give it more breadth; the result is an increase in
death sentences and a consequent alteration in the index of jury sen-
tencing. Finally, death qualification of juries further stacks the deck
of jury sentencing because it excludes members of the community who
are opposed to the death penalty and, even though it permits the seat-
does not balance out the removal of "Witherspoon excludables" and thus insure the relia-
bility of jury decisions as reflections of the evolving standard; the jury that is eventually
seated is still composed of people ready, willing, and able to sentence a defendant to death.
But see Belt, supra note 414, at 165-67 (arguing that "life qualifying" of juries balances out,
albeit imperfectly, "death qualifying" of juries).
The requirement that ardent proponents of the death penalty be excluded seems also
compelled by the principle that the jurors be able to follow the law aid obey their oaths.
See supra notes 397-399 and accompanying text. Because the decision to impose the death
penalty must be guided, jurors must make specific findings prior to the imposition of the
penalty; this decision is not discretionary, as can be the one to decline to impose the pen-
alty. Therefore, if a juror is predisposed, he or she will fail to follow instructions to deter-
mine the existence of aggravating factors and therefore should not be seated. The effect
these jurors have on the sentencing process could be likened to the effect of a mandatory
death penalty statute in that the jurors would automatically impose death upon conviction
of a certain type of murder. That type of scheme has been held unconstitutional. See
Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 303 (1976) (plurality opinion) (finding North
Carolina's mandatory death penalty statute unconstitutional in part because it "provide[d]
no standards to guide the jury in its inevitable exercise of the power to determine which
first-degree murderers shall live and which shall die"); cf. Morgan, 504 U.S. at 736-39 (rea-
soning that these excludables cannot follow the law with regard to consideration of mitigat-
ing factors); Gillers, supra note 339, at 99 n.452 (suggesting that in 1980 these people might
have been excludable because they would fail to accord the defendant the individualized
consideration required by Lockett). This argument can be contrasted with that regarding
Witherspoon excludables' ability to follow their oaths. See discussion supra note 415.
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ing of jurors with some scruples against the penalty, requires that scru-
pled jurors bury their opposition in order to impose death in
appropriate cases. In either situation, the sentence rendered by the
jury may well be more likely to be a death sentence, but at the very
least cannot accurately reflect anti-death penalty sentiment within the
evolving standard. All of these rulings work together to systematically
channel jury decisionmaking to return death sentences. Jury sentenc-
ing behavior can therefore be rigged and is thus not an "objective"
indicator of societal standards of decency and should not be relied
upon as a key test of constitutionality.
B. Selective Evaluation of Legislative Enactments Ensures
a Pro-Death Penalty Sampling
In addition to employing evidence of jury sentencing behavior to
determine the evolving standard, the Court has relied on legislative
enactments of the various states to indicate the current societal con-
sensus relating to the death penalty. Public opinion as borne out in
decisions of legislators is considered another objective indicator of
what is cruel and unusual.432 The Court has split into factions over
this prong of the standard as well,433 with the latest majority's ap-
proach being the least effective at achieving an accurate, non-pro-
death reflection of the evolving standards of decency. The best illus-
tration of this split is found in Stanford v. Kentucky.4 34
432. See supra notes 16-18, 20-21 and accompanying text. Professor Radin has gener-
ally criticized reliance on legislative enactments as an indication of what is constitutional.
Conceding that legislative enactments may be relevant to the determination to some de-
gree, she nonetheless opined the following:
conclusive reliance on these indicators either through substantive definition or
extreme judicial deference is circular. Constitutional doctrine may not be formu-
lated by the acts of those institutions which the Constitution is supposed to limit.
To glean a list of permissible punishments from those enacted by legislatures
either assumes that legislators never enact a punishment they think is, or may be,
cruel or allows the legislature to define permissible punishments by its enact-
ments. Such a view removes any role for a constitutional check.
Radin, Jurisprudence of Death, supra note 26, at 1036.
433. See supra notes 116-117, 122 and accompanying text.
434. 492 U.S. 361 (1989). In Stanford, there was a clean break on this issue between the
majority, comprised of Justices Scalia, Chief Justice Rehnquist, and Justices White,
O'Connor, and Kennedy, see id. at 364, 370 & n.2, and the dissent, comprised of Justices
Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens. See id. at 382, 384-85. In Thompson v.
Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815 (1988), the schism was not so clear, but the plurality addressed the
interpretation difference in a footnote. See id. at 829 n.29; see also supra note 122 and
accompanying text. In Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989), although the same majority
as in Stanford found from legislative enactments no violation of the evolving standards, see
id. at 306, 334-35, the count was such as to make less of a difference to the outcome so that
the majority did consider abolitionist states in the calculation. See id. at 334 ("In our view,
EVOLVING STANDARD OF DECENCY
The Stanford majority looked only at statutes from death penalty
states to determine whether execution of sixteen- and seventeen-year-
olds was contrary to the evolving standard. The dissent, which was
comprised of the same Justices who constituted the plurality in
Thompson v. Oklahoma, stressed that all state statutes must be con-
sidered if that prong of the test is to be truly representative of soci-
ety's views. The Stanford dissent appears to have the better reasoned
approach regarding the appropriate pool by which to compare a chal-
lenged death penalty statute. Employment of that approach would
also result in a more objective sampling of standards regarding the
death penalty and thus achieve a more accurate reflection of the
evolving societal standards of decency.
The Justices had previewed their modes of interpretation and the
schism in Thompson,435 which involved execution of those who were
fifteen or younger at the times of their offenses. The plurality in that
case had initially confined its analysis to those states that had specifi-
cally considered the execution of this class of offender, but engaged
the dispute by responding to a dissent criticism. 4 36 If the tally were
also to include those death penalty statutes that specified no minimum
age, as the Thompson dissenters contended, then it should also in-
clude states that had no death penalty at all; only that way would the
focus be consistent, by looking generally to those state statutes that
facially did or did not permit the execution of this class of offenders.437
The ratio by that method would have been two-to-one against execu-
tion of members of this class.438
Justice Scalia in dissent, joined by the Chief Justice and Justice
White, would not look to non-death penalty states; these three Justices
chose to include in the computation of evolving standards only states
that authorized the death.penalty and included those that had pro-
vided no minimum age prohibition on execution.439 These statutes
showed, in the dissent's view, that "a majority of the States for which
the two state statutes prohibiting execution of the mentally retarded, even when added to
the 14 States that have rejected capital punishment completely, do not provide sufficient
evidence at present of a national consensus.").
435. 487 U.S. 815, 829 n.29 (1988) (plurality opinion); id. at 867-68 (Scalia, J., dissent-
ing). Justice Kennedy did not participate in the consideration or decision of the case. IM. at
817.
436. Id. at 829, 829 n.29.
437. Id. at 829 n.29. Justice O'Connor in her concurrence also considered non-death
penalty states but was less sure about the conclusion she would draw from the evidence.
See id. at 849-52.
438. Id. at 829 n.29.
439. Id. at 867-68.
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the issue exists (the rest do not have capital punishment) are of the
view that death is not different insofar as the age of juvenile criminal
responsibility is concerned."4 0 Justice Scalia characterized these gen-
eral death penalty provisions as proof of affirmative determinations to
set no minimum age: "the larger number of States ([nineteen]) ...
have determined that no minimum age for capital punishment is ap-
propriate ... ."441 In so doing, the dissent essentially read into a gen-
eral allowance a more specific provision, that the states considered
and chose to allow the execution of fifteen-year-olds. Using this anal-
ysis, the dissent argued that forty percent of the states would allow
this penalty for this class." 2
The majority in Stanford consisted of the Thompson dissenters,
now joined by Justices O'Connor and Kennedy.443 As three of the
Justices had done in the dissent in Thompson, the majority here re-
fused to accord the same interpretation to general prohibitions in abo-
litionist states as it accorded to general authorizations in death penalty
states; it would not consider general prohibitions as encompassing
specific prohibitions against execution of certain teenagers, but would
consider general allowances as specific allowances to execute certain
teenagers. 4 Logically, however, the general prohibition in abolition-
ist states could just as easily show that the states considered and chose
to prohibit a narrow class of executions, those of fifteen-year-olds. In
fact, it is more logical to conclude that the general prohibition encom-
passes the specific prohibition, as Justice Brennan and the other Stan-
ford dissenters" 5 did, than to conclude that the general allowance
encompasses the specific allowance, as the majority did in Stanford;
abolitionist states determined that the death penalty was suitable for
no one and left no question regarding whether fifteen-year-olds could
be executed under their schemes: they clearly could not.
By contrast, a general authorization for the death penalty evinces
nothing definitive about the specific case of fifteen-year-olds; a gen-
eral allowance does not preclude the legislature from later carving out
specific prohibitions for classes of defendants that could nevertheless
coexist with the general authorization. Moreover, a court in a death
penalty state could similarly carve out a prohibition from the general
440. Id at 868.
441. Id.
442. Id.
443. Stanford, 492 U.S. at 363.
444. Id at 370-71 & nn.2-3.
445. Justice Brennan was joined in dissent by Justices Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens.
Id. at 382 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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authorization. In an abolitionist state, the converse is not true: a legis-
lature that had affirmatively abolished the death penalty would not
likely carve out a small death-eligible class like the one at issue here,
and a court in that state could never carve out a specific authorization
from the general prohibition against capital punishment. The Stan-
ford dissent's approach is more doctrinally sound in this context.
Therefore, if the current majority, led by Justice Scalia, continues to
posit that general authorizations for the penalty of death show, with-
out more, that the state considered and chose to impose the penalty
on a discrete class of defendants, then, to be consistent, it must also
count general prohibitions on the death penalty as showing a consid-
ered decision not to impose the penalty on a discrete class.
The more logically sound approach has, for purposes of this the-
sis, a more significant virtue in that it examines non-death penalty sen-
timent within the calculation of the evolving standards of decency.
Such an approach would render a truer reflection of society's attitude
toward the death penalty because it would then include opposition,
general evidence of which is currently excluded by the majority.
As presently formulated, however, the legislative enactments
prong of the evolving standards of decency test is not an objective
index of society's views on the death penalty. The majority's method
of compilation of the evidence is biased in favor of death because it
selectively evaluates pro-death penalty enactments and excludes a sig-
nificant number of enactments that evidence opposition to the death
penalty. The resulting picture of the evolving standards of decency is
not objective but is distorted toward death. Therefore, the test, in this
regard as well, is not wholly reliable and should not be used exclu-
sively to resolve substantive Eighth Amendment questions. 46
446. For different reasons, Professor Radin has also proposed that the evolving stan-
dards analysis should not be the only one used to judge whether a punishment is cruel and
unusual. See Radin, Jurisprudence of Death, supra note 26, at 1036-38. She proposed that
"[t]he Court must search [also] for a deeper moral consensus on the meaning of cruelty in
order to determine whether a specific punishment comports with current standards of de-
cency." Id. at 992. She found tools for ascertaining that consensus essentially in what is
termed here as the Court's excessiveness inquiry. See id. at 1030, 1042-62. Former Justice
Goldberg and Professor Dershowitz also argued that the "objective criteria of the evolving
standards of decency are properly viewed only as threshold, rather than determinative,
inquiries under the [E]ighth [Almendment." Goldberg & Dershowitz, supra note 26, at
1782. Opining that "[t]he final test must lie elsewhere," id., the authors proceeded to out-
line a "[p]urposive [tiest of [c]onstitutionality," id. at 1784, that included evaluation for
extreme severity and wantonness or excessive severity. See id. at 1785-97. In this Article,
these evaluations are termed "proportionality review" and "assessment for furtherance of
penological goals".
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V. The Final Analysis
Because at least three members of the current Court have ex-
pressly indicated that, beyond the test of historical acceptance, they
favor employing the evolving standards of decency test as the sole de-
terminant of the constitutionality of death sentences under the Eighth
Amendment, this Article undertook to evaluate whether that test was
truly as "objective" as its supporters have claimed. This analysis
reveals that the components of the test are not objective indicators of
community values; one prong can be influenced by other decisions of
the Court and statistics about the other prong can be selectively
interpreted.
At least five separate areas of death penalty jurisprudence com-
bine to render suspect the validity of jury decisionmaking as an accu-
rate indicator of the evolving standard of decency in society. Two
lines of case law, those dealing with antisympathy instructions and vic-
tim impact evidence, allow the force of the jury's emotions to be
vented only in favor of the victim, and hence the state, but to be
wholly squelched in the decision whether to grant the defendant
mercy by declining to impose the death penalty. The result of the
synthesis of these rulings is a jury that is told that the only valid emo-
tions that it can heed are those that would lead to a sentence of death.
Another significant line of constitutional principles has under-
gone revision by the Court in a way that further impugns the employ-
ment of jury decisionmaking as a reflection of community values.
Under the guise of reining in the jury's discretion with regard to miti-
gating evidence, the Court has essentially gutted a line of doctrine re-
quiring that the jury be allowed to consider and give effect to any
mitigating evidence that a defendant produces as a reason for a sen-
tence less than death. States are now permitted to prescribe how a
jury uses and gives effect to mitigating evidence, posing the danger
that the evidence will not be considered or given effect at all and that
the penalty phase will then be dominated by aggravating factor evi-
dence. The jury will have far fewer reasons for imposing a sentence
less than death.
Moreover, the Court has recently relaxed the requirement that
statutory aggravating circumstances be sufficiently clear and under-
standable to channel the sentencer's discretion and ensure death
sentences only for those truly deserving defendants. The consequence
of this relaxation is to broaden the class of death-eligible defendants
and thus to permit more death sentences.
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Decisions of the Court concerning jury composition further stack
the deck in favor of jury decisions that may not accurately reflect the
societal standard of decency regarding the death penalty. Because the
Court has held that states can exclude from the jury those members of
society who oppose the death penalty in any context, and who would
never impose the death penalty, juries are composed of people who
are at least willing to sentence someone to die. The Court has also
relaxed the standard by which veniremembers can be struck for cause,
thereby potentially allowing the exclusion of those less certain about
their positions on the penalty. Finally, because jurors can be urged to
set aside their convictions in order to apply the law and sentence to
death, any scruples against the death penalty are further obscured
from the process. A jury decision will thus never reflect the standards
of decency of that segment of society, no matter how large, with
scruples against the death penalty; hence, the Court will never factor
into its calculus of the evolving standard of decency those life
sentences that were reached by juries composed, at least in part, of
these objectors.
In these ways, "[t]he rules are stacked in favor of death" and
"place the weights on the side of man's sadistic drive."" 7 Because so
much of death penalty law can be manipulated and can ultimately
combine to influence a jury's decision in the direction of death, the
outcome of that decisionmaking is not altogether reliable as an index
of society's views and thus is not reliable as a determinant of "the
evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of [this] matur-
ing society."448 This portion of the evolving standards test can and has
been rigged in favor of the constitutionality of death sentences.
Therefore, the test cannot stand alone, beyond that of historical usage,
as the exclusive test of constitutionality in the death penalty context.
Finally, the selective evaluation of only death penalty states' leg-
islative enactments skews the calculus away from objectivity and to-
ward death as a constitutional punishment; death will not be deemed
cruel and unusual, but rather will be constitutional because it com-
ports with the evolving standard of decency in death penalty states.
This prong of the evolving standards test fails the objectivity test as
well and casts more doubt on the propriety of sole use of the evolving
standards test to determine the constitutionality of the death penalty.
447. McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 247, 248 (1971) (Douglas, J., dissenting)
(dissenting from decision upholding, against due process challenge, Ohio's unitary death
penalty trial system).
448. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100 (1958) (plurality opinion).
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A. A Proposal
Two fundamental reasons compel the conclusion that the Court
should not look only to the "objective indicia" of evolving standards
of decency to determine the constitutionality of the death penalty.
One reason, developed throughout this Article, is that the indicia are
not wholly reliable as objective indicators of society's values but can
be manipulated and selectively analyzed. Jury sentencing behavior
should not be employed at all as an index of society's views because
the capital jury's composition does not mirror society and because its
decisionmaking has been influenced toward death from the outset. If
jury sentencing behavior is used as an index, it must be used with cau-
tion and an awareness that the process may not yield an objective re-
sult. Legislative judgments as an index of cruelty and unusualness
could be somewhat more accurately reflective of society's standards of
decency, however, if the Court considered all legislative judgments
concerning the death penalty, not just those in states whose popula-
tion and/or legislators support the punishment."49
The second reason that the "objective indicia" should not be used
exclusively is that under the American system of justice, the Supreme
Court is the final arbiter of what is constitutional 50 and therefore of
what is cruel and unusual; the Court cannot abdicate that responsibil-
ity to legislatures and juries. For this reason, even if the Court were to
attempt to cure the deficiencies in the evolving standards test, that test
should not be the singular standard.
Because public opinion could clamor for just those punishments
that should be considered cruel under ordinary definitions, which
clamoring would find its way into jury decisions and legislative enact-
ments, these forms of public opinion cannot be bootstrapped into
usurping and, by that usurping, eliminating the restricting function of
the constitutional provision. The Eighth Amendment prohibits cruel
and unusual punishments; it does not permit whatever punishments
the majority, through legislatures and juries, deems to be appropriate,
449. There may even be a strong argument that legislative enactments should not be
employed at all as a measure of society's views. Researchers found in one study that "pub-
lic support for capital punishment is an illusion that has become a self-perpetuating polit-
ical myth." William J. Bowers, et al., A New Look at Public Opinion on Capital
Punishment: What Citizens and Legislators Prefer, 22 AM. J. CRiM. L. 77, 142 (1994). To
these researchers, "legislative support for capital punishment suggests that lawmakers are
out of touch with the actual punishment preferences of their constituents. . . ." Id. at 132.
In that event, legislative enactment of death penalties would not at all be an accurate re-
flection of society's evolving standards of decency.
450. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177-78 (1803).
just as the Fourteenth Amendment does not sanction whatever public
opinion deems to be due process or equal protection.45' Justice Bren-
nan, concurring in Furman v. Georgia, articulated the idea precisely:
this Court finally adopted the Framers' view of the [Cruel and
Unusual Punishment] Clause as a "constitutional check" to en-
sure that "when we come to punishments, no latitude ought to
be left, nor dependence put on the virtue of representatives."...
If the judicial conclusion that a punishment is "cruel and unu-
sual" "depend[ed] upon virtually unanimous condemnation of
the penalty at issue," then, "[l]ike no other constitutional provi-
sion, [the Clause's] only function would be to legitimize ad-
vances already made by the other departments and opinions
already the conventional wisdom."... Judicial enforcement of
the Clause, then, cannot be evaded by invoking the obvious
truth that legislatures have the power to prescribe punishments
for crimes. That is precisely the reason the Clause appears in
the Bill of Rights .... [W]e must not, in the guise of "judicial
restraint," abdicate our fundamental responsibility to enforce
the Bill of Rights.4 52
Although the indicia of community values do indicate something
about the cruel and unusual nature of punishments, they cannot serve
with historical usage as the sole benchmarks of constitutionality. The
Court must wade into the fray as it does under other clauses and judge
for itself what is cruel and unusual.
In the death penalty context, the Court need only return to or
continue its reliance on established principles and checks of constitu-
tionality. For example, the Court has not in the past abdicated its role
but has conducted its own excessiveness inquiry, by looking to propor-
tionality principles and goals of punishment to ascertain whether the
punishment comported with the "dignity of man"; these tools acted as
451. See Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 391-92 (1989) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Justice Scalia's likely retort to this argument would be that the Fourteenth Amendment
does not contain language that would suggest a resort to some form of public opinion is
necessary. He would argue that the Eighth Amendment, however, contains the phrase
"and unusual," the meaning of which can only be ascertained by looking to what the people
are doing. See supra note 163. "What the people are doing" and so what is not "unusual"
can be evidenced by even rare provisions for and impositions of a punishment, under Jus-
tice Scalia's approach. See supra notes 158-160, 163-164 and accompanying text. Hence, if
this counterargument had merit and if the clause meant what Justice Scalia argues it
means, there would have been no need for a Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause be-
cause what was being done would automatically pass muster. See supra note 164.
452. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 268,269 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring) (quot-
ing Goldberg & Dershowitz, supra note 26, at 1782); see also Bilionis, supra note 163, at
294-95 n.34 (positing that legislative enactments are not reliable indicators of standards of
decency in the death penalty context because legislators so often respond according to
perceived or presumed dictates of the Supreme Court); see also supra note 432.
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further checks on state power by allowing for some measurement be-
yond mere public opinion as represented in the evolving standards
test. Such punishments that could be imposed by the majority, but
would fail to serve a deterrent or retributive function or would be too
severe for the offender or crime involved, would not survive the scru-
tiny of the additional measurements.453 The Court should continue its
reliance on these other tools.
Furthermore, the Court should once again consider the practices
of other nations in the constitutionality assessment. Currently, in its
assessment of what society deems acceptable, a majority of the Court
has refused to consider evidence of other nations' abolition of the
death penalty, either in total or for certain classes of offenders. Justice
Scalia, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, and Justices White,
O'Connor, and Kennedy, in Stanford v. Kentucky had "emphasize[d]
that it is American conceptions of decency that are dispositive," and
rejected the notion that other nations' stances on the death penalty
were relevant. 54 This approach is not only without historical basis,455
453. Justice Brennan has similarly argued that proportionality analysis and assessment
according to the evolving standards of decency are both necessary Eighth Amendment
evaluations because penological goals alone cannot justify the imposition of certain punish-
ments; those goals are not self-limiting. Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 179-82 (1987)
(Brennan, J., dissenting).
454. 492 U.S. at 369 n.1. This interpretation may not be consistent with the approach of
the Chief Justice and Justices Scalia, White, and Kennedy to employ only the evolving
standards test and its "objective indicia." Other countries' sentencing practices, particu-
larly those in western democracies, would arguably constitute "objective indicia" of stan-
dards of decency of maturing societies regarding the death penalty. Because such evidence
would not require the justices to rely only on their "subjective views" of the rightness of
the death penalty, it should have been acceptable to them. Their failure to include it re-
sults in the exclusion of anti-death penalty sentiment because most other western nations
have abolished the death penalty. See Ved P. Nanda, Recent Developments in the United
States and Internationally Regarding Capital Punishment-An Appraisal, 67 ST. JOHN's L.
Rtv. 523, 523 (1993). According to a report compiled at the request of the Economic and
Social Council of the United Nations, see ROGER HOOD, THE DEATH PENALTY: A
WORLDWIDE PERSPECTIVE vii (4th impression 1994), the following countries' laws "do not
provide for the death penalty for any crime": Australia, Austria, Columbia, Costa Rica,
Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Finland, France, Germany, Haiti, Holy See,
Honduras, Iceland, Lichtenstein, Luxembourg, Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Netherlands,
Nicaragua, Norway, Panama, Portugal, Sweden, Uruguay, and Venezuela. Id. at 169. In
the three and one-half years between the third and fourth reprints of the book, "ten more
countries ha[d] abolished the death penalty for all crimes," including Angola, Croatia,
Greece, Hong Kong, Hungary, and Switzerland. Id. at x. A commentator has observed,
however, that, in addition to the United States, Japan is an exception to the other western
industrial nations that have abolished capital punishment. Nanda, supra, at 523 n.4. None-
theless, because strong evidence of western nations' abolition of the death penalty is ex-
cluded from the calculus by the majority, objective evidence of evolving standards against
the death penalty is not factored in and the skewing persists.
455. See, e.g., supra notes 72, 97-99, 123-124 and accompanying text.
EVOLVING STANDARD OF DECENCY
but is a crabbed approach to an Qtherwise fluid clause, whose meaning
is derived from evolving standards.
Because of the foundations on which the Cruel and Unusual Pun-
ishment Clause rests, part of the fidelity to established principles
should include returned resort to evidence of other nations' sentenc-
ing practices. The Court has emphasized that "[t]he basic concept un-
derlying the Eighth Amendment is nothing less than the dignity of
man"1; 45 6 it has not stated that the protections must accord with the
dignity of Americans. The concepts of cruelty and decency are uni-
versal ones, not singularly American ones. These concepts are not
limited by boundaries but are ascertained by reliance on the evolving
standards that mark the progress of a maturing society. It would seem
to mock the clause, or at the very least render it meaningless, to inter-
pret it in a way that would allow for barbarous but common punish-
ments within this country, while those punishments were abolished for
their cruelty all over the world. Therefore, to remain faithful to the
clause that was meant to safeguard the dignity of humankind and
faithful to traditional doctrine, the Court should once more consider
international opinion of the death penalty in its evolving standards
assessment.
B. Conclusion
The Court must employ various tests to ascertain whether a death
penalty comports with the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause of
the Eighth Amendment. First, in its consideration of the evolving
standards of decency, the Court must not only consider all states' posi-
tions on the death penalty but must also consider evidence of other
countries' standards regarding the death penalty. The Court must also
rely again on those tests that permitted the Justices to say what the
law is in regard to the cruel, unusual, or excessive457 nature of capital
punishment: whether the punishment is proportional to the crime and
blameworthiness of the offender and whether the punishment furthers
goals that the Court has said can justify capital punishment in some
456. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100 (1958) (emphasis added); see also Thompson v.
Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815,836 (1988) (plurality opinion); Sumner v. Shuman, 483 U.S. 66,85
(1987); Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 409 (1986); Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104,
112 (1982); Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978) (plurality opinion); Gregg v. Georgia,
428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976) (plurality opinion); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304
(1976) (plurality opinion).
457. For an argument that due process requires excessiveness review in the death pen-
alty context, see Note, Excessiveness Review for Capital Defendants After Honda Motor
Co. v. Oberg, 108 HARv. L. REv. 1305 (1995).
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circumstances.458  Otherwise, if the evolving standards test is the sole
standard for constitutionality, there will exist no real constraint on the
death penalty under the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause459 and
the clause itself will degenerate into a tool to validate the whims of the
masses. It could even be argued that the clause would be entirely
written out of the Constitution.460 Even from an originalist's perspec-
tive, surely the framers could not have intended the clause to generate
a standard for cruelty and unusualness that could itself place its impri-
matur on cruelty, as can the evolving standards test, but rather sought
to protect us from ourselves and our baser instincts.461 Employment
of additional tests will ensure the continuing vitality of the Eighth
Amendment and maintain its function as a bulwark against the venge-
ful and otherwise unrestrained impulses of the majority.
458. For a thoughtful discussion of the propriety of and jurisprudential bases for em-
ploying these additional checks, see Radin, Jurisprudence of Death, supra note 26, at 1030-
62. Professor Radin more recently stated that she "would [now] be more inclined to stress
the philosophical incompleteness of both [utilitarian, or deterrent, and Kantian, or retribu-
tivist,] modes of reasoning." Margaret J. Radin, Proportionality, Subjectivity, and Tragedy,
18 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 1165, 1170 n.7 (1985).
459. Cf. Goldberg & Dershowitz, supra note 26, at 1782 ("If the [E]ighth [A]mendment
is to retain independent moral force, these tests [of historical usage, legislative enactments,
and public opinion] are not and cannot be the final arbiters of constitutionality."); Stephen
P. Garvey, Note, Politicizing Who Dies, 101 YALE L.J. 187,205 (1991) ("To delegate [con-
stitutional] norm selection to state legislatures ... will inevitably jeopardize the Eighth
Amendment's ability to act as a meaningful check on the majority's impulse, born of fear
and frustration, to execute.").
460. See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 383-84 (1972) (Burger, C.J., dissenting); Ar-
thur J. Goldberg, Memorandum to the Conference Re: Capital Punishment October Term,
1963, 27 S. TEx. L. REv. 493, 500-01 (1986) ("If only punishments already overwhelmingly
condemned by public opinion came within the cruel and unusual punishment proscription,
the Eighth Amendment would be a dead letter.. . ."); Goldberg & Dershowitz, supra note
26, at 1782 ("Were wide acceptance-measured by statutory authorization or public opin-
ion polls-enough to authorize a punishment, the clause would indeed be 'drained of any
independent integrity as a governing normative principle."'); Radin, Jurisprudence of
Death, supra note 26, at 1035-36 ("The trouble with [relying only on objective indicators] is
that it reads the clause out of the Constitution," in part because "the majority of the public
favors few of the protections embodied in the Bill of Rights.").
461. See, e.g., Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 345 (1972) (Marshall, J., concurring)
("the Eighth Amendment is our insulation from our baser selves."); Goldberg, supra note
451, at 501 ("The Eighth Amendment, like the others in the Bill of Rights, was intended as
a countermajoritarian limitation on governmental action ... ."); Ledewitz, supra note 355,
at 143 ("[D]efending us from ourselves ... is obviously part of the reason a society has
judicial review in the first place."). But see Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 313
(1976) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (implying that the Cour*t was seeking to "save the people
from themselves," rather than relying on the Eighth Amendment and trying to "ascertain
the content of any 'evolving standard of decency"' through which the Amendment limited
punishments).
